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Abstract
My thesis addresses the question of International Tax Arbitrage (“ITA”). The discussion is 
comparative in nature, covering the United States and the United Kingdom. The study builds 
a foundation to discuss cross-border transactions where the laws of more than one 
jurisdiction apply to the transaction in question. Weighing the intervention of national 
revenue authorities in these transactions requires us to look also at the different background 
and policy objectives of each country, including the varying tax incentives that exist in each 
jurisdiction and the attitude of each country towards cross-border transactions.
ITA is a situation whereby a given taxpayer structures her affairs in a way that allows her to 
follow and comply with the tax laws of two or more jurisdictions while receiving a tax 
advantage without any net investment as a result of inherent inconsistencies between the tax 
laws of the different jurisdictions, thus reducing her overall world tax rate.
I focus on the question whether taxpayers should be allowed to exploit inherent differences 
between the tax rules of different jurisdictions. I discuss this question both at the practical 
level and at the policy level.
To properly answer this important question, we need first to determine what are the relevant 
policy considerations that should be taken into account. In this analysis, attention has to be 
given also to considerations that are not always included in the analysis, like foreign policy 
and political considerations, including in the UK, the impact of EC law on tax policy.
Once the considerations have been identified, it is necessary to apply them to the situation at 
hand. In the thesis, I explore the different considerations both independently and in relation 
to specific case studies and develop an approach to analyze the appropriateness of ITA in 
given situations.
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Chapter 1 - The Dilemma in its Legal Context
The Hypothesis
The hypothesis I shall use for this chapter and for the thesis in general is a two-fold 
hypothesis that was presented by Rosenbloom as follows:1
“International tax arbitrage is the natural response o f taxpayers to the normal differences 
that occur between any two tax systems. As such, it does not represent a problem, or at least 
no adequate explanation for why it is a problem has yet been given, other than invoking an 
“international tax system ” that does not exist. Moreover, even i f  international tax arbitrage 
were a problem, in the current and any reasonably likely future o f the world, no solution is 
likely to be available. Therefore, tax policymakers should not bother to try to combat 
international tax arbitrage, and should repeal those provisions (such as the dual 
consolidated loss rules) that are inspired by the desire to prevent it.”2
The starting point is that there are differences between the different tax systems, differences 
that are to a large extent, the result of the different background, policies and development of 
each of these tax systems. For many years these systems evolved separately without any 
connection between one and the other. To a large extent these systems are based on different 
sets of principles and policies. Even when some of these principles and concepts may share 
the same name, often their applications may nevertheless be completely different in each 
jurisdiction. In addition, since different tax systems are to a large extent based upon and 
interpreted by different sets of legal and interpretation rules, different attitudes are adopted in 
different countries with respect to questions of tax avoidance, tax mitigation and statutory 
interpretation. As a result, similar transactions may be treated completely differently by 
different jurisdictions.3
The rapid changes in the world’s economy challenge many of the existing concepts of 
taxation in general and of international taxation in particular. As a result of the growth in 
international trade and commerce, the deregulation of many of the existing local markets and 
the globalization of the financial markets, trade and commerce become global issues 
regardless of whether the different tax systems are able to deal with such development.4
1 As summarized by Avi-Yonah (1999-2000) who commented on Rosenbloom’s article (1999-2000) on the issue.
2 Avi-Yonah (1999-2000).
3 1 explain this point further in the case studies below.
4 Roxan (2003b).
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The outcome of such development is an ever-increasing interaction between different tax 
systems in ways that were not perceived until now. The existing concepts or policies are no 
longer able to deal successfully with many of the issues that resulted from such development. 
Some of the problems are new problems but most of them are merely a development of 
existing problems.
The result can be either single, double, triple or no taxation of the same income. This 
outcome can be achieved either intentionally, in cases where the taxpayer is planning her 
affairs in a way that will ensure non-taxation of the income, or unintentionally, in cases 
where the tax outcome is just the normal consequence of the business transaction or activity 
that took place. ITA, for that purpose, is one of several possible outcomes. Its uniqueness is 
in the fact that the benefit is obtained from the difference between the tax systems.
In this work, I intend to examine the features of ITA and it appropriateness as a “side effect” 
of the unfinished process of globalization which we are in the midst of.
Working assumptions
For the purpose of the discussion I shall make certain assumptions to narrow the scope of the 
discussion to the more interesting elements of ITA. First, while it is possible that ITA will 
result in double and even triple taxation that in certain cases may not be relieved through the 
use of the existing tax relief mechanisms, the discussion below is focused on the other side of 
the coin. That is, ITA that results in double non-taxation or in some other tax advantage, as 
opposed to a tax disadvantage.
Second, while certain ITA situations are the result of inadvertent or unintentional operations, 
the ITA that I shall focus on in this thesis is ITA that is obtained intentionally (or if to be 
more blunt -  deliberately) by the taxpayers in order to achieve the desired tax advantage. 
This, however, does not mean that the taxpayer has no other business reason in structuring 
the transaction.
The Case studies
The aim of this paper is not only to look at the immediate question of ITA but also to 
examine existing policy considerations through the use of ITA. To make the discussion more 
focused I chose to use two case studies that illustrate the dilemma of ITA and to relate the 
discussion to two jurisdictions, the US and the UK. In addition to the general discussion of
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the case studies in the context of both jurisdictions, in each jurisdiction I examine an 
additional issue through the lens of ITA: the use of political considerations as part of the tax 
policy discussion in the US and the relations between EU and the UK.
Case Study 1 -  Hybrid Financial Instruments (HFIs)
Company X, a resident of country X wishes to expand its operations into country Y. for that 
purpose, it incorporates a wholly owned subsidiary, company Y. To finance the subsidiary’s 
operations, company X transfers $500,000 to company Y in exchange for HFIs that are 
issued by company Y. Due to differences in the taxation of HFIs in country X and in country 
Y, the HFIs issued by company Y are classified as debt for country Y tax purposes and as 
equity for country X tax purposes. As a result, payments made on the HFIs are treated as 
dividend in country X and as interest in country Y enabling company Y to claim interest 
deductions with respect to these payments. At the same time, these payments are not subject 
to tax at the hands of company X.
Case Study 2 -  Double-dip Cross-border Leasing
Airplane Inc. an airplane manufacturer resident in country X enters into a lease with 
EasyAir, a country Y airline company for the lease of an airplane. Due to differences in the 
tax laws of both countries, both Airplane and EasyAir both are regarded as the owner of the 
leased airplane for tax purposes and each is entitled to receive depreciation deductions.
The Analysis
In this thesis I wish to explore the dilemma of ITA through an analysis of two case studies, 
HFIs and cross-border leasing. The starting point for my discussion is to explore the different 
arguments and considerations that are used or should be used in the process of evaluating 
whether ITA represent a problem that warrants intervention.
This discussion begins with examining ITA vis-a-vis statutory interpretation. This is 
followed by an analysis of international law with the purpose of determining to what extent it 
can be argued that there is a principle of international law that requires tax to be imposed 
once (the single tax principle). To the extent this argument is valid, then the single tax 
principle is a valid justification for intervention in ITA situations. Otherwise, whether or not 
to intervene is still a question that is subject to the full discretion of each country applying its 
tax legislation to further its tax policy goals.
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At this time I move to discuss the more traditional considerations used in the limited ITA 
discussion. These are efficiency, neutrality, equity and competitiveness. The aim is not only 
to explore their application to ITA but also to define them and their scope in light of recent 
literature. This is especially with respect to neutrality and efficiency as they both are 
reflected in Graetz recent critique5 and the consideration of competitiveness that is often 
used but seldom explained.
This is followed by an analysis of other considerations that are mentioned in the context of 
ITA. These considerations include harmful tax competition and its possible resemblance 
with ITA, revenue loss and the argument that ITA is an unintended result and thus countries 
should be more willing to cooperate in objecting to ITA than in other areas.
In the next chapter I move to discuss those considerations that are not always referred to in 
policy discussion but I believe them to represent an important part of the discussion. I refer 
to them as the practical considerations and they include foreign policy, political 
considerations and implementation.
Following the chapters in which I discuss and explore the possible considerations at a more 
general level, I move to discuss the case studies where the different considerations are to 
apply to deal with two specific situations, ITA in HFIs and in cross-border leasing.
First, I present the legal context of each system and my focus in the analysis. In the UK, the 
focus is not on the UK tax policy per se but rather on the impact EC law has on this policy. 
As I argue below, I believe that the interaction between existing EC law limitations in direct 
tax matter on one hand and ITA on the other hand lead to some interesting questions which I 
intend to explore.
While in the UK context I focus on the interaction with EC law, in examining the US I focus 
on the political considerations that are at the center of the debate. By reviewing the 
development of tax policy especially from the time of the important compromise of 1962,1 
explore the limitations of such compromise and the current state in which the US is at and its 
relevance to the question of ITA.
At this time I move to discuss the case studies, starting with HFIs which I believe to be the 
more general case study and then the more specific case of cross-border leasing. In each case
5 Graetz (2001).
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study I carefully examine the general methods that exist for the taxation of HFIs and cross- 
border leasing, respectively, moving to explore the method in which each system is 
approaching these issues and finishing by an analysis of cross-border limitations imposed in 
each system and their possible application to ITA, either as limitations on its existence or as 
an indication as to whether or not it should exist based on the country’s overall tax policy.
In doing so, I intend to establish a few points. First, the distinction that gives rise to ITA is 
not between an economic substance approach and a legal form approach but rather a more 
delicate distinction with more limitations on the availability of ITA than originally believed.
Second, 1 intend to argue that each system develops as an independent system reacting 
mainly to domestic tax planning and developing to a large extent without regard to their 
international tax implications. As a result, attempts to create more coherent distinction 
domestically may lead to the creation of new ITA opportunities at the cross-border level.
Third, examination of the cross-border provisions in general may prove as an effective tool 
in discussion of ITA.
In the next chapter I return to the policy level. After summarizing the limited writing on ITA 
together with introducing some of my conclusions from the analysis thus far, I move to apply 
the different considerations discussed earlier in the thesis to possible situations that exist in 
the two chosen case studies, thus exploring different considerations with respect to specific 
situations.
The final chapter concludes.
11
Appropriateness and the coherence of the system
This argument stems from Rosenbloom’s criticism that basically poses a rather naive 
question of what can be wrong if the taxpayer is complying with the laws of the two systems 
involved.6
Basically, according to the above-mentioned definition of ITA, in each jurisdiction the 
taxpayer satisfies all the tax laws requirements in that jurisdiction and as such should be 
entitled to receive the associated tax attributes. The taxpayer is consistent in her presentation 
of the facts in both jurisdictions and the mere advantage received is the result of the inherent 
differences between the tax systems, differences that do not and should not render void or 
alter the treatment received in each jurisdiction.
It is, however, important to understand what is meant by this requirement in order to fully 
appreciate the definition and dilemma of ITA. Prima facie, it is clear that at least as far as the 
statutes are concerned, the taxpayer satisfies the requirements necessary to obtain his desired 
tax treatment in each jurisdiction. For example, in the case of a HFI (that is further discussed 
below in chapter 6) the taxpayer satisfies the legal requirements necessary to allow for an 
interest deduction. The questions that should be asked at this stage are: (1) is there an 
inherent requirement in the statute that would disallow the interest deduction even if all the 
formal requirements were met?
(2) should the court, in analyzing the statutory meaning, look into the tax treatment of the 
instrument in the other jurisdiction?
To a large extent, this is a question of statutory interpretation that may vary from one country 
to another. If the country in question follows a tradition of purposive interpretation, then the 
purpose of the statutory provision might lead to the existence of an implied reliance on the 
treatment in the other country. Conversely, a textual approach to statutory interpretation can 
lead to the opposite conclusion by limiting the inquiry to the conditions specifically provided 
for in the statutory instrument.7
Cases of tax avoidance depend on the approach to statutory interpretation.8 As Likhovski 
rightly notes in his historical analysis of anti-avoidance decisions in both the US and the UK,
6 Rosenbloom (1999-2000).
7 West (1996).
8 Likhovski (2004). For example: Gregory v. Helvering 293 US 465 (1935) and MacNiven v. Westmoreland 
Investments Ltd. [2003] 1 AC 311 (HL).
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there are more than mere legal reasons that lead judges to arrive at a certain decision. Thus, 
in addition to possible legal differences that may exist between one system to another, it is 
also necessary to take into account other non-legal factors as this might have an impact of 
the way statutes are interpreted in different jurisdictions and thus on the availability or 
unavailability of ITA.9
Once the appropriate approach to statutory interpretation is selected, it is necessary to 
examine the focus of the analysis. In ITA, the benefit is only visible if the entire transaction 
is looked at from all the relevant jurisdictions’ perspectives, and not only from the 
perspective of one taxpayer in isolation. The role of foreign tax law is an active role in the 
formulation of the benefit.
In contrast, in most cases of tax avoidance, foreign tax law does not have an active role in 
determining the benefits derived from the transaction. In addition, the foreign participants 
are usually involved because they are indifferent with respect to the outcome of the 
transaction and in some cases they are replaced by other taxpayers who are in an indifferent 
position (for example, tax-exempt entities, loss corporations etc.). For this reason, the courts, 
in examining cases of tax avoidance, generally focus on the application of the law in one 
country, not taking into account the treatment in the other country.10
In addition, most tax avoidance cases usually involve some type of artificiality11 that allows 
the taxpayer to gain the extra benefit. In ITA, the artificiality is not necessary because the 
benefit is achieved through the inconsistency in the treatment in the two tax jurisdictions.
9 Among the non-legal reasons mentioned by Lihovski are: cultural reasons surrounding the morality o f tax 
avoidance and political context that exists at the time o f the decision. In addition, mention is made to the 
background o f the judges, their education and practical experience etc. see generally, Likhovski (2004) at 24
10 For example, see the decisions in Compaq Computer Corp. and Subsidiaries v. C.I.R. 277 F.3d 778 (CA 5th Cir 
(2001)). and IES Industries, Inc. v. US 349 F.3d 574 (CA 8th Cir.(2003)) (where the real issue was whether the 
taxpayer is entitled to enjoy the benefit o f the foreign tax credit. The tax treatment under foreign law was 
irrelevant. The only relevant part was that it resulted in foreign tax credit that the taxpayer sought to claim. A 
better approach to the issue dealt with in these cases would be from an ownership perspective, asking whether the 
US taxpayer actually own the ADRs to be able to claim the benefits o f the foreign tax credit (see generally, 
Kingson (2001)). Similarly, in Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (Tax Ct. 1972), the focus was 
on whether the foreign taxpayer “received” the income in the way required under US domestic law and the 
applicable treaty. Whether the foreign taxpayer was taxed was irrelevant for this purpose. This approach is also 
consistent with TAM 9748005 where the IRS supported a characterization o f a transaction as a lease even though 
the other taxpayer (the lessee) claimed and received an inconsistent characterization under his own laws. The 
treatment under foreign law was determined to be irrelevant. In the UK, the general approach in statutory 
interpretation appears to be similar and to focus only on the tax treatment o f the resident taxpayer. For example, 
McGuckian v. IRC (1997) 3 All E.R. 817, Barclays Mercantile Business Finance (BMBF) v. Mawson [2003] 
EWCA CIV 1560 (8) and in BMBF (No. 24) Ltdv. IRC [2002] STC 1450.
11 In this work I use the term artificiality as being similar to the requirement o f business purpose. Artificiality 
exists where an act has no independent rationale apart for the tax reduction rationale. For example, the use o f an 
intermediary for no reason but for a tax reason. For a discussion o f the business purpose -  see generally, 
McMahon (2002).
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Example
A good example to illustrate the difference is a comparison between double-dip leasing and a 
sale-leaseback transaction. Under a double-dip leasing, as described above as case study 2, 
the benefit, which is essentially a timing benefit, is achieved through the interaction between 
the two tax systems which results in both the lessor and the lessee being regarded as the 
owners of the leased equipment entitled to receive depreciation deductions. Whereas under a 
regular single-dip lease, there are two sets of deductions one depreciation deductions at an 
accelerated pace and another rental deductions at a regular pace, a double-dip lease provides 
instead for two accelerated depreciation deductions (and no rental deductions). There is no 
added artificiality in the transaction because the transaction is identical in its structure to a 
regular single-dip leasing transaction.12
In a sale-leaseback, an asset that is owned by taxpayer A is sold to taxpayer B who then 
leases it back to taxpayer A. From an economic perspective and from a practical perspective, 
the transaction has not changed anything. The asset never left taxpayer B’s possession who 
continues to use it as before. The only difference is legal with tax implication. That is, the 
ownership passed to taxpayer B. In fact, the transaction is very much like a loan from 
taxpayer B to taxpayer A, the sale price is regarded as the loan and the rental payments as the 
repayments on the loan. However, unlike a regular loan, here an additional advantage exists 
in the form of the depreciation deductions that taxpayer B may claim with respect to the 
property, deductions that are generated as a result of a purely financial transaction.
The transaction represents an artificial creation of depreciation deductions with respect to a 
property that is already depreciated in full or in part usually by the same tax system. The 
depreciation deductions are essential for the transaction to be commercially viable and are 
the product of the artificial sale-leaseback.13
To summarize, the questions to ask in applying tax law to determine whether the tax 
treatment is the appropriate treatment is the following: in applying the relevant approach to 
the situation is there an implied or an express intention by the legislator that the benefits 
received in the jurisdiction are contingent upon the tax treatment in the other jurisdiction? In 
the absence of such intention, the focus of the analysis should be on the taxation in the
12 Arguably, the basic concept o f a lease is an artificial concept that allows one taxpayer to transfer tax attributes 
to another taxpayer. However, unlike the artificiality element in a tax avoidance scheme, in a lease the artificiality 
is accepted and encouraged by the tax system.
13 Recently, the Inland Revenue commented on the artificiality element o f sale-leaseback transactions in REV BN 
29, 17 March 2004.
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country whose laws are being analyzed, no more no less.14 While the adoption of purposive 
interpretation might prove to be wider and allow intervention also in situations where the 
plain text does not provide reliance on the treatment under foreign law, it is still necessary to 
establish the existence of an intention to be able to rely on the treatment under foreign tax 
law. As West notes, such reliance usually does not exist.15
14 See generally, West (1996).
15 West (1996) and see further discussion below (for example, pp. 196-197).
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International Law
The starting point for the entire discussion is the legal framework in which tax law exists. As 
countries operate within a framework of international rules and principles, it is necessary to 
examine not only the single country legislation but also the potential effect, if any, 
international law might have on the tax treatment of a taxpayer/transaction. This is especially 
true when the transaction in question is of an international nature, in which case, it is more 
likely to give rise to international law issues.
At the international level, international tax law is very much a part of international law. In 
international tax like in international law, the relevant countries have to establish their 
jurisdiction before they can impose taxation on the income. Once jurisdiction has been 
established, countries usually exercise their sovereignty to determine how and to what extent 
the income that is subject to that jurisdiction should be taxed. This exercise of sovereignty is 
usually limited by the acceptance by a country of international law principles.
“Sovereignty refers to the bundle o f rights and competences which go to make up the Nation 
State. Jurisdiction refers to particular rights from that bundle, namely a State's right o f 
regulation. States do not have absolute and unfettered rights o f sovereignty and jurisdiction. 
The nature and extent o f a State's sovereign rights are determined by:
its own internal constitutional arrangements -  the internal dimension o f Sovereignty; and 
most importantly fo r  the purposes o f this study, by the interaction o f  international law (in 
particular custom, treaties and supra-national entities such as the EC) with national law -  
the external dimension o f sovereignty. ”16
The two main limitations that exist are treaties and customary international law (CIL).17
Treaties represent an important limitation on the countries’ ability to exercise their 
jurisdiction, a limitation countries take upon themselves voluntarily either through bilateral 
treaties or multilateral treaties. This type of limitation is restricted, however, to the 
limitations imposed by the treaty and applies only to the extent that the relevant country is a 
party to the treaty and only with respect to taxes covered by the treaty in question. Such 
limitation might also be conditioned on the existence of certain requirements that the
16 Jeffery (1999) at 170.
17 Shaw (2001) chapter 3. The interaction with EC law in the context o f the UK is discussed separately below (pp. 
81-95, 242-245).
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taxpayer would have to satisfy in order to benefit from the treaty. In the tax area, most of the 
treaties are bilateral by nature and to a large extent they follow one of two leading models, 
the OECD model tax convention and the UN model tax convention. A treaty, however, does 
not have to be a tax treaty to limit the exercise of sovereignty in tax matters. A good example 
for that is the EC Treaty.
The second important source of international law is CIL. Unlike treaties it can be more 
uncertain in its existence and scope and applies with respect to all countries except to those 
that expressly protested against its adoption in the first place.18
Avi-Yonah argues that to the extent CIL exists in the international tax context (and he 
believes that it does), it is possible to argue that there is an international tax regime and to 
that extent, there is a legitimate objection to ITA.19
Looking at the definition of CIL, two cumulative requirements emerge. First, the rule has to 
be subject to a general and consistent practice of the states. Second, such practice has to be 
followed by the states due to a belief of a legal duty or an obligation (Opinio Juris)?0
The first requirement deals with the existence of state practice. The exact definition of what 
constitutes state practice appears to be inconclusive. Thus, there is some disagreement 
regarding the exact scope of what constitutes evidence of state practice and whether only 
positive acts of a state qualify as state practice or also other statements in abstracto.21 
Similarly, there is no consensus of the amount of acts, the length of time, number of 
countries taking part in the practice, and number of repetitions that are necessary to establish 
state practice. For example, on one hand, the International Court of Justice held that a 
practice that lasted for more than 125 years gave rise to CIL and on the other hand, the 
establishment of CIL in outer space was very quick.22
A better approach appears to be one, which is dependant on the specific facts and 
circumstances of the relevant custom that is sought to be established and the length of time, 
number of countries involved, number of repetitions and other elements establishing the
18 CIL has a universal application and would apply to all countries regardless o f  their involvement in the process 
o f establishing the specific CIL. This would apply also to countries who object to the rule after its acceptance but 
not to those who objected to it from the very beginning. See generally, Akehurst( 1974-5).
19 Avi-Yonah (2004).
20 See generally, Akehurst (1974-5), D ’Amato (1971), Brownlie (2003) at 6-12 and Statute o f the International 
Court o f Justice, Art. 38.1(b).
21 Compare, for example, Akehurst (1974-5) at 1-11 with D ’Amato (1971) at 88.
22 Shaw (2001) Chapter 3.
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existence of state practice would tend to vary depending on the situation in question.23 For 
example, it is generally more difficult to create a rule of CIL which departs from existing 
CIL as opposed to one which operates in vacuum and stronger evidence would be required to 
establish the rule in the former situation24
In addition, in general, the practice has to be consistent and the existence of inconsistency 
both in state practice and among the different countries involved can require other elements 
to be more persuasive for the rule to qualify as a CIL.25 Akehusrt suggests that the way to 
approach inconsistencies and conflicting interests that cannot be resolved based on time 
difference (earlier and later practice) or some other relatively objective criteria is by looking 
at it in relative terms, similar to the approach with respect to acquisition of title in 
international law. That is, the one who has a better claim prevails26
Even if the first requirement is met, it is necessary to establish that the countries following 
this practice do so out of a sense of a legal obligation. For that purpose, it is necessary to not 
only to establish that there is a legal obligation to follow the practice but also that the states 
following it do so knowing that such obligation exists.27
This requirement suffers from an internal difficulty in the creation of new CIL as it requires 
countries to act under the belief that they act because they are obligated to do so although the 
obligation itself (the new rule of CIL) is still not formed and therefore there is no obligation 
at the time the act is performed.28 Nonetheless, the majority view appears to be that opinio 
juris is required in the establishment of a rule of CIL and for distinguishing CIL from 
general state practice.
Otherwise, many principles that exist in general state practice might be wrongly classified as 
CIL with all the important consequences such classification has, including the binding effect 
CIL has on countries that did not object to the rule becoming CIL who are later bound by its 
application.29
23 See generally, Akehurst (1974-5) at 15-16 (time), 16-18 (number o f states), and 18-19 (different presumption 
that exist).
24 Ibid.
25 Akehurst (1974-5) at 20-31 dealing with the different aspects o f consistency o f  practice. In addition, the 
consistency o f practice (or lack thereof) can have an impact on the strength o f the rule once it becomes CIL.
26 Akehurst (1974-5).
27 Akerurst (1974-5).
28 This difficulty led to different interpretations and some suggestions with respect to this requirement o f opinio 
juris. See generally, Akehurst (1974-5) at 32-34). See also the Statute o f the International Court o f Justice Art.
38.1(b) that requires “international custom, as evidence o f  a general practice accepted as law. ” (Emphasis 
added).
29 However, those countries that object from the beginning before the rule became part o f CIL are allowed to 
disregard it. See generally the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (ICJ Reports, 1951, at 116; 18 ILR, at 86).
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Even if CIL exists in the tax context as Avi-Yonah argues, it is still necessary to establish the 
content of that CIL and what exactly it means. For Avi-Yonah, it appears to include what he 
refers to as the Single Tax Principle, the requirement that income should be taxed once, no 
more no less. If it does, then arguably, there is a legitimate justification to object to the 
existence of ITA. Thus, I shall limit the discussion in the following paragraphs only to the 
issue at stake.
Most of existing CIL in international tax are in the context of tax treaties. For example, the 
basic rules determining tax treaty interpretation originates from the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which is applicable also to the interpretation of tax treaties and is 
regarded as a codification of customary law thus applicable not only to those who are party 
to the treaty.30
In the context of Avi-Yonah’s argument, arguing for the existence of a single tax principle to 
exist at the international level, there has to be either a positive limitation in existing treaties 
or a rule of CIL that would apply even in the absence of a positive requirement in the treaties 
or even if the taxpayer does not apply to a treaty.
To establish such a rule of CIL, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following 
conditions: first, the single tax principle should exist in state practice of different countries 
and this state practice has to be consistent and repetitive enough to qualify as state practice 
for CIL purposes. If we follow Akehurst wide definition of state practice, such state practice 
can be evidenced also through treaties to which the country is party and statements made in 
that context by state officials. It is, however, important to establish a consistent approach. 
Second, in applying this state practice, it is necessary to establish that the state practice was 
carried out under the knowledge by the state that it is obligated to do so. Otherwise, the 
necessary opinio juris would not be met.
Let us briefly analyze each of these requirements. First, the requirement of state practice that 
would appear to follow the single tax principle does not appear to exist in the meaning 
required by CIL. Prima facie, countries that tax on a worldwide basis while granting a 
foreign tax credit, as a relief from double taxation would appear to follow this principle. 
However, it is still necessary to establish that the reason for such conduct is based on the 
single tax principle and not just a rule of convenience or indifference and that this rule is
30 See generally, Sinclair et al. (1986).
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applied consistently and repeatedly throughout a certain period. Such evidence can come, for 
example, from official statements relating the application of tax treaties to which the country 
is a party. In addition, it is not sufficient to establish this principle with respect to one 
country but to a large number of countries, mainly due to the generality of the principle and 
its central role, if accepted as CIL, in taxation of cross-border income in general and in tax 
treaty interpretation in particular.
Even if we look at the narrow area of tax treaties, it appears that there is no consensus among 
countries with respect to the existence of the single tax principle. This can be ascertained 
from a recent comparative study of the issue of double non-taxation in the application of tax 
treaties.
Double taxation, for example, has been thoroughly discussed in international tax law. From 
existing tax treaties, country practice, and international model conventions, it is quite clear 
that the prevention of double taxation can probably be regarded as the above-mentioned state 
practice requirement. Indeed, this principle is also reflected, in one way or another, in 
domestic legislation of most jurisdictions.
The same cannot be said of the prevention of ITA or of double non-taxation. The above- 
mentioned examination of the state of international law and practice in the context of double 
non-taxation establishes that unlike the prevention of double taxation, this principle does not 
exist in tax treaties on a regular basis and can hardly be said to be part of existing customary 
law.31 Only in 1999, the OECD has introduced the prevention of double non-taxation and for 
the first time attempted to add to the Commentaries the principle that tax treaties are also 
applied for the purpose of the prevention of double non-taxation.32
Current practice and application of tax treaties lead to conflicting positions. On one hand, it 
is established both in practice and academic writing, as well as in case law, that application 
of a tax treaty may lead to double non-taxation of a transaction/taxpayer due to an 
inconsistent treatment of the transaction/taxpayer under the laws of the two countries 
involved.33 This view is in line with existing practice of the treatment of foreign income for 
domestic tax purposes, at least in the two jurisdictions examined in this work. In both 
situations, foreign law (and not tax law) is used to establish the legal character of the
31 Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 64, 95 D.T.C. 5389, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 485, [1995]
2 S.C.R. 802 and Hausmann Estate v. The Queen, [1998] 4 C.T.C. 2232 (both decisions support the view that the 
prevention o f  double non-taxation is not part o f the object and purpose o f tax treaties).
”  OECD (1999). Cf. Lang (2000).
33 See generally, Lang (2004); Avery Jones et al (1996) and Avery Jones et al (1999); Memec p ic  v. IRC [1998] 
STC 754.
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transaction, a result that is applied to domestic tax law principles for the determination of the 
tax treatment in the countiy.34
On the other hand, some countries have adopted over the years, as part of their double tax 
treaties policy, measures that are meant to prevent double non-taxation and in recent years 
the OECD made certain changes to the existing model treaty. These measures and changes, 
however, are aimed mostly at preventing double non-taxation as a result of mismatch in the 
tax jurisdiction of the two countries involved, a mismatch that results from the application of 
the treaty. Such measures are not aimed at, or attempt to prevent ITA, although it might be 
argued that they are a step in establishing the single tax principle as a basic principle of 
international tax law.
A better view of these measures is to regard them, to the extent they are incorporated into the 
treaty, as constituting a specific rule to deal with specific situations and not a general 
practice to serve as an underlying principle. It is possible, however, that with the 
development of a consistent policy both the OECD and UN model tax conventions and 
specific countries, things might change.
Even if it were possible to establish a general state practice exists, it is still necessary to 
establish that the different countries follow this policy with the knowledge that they are 
legally obligated to do so. That is, to establish the existence of opinio juris. Otherwise, the 
state practice would probably not be regarded as forming CIL.
Although the existence of many different bilateral treaties following the same manner can 
theoretically lead to the creation of CIL, caution is warranted in this respect.35 Thus, it should 
be noted that even the prevention of double taxation, which is at the center of tax treaties and 
represents the underlying principle for entering into tax treaties probably does not exist 
independently of a treaty and thus does not form part of CIL. If this is the analysis with 
respect to the prevention of double taxation, then it should follow that the prevention of 
double non-taxation, whose existence as a general principle in the context of tax treaties is 
still debatable, is even further from qualifying as a principle of CIL.
At present, subject to certain limitations of international law, taxation is to a large extent, a 
domestic issue, determined at the domestic level and based on domestic considerations.
34 In the UK, see generally Rae v. Lazard Investment (1963) 4 TC 1, Baker v. Archer-Shee [1927] AC 844 and 
Archer-Shee v. Garland [1931] AC 212. In the US, see generally the discussion in West (1996).
35 Brownlie (2003), ibid.
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Countries are generally unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty, even though such act might 
lead them to be better off. As it is further discussed below,36 even in the limited context of 
the EU, member states (MS) are reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty in tax matters.
36 See pp. 81-95 and 242-245 below.
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Chapter 2 -  The Traditional Arguments
The Efficiency Debate
In the previous chapter I discussed ITA in its legal context and established that at present, 
subject to certain limitations of international law, taxation is to a large extent, a domestic 
issue, determined at the domestic level and based on domestic considerations. In the next 
few chapters, I examine and analyze the different considerations that counfries use in 
determining their international tax policy, with particular reference to ITA.
A few basic concepts
Our starting point in the tax policy discussion is efficiency. The question before us is 
whether and to what extent efficiency can be used as policy objection to ITA. Before dealing 
with this question, let us define some basic concepts that we shall use in the analysis.
Tax efficiency is based on the idea that available resources should be used in a way that 
would result in maximum welfare. A Pareto-optimum is achieved when a market has reached 
a situation whereby any further improvement in the position of some of the participants 
results in deterioration in the position of the other participants.37 In practice, this is modified 
by the requirement of no net gain in the market. That is, there is no further gain without an 
offsetting loss. For that purpose, a net gain change is defined as a situation whereby if we 
examine the changes of all the participants in the market, the amount of gain allocated to 
some taxpayers exceeds the amount of loss suffered by others. In other words, this 
deterioration cannot be compensated by the improvement in position of the former group of 
participants.38
The two fundamental theorems of welfare economics are that every competitive economy is 
Pareto efficient and that every Pareto efficient resources allocation can be achieved through a 
competitive market mechanism.39 Pareto-optimum does not tell us anything on the other 
values of the resource allocation apart from efficiency and that there can be no further gain 
without a corresponding loss.
37 James and Nobes (2000) at 22.
38 Ibid. “No net gain” is probably a simplistic way o f defining the situation, mainly because in many cases, it is 
unclear how to compensate the losing party for its loss and thus it is hard to conclude whether overall there is a 
net gain or not.
39 Stiglitz (2000) at 60.
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Thus, having reached a Pareto-optimum does not necessarily mean that this state cannot 
replace it with another Pareto-optimum, which better addresses other policy goals, as for 
example, one, which adopts better redistribution mechanisms.40
Tanzi, discussing taxation in a global world, identified two patterns in investments and 
taxation. He found that direct investment is affected by the level of effective tax rate whereas 
portfolio investment is usually affected by the tax rates.41
According to Tanzi, in light of the globalization process and due to the existence o f  
competition, countries are likely to pay a higher price than in the past if they impose high 
marginal rates with respect to these types of income. Because the allocation of the world’s 
capital is likely to be influenced (if not driven) by tax considerations and not only the pre-tax 
return on investment, greater inefficiencies in the allocation of this capital may result. The 
immediate types of income at stake are the more mobile income such as highly skilled labor 
and financial capital. As a result, countries would be required to lower their tax rates with 
respect to certain types. Such process has an important effect on the design of the countries’ 
tax systems and may lead them to adopt tax structures that are regarded as less desirable and 
that they would not have adopted had their economy continued to act as a closed economy.42
In addition, unless they can find other sources to finance their public spending, countries will 
be required to lower their amount of spending. Thus, as it is further developed below,43 in the 
absence of cooperation, internal inefficiencies and lack of equity might increase with more 
tax being levied on the less mobile sources of income, even though it is not certain that such 
measures would assist in regaining the lost revenues.
40 As Roxan (2003b) notes, from the narrow perspective o f efficiency, a system that is at a pareto-optimum 
efficiency does not necessarily have to be fair or to accommodate any further goals. For example, in a market o f  
three participants A, B and C, a point of Pareto-optimum is achieved when A has income o f 100 while B and C 
have 0. Nonetheless, this market, although being efficient, is not fair. In order to satisfy other objectives, it would 
be necessary for to find another point o f pareto-optimum that would also satisfy the other goals while maintaining 
efficiency in the markets.
While one Pareto-optimum can be preferred to another and while arguably no efficiency loss should result if  we 
are to move directly from one optimum to another, this is not that simple in practice. In practice, moving from 
one optimum to another may involve departing the point o f Pareto-optimum which might lead to putting some 
participants (taxpayers) and also the entire market in a worse off position (at least temporarily). While overall, if  
we at the end o f  the process reach again to a Pareto-optimum, then as long as we do not exceed this point, the 
amount o f loss in the system should be compensated by the amount o f  gain in the system. However, two 
problems arise. First, the transfer may give rise to non-lump sum taxation due to the loss o f efficiency. Second, 
once the market regains it’s point o f Pareto-optimum, it is unclear how do we compensate those participants who 
are worse off as a result o f  the changes.
41 Tanzi (1995).
42 Tanzi (1995).
43 See pp. 32-34 and 54-58 below.
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In this process, ITA increases the potential inefficiency in the markets by encouraging 
certain tax driven transactions and financial investments that in the absence of ITA would 
either not be taken or would have been taken but at a higher cost for the taxpayers (and more 
revenues to the tax authorities).44
From a neutrality perspective, a tax system should try, to the extent possible, to remain 
neutral and to avoid any influence on taxpayers’ behavior and the exercise of their 
investment and saving choices. As it was defined by a leading UK policy textbook, “[A] 
neutral tax system is one which seeks to raise revenue in ways that avoid the discretionary 
substitution effects we have described; it is designed to minimize as fa r  as possible the 
impact o f the tax structure on the economic behaviour o f agents in the economy.”45
Given the fact that tax by its nature is a non-neutral intervention pursuing this goal is often 
easier said than done, especially when other principles and restraints (some of which are 
designed to be non-neutral and affect the taxpayers’ decisions to follow one way over the 
other) co-exist and affect the policy decision making process. However, a relatively neutral 
tax system does not require that tax will not affect the pre-tax situation at all but rather that 
the effect on the decision making process of the taxpayer will as minimal as possible.46
For example, if both equity and debt are taxed in the same way, the pre-tax situation is not 
similar to the post-tax situation because tax is imposed and the taxpayer is left with less post­
tax income when compared with his pre-tax income47 However, since the tax is imposed in 
the same way with respect to both types of investments, the tax does not affect the decision 
on the choice of investment
The neutrality principle is not an absolute principle. Sometimes, a country may decide to use 
the tax system to promote or encourage a certain activity. In such case, the country would 
violate the neutrality principle by creating legislation that is designed to intentionally affect 
the decision of the taxpayer with respect to certain activities or investments48
44 Edgar (2003).
45 Kay & King (1990) at 18. With neutrality there is an overall assumption that a minimal degree o f  intervention 
cannot be avoided (otherwise there could be no taxes, for example). The question is whether a second best 
situation (of minimal intervention) is better than, for example, another second best situation.
46 Arguably because if we take the alternative approach then the mere imposition o f taxes is a non-neutral act and 
so taxes and neutrality can never co-exist. In addition, there are many market imperfections that we live with as, 
for example, the need for some public goods.
47 Kay & King (1990), ibid.
48 For example, the decision to grant accelerated depreciation or generous writing off allowances to promote 
acquisition o f capital assets.
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Neutrality and efficiency do not always go hand in hand. For example, if we accept the 
position that the pre-tax system is inefficient, a market failure,49 (prior to the imposition of 
taxation) then a tax neutrality approach may not serve efficiency. In an inefficient system, 
supporters of efficiency may wish to use the tax system as a tool to adjust and encourage 
activities thereby removing the market failure, achieving a better allocation of resources and 
as a result a higher efficiency in the markets. In this way, the principle of tax neutrality 
would have to be set aside to allow promotion of competition and better allocation of 
resources among taxpayers.50
CEN (& CIN) and inter-nation neutrality
In the international dimension, tax neutrality is usually measured in the light of the 
benchmarks of capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN), both 
aimed at maximizing the worldwide economic efficiency.51 CEN is defined as taking place 
where a tax system is neutral with respect to the export of capital since investors face the 
same marginal effective tax rate on income from similar investments, whether they invest 
domestically or abroad.52 CIN, on the other hand, is defined as taking place when domestic 
and foreign suppliers of capital to any given national market obtain the same after-tax return 
on similar investments in that market (taking into account both the corporate and individual 
taxes paid in both the country of residence and the country of source).53
Both types of neutralities are thought to lead towards worldwide economic efficiency 
maximization. It is generally understood that in the absence of harmonization of the world’s 
tax rates, these two principles cannot co-exist in the same tax system54
In general, there is support for each of these concepts. Most economists, however, prefer 
CEN, which promotes neutrality with respect to investments, to CIN, which promotes
49 Market failure does not concern the participants’ willingness to gain a monopoly status in the market but rather 
the market’s (or the market’s forces) failure to prevent this by allowing one or more participants to gain the 
monopoly status.
50 For example, it can be argued that an efficient allocation o f resources requires the existence o f a certain degree 
o f competition in the market and that in the absence o f existing competition it may well be that the tax system 
should be used to facilitate such competition. This argument will be discussed further below. See also -  Dagan 
(2003).
51 There is also a third benchmark, National Neutrality (NN), which supports a maximization o f the national 
welfare (instead o f worldwide welfare). This benchmark is less supported and will be addressed below.
52 OECD (1991) at 18.
53 OCED (1991) at 18. See also Graetz (2001) at 1364. It should be noted, that there is also a third alternative, 
National Neutrality (NN). However, while this alternative promotes the overall national (as opposed to 
worldwide) efficiency, it is perceived by many commentators to be too short-sighted and thus failing to achieve 
its goal on the long-term.
54 Easson (1991) at 11.
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neutrality with respect to saving as the guiding principle.55 Even if all countries would decide 
to fully adopt one of these policies, there will only be partial neutrality.56 Nevertheless, no 
country has yet to adopt either principle completely.57
According to Avi-Yonah, one of the main objections to ITA is efficiency and to be more 
precise, CEN.
“The typical argument against undertaxing income from cross-border transactions is made 
in the name o f capital export neutrality. I f  taxpayers invest abroad and by using 
international tax arbitrage earn higher after-tax returns than on domestic investments 
earning higher before-tax return, they will prefer the former investments over the latter. 
Thus, resources will be allocated away from their most productive use, resulting in 
diminished global welfare.”5*
Countries following CEN would attempt to create equality between the tax treatment of 
investments abroad and domestically, so that, all other circumstances being equal, a taxpayer 
resident in a country that follows CEN should not have any tax incentive to invest abroad (as 
opposed to domestically).59 This is usually achieved through the adoption of two separate but 
connected policies.60
Thus, theoretically, a country that follows CEN as a tax policy goal would prefer not to 
allow an incentive for taxpayers to invest or operate abroad (instead of domestically). If CEN 
is violated because there is an after-tax incentive to invest abroad even though the pre-tax 
return is better domestically.
“The result is a deadweight loss from a global efficiency perspective because investments 
will not be allocated to their most productive (highest-yielding) pretax uses. In the long run, 
as more capital flows to host-country investments, the pretax returns on those investments 
will fa ll and pretax returns on home-country investments will rise until equilibrium is
55 Easson (1991) chapter 4. See also Graetz, (2001) at 1366.
56 The issue o f partial neutrality (or relative neutrality) is discussed by Vogel (1990) at 59.
57 This is mainly due to other considerations such as revenue loss etc that are taken into account in the decision 
making process.
58 Avi-Yonah, (1999-2000) at 171.
59 The taxpayer is thus subject to tax on his worldwide income and to prevent situations where investments 
abroad result in a higher tax burden, the taxpayer is also entitled to a foreign tax credit to alleviate the foreign tax 
burden.
60 On one hand, such a country should tax its residents on their worldwide income and not allow for any deferral 
o f taxation through the use o f foreign subsidiaries. On the other hand, such country should also allow its taxpayer 
to obtain full tax credit with respect to income taxes paid abroad without any limitations. This is not only because 
o f the unavailability o f the full foreign tax credit but also because all countries today allow their taxpayers some 
degree o f  deferral with respect to income from foreign sources.
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restored (when after-tax returns are equalized). The deadweight loss, however, will remain 
the same because some less productive host-country investments will be made at the expense 
o f more productive home-country investments (that is, capital will be oversupplied in the 
host country and undersupplied in the home country).”61
In a more conventional situation, the encouragement of investment abroad (for example) is 
achieved through the combination of low statutory tax rates together with exemption or 
deferral of taxation of the foreign income by the country of residence. In the case of ITA, 
this is not the situation.
Prima facie, there is no deferral of domestic taxes and the statutory tax rates are relatively 
high. In these scenarios, however, the incentives to investment abroad are given through the 
use of the differences in the structure and computation of the tax bases in the relevant 
jurisdictions involved.62 The “distortion” is not within the tax system but rather outside it. 
Each tax system includes provisions which are neutral in their treatment of domestic 
transactions and similar cross-border transactions and it is the interaction between the 
country Y tax system and country X tax system, which is the reason for the “distortion”.
A similar argument can be made on behalf of CIN, for example, from the perspective of a 
source country allowing for a deduction in a double-dip cross-border leasing situation, 
arguing that allowing the second depreciation deduction is contrary to the principles of CIN. 
Yet, the question of neutrality looks at neutrality in general and is not limited to specific 
benchmarks as CEN and CIN.
Thus, the OECD has recognized that
"Issues o f international taxation are more complex to deal with since they involve the 
interaction between national tax systems and tax treaties. The approach adopted in this 
report is to evaluate the tax treatment o f cross border investment flows against the criteria o f 
capital import and capital export neutrality....These concepts are used as benchmarks by 
which to judge the efficiency effects o f international tax arrangements. Yet these neutrality 
benchmarks cannot capture all o f the complexity o f these arrangements....Each o f  these 
decisions cannot be encompassed in a simple conceptual framework. ”63
6lAvi-Yonah (2000) at 1604-1605.
62 Basically, the problem is that the tax base is different whether it is due to different characterization (o f either 
the transaction or the type o f income), or to different methods o f computing and measuring it. Thus, Ihe premise 
that the tax base is similar can not be sustained anymore.
63 Jeffery (1999) at 8 quoting OECD (1991) at 14.
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Jeffery suggests that neutrality should not be seen as an absolute ideal (an all or nothing 
question). Instead of one single approach to an overall “neutrality”, we should focus on 
different neutralities, each examining the level of neutrality as between two or more 
alternatives that are compared. Thus, for example, CEN comparing the treatment of 
investment abroad and investment domestically. These benchmarks are only good as long as 
we apply them in the context in which they are set.64
Both CEN and CIN are determined separately by each country at the national level. Having a 
situation, like with ITA, whereby a domestic treatment of the taxpayer and of the transaction 
is completely neural and despite that there is still lack of neutrality because of the interaction 
with another tax system, leads us to question whether countries should revisit and design 
their tax systems in a way that would eliminate these potential lack of (external) neutralities 
i.e. does the concept of neutrality, even when conducted by different countries at the country 
level, requires them to go outside the limits of their tax systems and to adapt the system to 
react to the different external lack of neutrality.
CEN can no longer be satisfied by looking at the taxpayers’ tax situation only from the 
perspective of the country of residence (in CEN). Instead it is necessary to adjust the 
treatment in the country of residence based on the nature of the external distortion. In other 
words, full neutrality (CEN) can only be achieved through coordination of both tax systems, 
of both the country of source and the country of residence.
Regarding CIN, it is known that a successful CIN policy cannot take place unless the country 
of residence (which is not the country whose policy is being discussed) uses exemption as 
foreign tax relief. As long as the trading partners of that country of source apply different tax 
rates and employ the credit as their foreign tax relief mechanism, there can be no CIN.
Thus, countries that would like to achieve inter-nation neutrality (for example, in the export 
o f capital) would be required to ensure that the taxpayers are subject to the same effective 
tax rates regardless of the applicable statutory tax rates.
Moreover, it is no longer sufficient to ensure that the taxpayer is subject to the same tax 
burden because several of the occasions of ITA go even a step further. In these situations the 
taxpayers’ direct tax burden is not altered (by the ITA) but the transactions’ overall tax
64 Jeffery (1999) at 9.
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burden is reduced as a way to encourage certain activity. As a result, both efficiency and 
neutrality are violated.65
Another point that has to be taken into consideration is whether the maximization of 
worldwide welfare is the desired goal (as opposed to maximization of domestic/national 
welfare). This issue is discussed below.66
65 For example, cross-border leasing.
66 See pp. 38-42 below.
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The Equity Debate
There are two types of equity that should be maintained: inter-individual equity and inter­
nation equity. The first type is divided into two sub-categories: horizontal equity and vertical 
equity. Horizontal equity requires that taxpayers earning the same amount of income pay the 
same amount of tax67 while vertical equity requires taxpayers who are not in similar 
circumstances will not be subject to the same tax burden in a fair way that those who have 
more carry a heavier burden and are required to pay more taxes, justifying the application of 
proportional and progressive taxation.68
A tax system that does not follow equity at all may become unfair and unjust to its 
participants. As a result, a system risks the possibility of taxpayers’ unwillingness to 
participate in it due to their lack of trust in the fairness and justice of the system.69
The way in which a country that adheres the principle of horizontal equity manages to ensure 
the principle is maintained also in the international dimension is by taxing its residents on a 
worldwide basis (without the availability of deferral) while allowing them a full foreign tax 
credit with respect to foreign tax paid. In that way, the taxpayer is not treated differently 
from his colleague who has only domestic income.
Since, however, the entire concept is based on comparing between persons in the “same 
circumstances” and distinguishing between persons who are not in the “same 
circumstances”, it is of crucial importance to define what “same circumstances” means and 
whether it is possible for two persons to be in the “same circumstances”. The result of the 
analysis depends to a large extent on the choice of comparable persons.
In the case of individuals, the debate is usually between individuals, couples, families or 
households as the tax unit. This becomes more complicated if we try to apply similar
67 This can be demonstrated in the following way. Assume that we have taxpayer A who derives all o f its income 
from domestic sources in the country and taxpayer B who derives some o f his income from domestic resources in 
the country and some o f its income from foreign source located outside o f the jurisdiction. If we are to maintain 
the principle o f horizontal equity, then assuming both A and B earn the same amount o f  overall income, then both 
should be pay the same amount of taxation.
68 The basic rationale behind this concept, which is based on the notion o f fairness and justice, is to increase the 
fairness o f the system and to encourage the different taxpayers to participate and pay the required tax. Even 
though the tax by its nature is usually a compulsory liability that is imposed without direct reference or relations 
to the amount o f services or goods that the relevant taxpayer is receiving from the state, the idea is to create a 
system in which no taxpayer is under a disproportionate burden o f taxes, usually when examined vis-^-vis other 
taxpayers.
69 This unwillingness to participate in the system may not be shown in a direct way. Rather, it can be shown in an 
indirect way through eager attempts o f taxpayers to reduce their tax liability. It should be noted that equity is 
measured and examined only among the members of the same jurisdiction. There is no notion o f equity between 
taxpayers from different jurisdictions (or different tax systems). Thus, in a sense a tax system is regarded as a 
close society for examining the notion o f equity.
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concepts to the taxation of companies and their shareholders and even more complicated 
once groups of companies are being considered (for example, a domestic controlled domestic 
company and a foreign controlled domestic company -  are they under similar 
circumstances?).
In addition, it is important to have some sort of normative criteria to allow more practical 
application of the equity principle.70
Labor v. Capital71
An important aspect of the equity principle is that tax system should not prefer one type of 
taxpayers to another, again in order to make the system more reliable, fair and efficient. This 
latter point is illustrated in the tension between the taxation of income from labor and the 
taxation of income from capital. Preference of one type of income to the other might lead to 
an unequal treatment of taxpayers who have more income from that type over taxpayers who 
derive more income from the other type. This may result in putting disproportional burden of 
taxation on one type of income.
For example, if income from capital is taxed more favorably, then income from labor is 
taxed more heavily and in a way that is not proportional to its share of the overall income. 
This inequality might result in fewer tendencies of taxpayers who are deriving most of their 
income from labor to participate in the tax system and to bear the burden of tax.72
To the extent that the taxpayer cannot alter the circumstances so as to increase his income 
from capital at the expense of his income from labor (or his income from abroad at the 
expense of his income from domestic sources) then we are dealing with a question of equity 
and fairness among taxpayers (as opposed to efficiency).73
According to Avi-Yonah,
“As revenues from both the individual and corporate income taxes have been generally flat -  
as a percentage o f total revenues—over this period, the increase in total tax revenues was 
financed by increases in consumption taxes in all countries and in payroll taxes in developed
70 See generally, Herman (2001).
71 This argument was originally used and dealt with specifically by Avi-Yonah (2000).
72 There is also an important effect from an efficiency perspective i.e. that such a tax system encourages capital 
investment over labor -  this might lead to a reduction in the productivity (see also below).
73 To the extent that the taxpayer can alter his position, the question is one o f efficiency, a question discussed 
above, pp. 23-30.
32
countries. Because both consumption taxes and payroll taxes fa ll on labor, whereas income 
taxes may be imposed on both labor and capital, the data are consistent with the shift from  
taxing capital to taxing labor predicted as a consequence o f globalization”1*
Linking back to our point above regarding the relationship between equity and efficiency, 
“[.BJecause labor is less mobile than capital, it is generally not able to turn the inequity into 
an efficiency by moving to countries with lower tax rates. Moreover, because capital income 
accrues disproportionately to the rich, the shift in tax burden from capital to labor has 
tended to make all the societies less equitable in terms o f distribution o f income or wealth. 
Remedying this situation calls for finding ways to tax capital despite its relatively high 
mobility).”15
According to Avi-Yonah, ITA is violating the fairness principle which is at the center of the 
equity principle. As a result of the distinction that ITA makes between taxpayers who earn 
domestic labor (and in certain circumstances, even capital) income and taxpayers who earn 
capital income overseas and can thus benefit from ITA.76 Not only that. ITA is only available 
in limited situations. These situations have a cross-border element and are only available to 
taxpayers that engage (and can afford to engage in) in cross-border investments. In that 
respect ITA represents an additional violation of the equity principle.
ITA also violates the efficiency in the market by potentially increasing the burden on income 
from immobile labor (income that can be referred to as “locked in income” due to its 
immobile nature) and reducing the burden on income from mobile capital.77
This argument, however, appears to be based on the premise that capital income is 
completely mobile whereas labor income is immobile and to disregard one possible outcome 
of ITA whereby it can be seen also as reducing the cost o f capital, allowing more funds to be 
available for business and more funds to be available to be spent on other aspects of the 
business (including salaries and employees costs).78
74 Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1621-2, referring to the period o f 1965-1995.
75 Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1625.
76 Avi-Yonah (1999-2000) at 172.
77 This statement has to be qualified. First, the reference to capital is with respect to highly mobile capital. 
Second, the reference to labor is to immobile labor. This for example does not include highly skilled labor that 
can relatively easily emigrate from one country to another. Third, the assumption is that the non-tax conditions in 
the two or more countries are similar or relatively similar.
78 With respect to the premise, as it is also discussed below, not all income from labor is essentially immobile and 
not all income from capital is completely or highly mobile. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a group of  
capital income that is generally mobile and as a result is likely to be subject to a lower tax rate when compared to 
a group o f income from labor that is immobile (usually, income earned by less skilled individuals).
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This is quite in line with the “spill-over” argument. Arguably, the existence of ITA would 
reduce the cost of borrowing and of financing and increase the volume of transactions thus 
indirectly increasing the amount of economic activity. These changes would allow a country 
to obtain more taxes from other sources, taxes that would compensate for the apparent loss 
of resources from ITA transactions. However, even assuming that other taxes distort less, 
this argument does not solve the problem at stake and does not balance the imbalance 
between the taxation of income from labor and the taxation of income from capital.
It can be argued that ITA merely spreads the heavier burden that is imposed on income from 
labor over more overall income (and possibly more taxpayers) or uses the higher taxes on 
labor to raise more revenues from taxpayers who would now earn more from their labor and 
would be able to contribute more taxes to compensate for the apparent loss. In effect, while 
the “spill-over” argument may serve as a counter argument to counter the opinion that ITA 
results in revenue loss, it would probably not help in the labor v. capital imbalance. On the 
contrary, it might widen the difference. I shall revert to this question from a different 
perspective in the discussion on competitiveness and tax competition and on revenue loss 
below.79
Inter-nation Equity
In addition to the inter-individual equity, some writers have suggested that with the 
international economic integration, we should also look at equity among nations. This 
principle, named “inter-nation equity” recognizes that in addition to the inter-individual 
equity, there should also be some sort of justice between nations with respect to the 
allocation of revenues from global operations.80
True, there is no agreement relating to what should be the proper allocation of the tax base. 
In addition, there is no principle of fairness that can be used to justify a certain allocation of 
the tax base.81 Thus, as Easson points out, one of the main obstacles in applying this standard 
is to determine how and when to strike the balance between nations so there will be a state of 
inter-nation equity.82 This, however, does not mean that there is no way of allocating income 
among nations.
79 See pp. 54-58 and 59-61 below.
80 Jeffery (1999) at 1.2.2.2. This is as opposed to among individuals from different countries, which does not 
exist.
81 Easson (1991) at 20.
82 Easson (1991) at 20-21.
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Herman discusses three approaches to the allocation of income.83 The first approach, Peggy 
Musgrave’s approach, the “national entitlement” approach, based on the understanding that 
both the residence and the source countries are entitled to tax the income which should be 
allocated between them.84
A second approach is the approach taken in 1920s by the League of Nations and its group of 
four economists based on the concept of “economic allegiance”. The main difference 
between this approach and the first approach mentioned above is the existence (or rather lack 
thereof) of a residual right to the country of residence to tax the income that is allocated to 
the country of residence but is partially or fully exempt by that country. While this residual 
entitlement exists under Musgrave’s approach, it does not under the economic allegiance 
approach.85
The third approach recognized by Herman is Avi-Yonah’s proposal for an inter-nation 
redistribution. According to this approach international tax law rules should be designed in a 
way that would ensure a fair redistribution of income among nations. Thus, inter-nation 
equity, in the absence of other mechanisms, is seen as the tool for redistribution and reducing 
the tension and inequalities among the different nations.86
Avi-Yonah recognizes that there is no international tax authority to govern such distribution, 
and precisely because of this absence, argues the case for redistributive inter-nation equity 
and finds some support for this argument in current international tax law practice.87
Moreover, if we take the position that “beggar thy neighbor” is not a good tax policy (at least 
not for the long-term)88 and that different countries are better off only to the extent that the 
wealth is shared among all nations in a relatively fair method, then such an approach as 
presented by Avi-Yonah should be included in the overall tax policy goals. This approach 
would appear to agree also with strive to achieve worldwide efficiency.89
According to the existing approach, which is also evident in many existing tax treaties, in the 
case of passive and portfolio income the country of residence is the country that has the right
83 Herman (2001) Chapter 2 at 26.
84 Herman (2001) Chapter 2 at 26.
85 Herman (2001) Chapter 2 at 26.
86 Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1649.
87 Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1649-1650.
88 See also the discussion in the context o f  competitiveness below (pp. 54-58).
89 In this context to the extent that the markets reach the point o f Pareto-optimum prior to the satisfaction o f the 
redistribution goals, the task o f redistribution will probably be done outside the tax systems so as not to violate 
the efficiency o f the markets.
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to tax the income while the country of source has a very limited (or at all) right to tax that 
income. On the other hand, in the case of active income, provided that the income has 
sufficient connection to the country of source, then this country has the right to tax the 
income (without any limitations) while the country of residence has a limited residual right 
(if at all) with respect to this income. This approach, however, is based on the state of the 
world, as it existed many years ago when the concept of taxing international income and the 
types of international income to be taxed were completely different from what takes place 
today.
In this context, it seems that Avi-Yonah’s approach is probably the desired approach to be 
taken in future time to allow better allocation of resources among the different countries of 
the world. While this approach is not free from problems or objections it can nevertheless be 
a valid approach if we believe that one of the main purposes of a tax system is to redistribute 
income among its different participants.90 The main obstacle is of course persuading 
countries (those who are already better off) to agree.
In the absence of a world tax authority (or an agreement to that effect) that would ensure 
compensatory payments are made from the countries that are better off to those that are 
worse off, the only way in which countries will be inclined to join in is if each country can 
satisfy itself that such move is in its best (self) interest. In other words, the challenge is to 
persuade countries that are better off today to give up some of their existing benefits in 
exchange for other benefits in an overall better off world, benefits that would make these 
countries better off as well, which is in effect a long term Pareto improvement.91
The challenge is to manage, through cooperation, to achieve a mechanism whereby the 
countries that lose from the changes in the inter-nation equity are compensated through other 
means. That is, to create a redistribution mechanism that would allow such compensation. 
The absence of such a mechanism can explain the desire on part of countries to stress the 
importance of national welfare maximization (As opposed to worldwide welfare 
maximization).
90 Some o f the problems associated with this option are as follows: (1) how do we determine the extent and 
method o f re-distribution among nations, (2) the redistribution option requires states to forgo their own interest 
for a global interest based on the assumption that if  everyone is happy then it is better for all states including 
those who forgo something (it also implies that a situation whereby some are losing is bad even to the better off 
states that are not (directly) affected). The challenge is to find the way to persuade those better off states to follow  
and adopt this line o f argument.
91 As discussed below, certain benefits, like a relative power in the global market or domination might be “lost” 
for good in a better off world.
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Although there is not always a contradiction between the two goals, there is no complete 
similarity and the end -result might prove detrimental to some of the countries while being 
beneficial to others. It might not be a Pareto improvement but society might still consider it 
to be better.
“Thus, it is not evident that the national economic interest is equivalent to efficient wealth 
maximization at the global level, a proposition o f Ault and Bradford. Maximization at the 
global level does not give any indication as to who will generate the tax proceeds. It would 
be more obvious fo r  policy-makers to aim at maximizing wealth fo r their own country. ”92
A redistribution mechanism is supposed to take care of this problem and to assure those 
countries that are likely to be worse off are being compensated for their loss. As a result, 
countries would tend to prefer maximizing national welfare to maximizing worldwide 
welfare.
ITA represents a potential for altering the existing balance by preferring one route of 
investment or one type of investment to another and by providing a tax incentive for 
investing in one country to another. Whether ITA results in a better or worse allocation of 
revenues among countries depends on the model of redistribution that is used and would 
require more analysis. It appears, however, that in the absence of an agreed upon mechanism 
for redistribution and cooperation among countries, ITA might lead to undesired results. 
First, in the absence of a compensatory mechanism, ITA is likely to be opposed by those 
countries that appear to lose from the incident of ITA, depending on the situation. Second, 
the absence of a redistribution method prevents us from being able to evaluate whether ITA 
in a specific situation is beneficial or detrimental to the overall result of the redistribution, to 
the end-result of the inter-nation allocation.
In the absence of such redistribution mechanism, each country is likely, to a large extent, 
take care of its own interest unilaterally. In that respect, changes in the inter-nation equity 
might serve as a justification to allow or to prevent ITA, depending on whom you ask.
92 Daniels (2001) at 5.
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Graetz’s Critique and the International v. National Level Discussion
After discussing both equity and efficiency, which are regarded as the building blocks of tax 
policy discussions, it is important to pause and examine the recent critique that was put 
forward by Graetz. Although the critique is mainly aimed at the US tax system, I believe that 
it is applicable, with certain adjustment, to tax policy discussion on the taxation of 
international income in general.
According to Graetz’s argument, worldwide economic efficiency receives too much 
importance in academic analysis while in practice, to a large extent, it is not being followed. 
In fact, other principles and considerations, like equity and foreign policy, should receive 
more attention.93 In addition, its focus in the case of efficiency is inappropriate and should 
instead be at the national level.94
Seeking worldwide economic efficiency on the other hand tells policymakers to “respond 
with equal vigor to avoidance o f a foreign country’s taxes and avoidance o f US taxes"95
The important point, however, is that worldwide economic efficiency “urges policymakers to 
embrace the larger benefit without regard to where it occurs or who benefits. Worldwide 
economic efficiency does not heed love o f country. But why should a US President or 
members o f Congress put aside “narrow” national interests to fashion US tax policy in a 
manner apathetic to whether benefits flow to US citizens or citizens o f other nations?"96
As Graetz mentions earlier in his article, ‘Tax policy decisions, including decisions 
regarding a country’s tax treatment o f international income, should be, and inevitably are, 
decided based on a nation’s capacity, culture, economics, policies and history. In 
democracies, such decisions are determined by the votes o f the nation’s citizens and their 
representatives. Taxation without representation is still a tyranny."91
This is a very important point in the understanding of ITA which, to a large extent, results 
from different perceptions by different countries of the same transactions. A blind following 
of economic principles towards harmonization by adopting a single principle would thus 
disregard the important contribution of the culture, policies and history to the state of the law 
in each country and to the policy decisions that have been made so far.
93 Graetz (2001).
94 Graetz (2001) at 1373-1374.
95 Graetz (2001) at 1375.
96 Graetz (2001) at 1375.
97 Graetz (2001) at 1374.
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Graetz’s starting point is history and he is examining the situation that existed then, starting 
in the 1920s and moves to the situation today. Despite all the changes that took place in the 
world’s economy since the international tax regime was put into place and despite the strain 
that the new reality has on the existing set of rules, the US Congress (and other governments) 
have chosen not to do anything to change the rules so that they better accommodate existing 
reality.98
Based on this introduction, Graetz goes on to explore these inadequate principles of 
international tax (as he refers to them). Graetz criticizes the focus on tax neutrality and the 
use of existing benchmarks (CEN, CIN and NN to which he refers to as “a two by three 
matrix”) and the inappropriate weight that is given to them in tax policy (especially with 
respect to equity and its supposed role).
“/« domestic tax policy, fairness in taxation tends to hold center stage. ...The dominant 
normative perspective o f international tax policy debates -  limited to a choice or a 
compromise between CEN and CIN -  both inhibits an adequate understanding o f the 
normative underpinnings o f international income tax policy and improperly limits serious 
consideration o f alternative policies.
Graetz’s first critique is that policy discussions are made with respect to national rather than 
international or global perspective. Worldwide efficiency, for example, should be replaced 
with national efficiency (and efficiency itself should not play a leading role in international 
tax policy).
Graetz views the general criticism of national efficiency and on the use of NN (national 
neutrality) as misconceived. The mere fact a policy like NN has its shortcomings does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that national efficiency (which is associated with NN) 
should be rejected altogether). According to Graetz, making up the best policy to further 
national efficiency sometimes requires the combination of one or more policies together 
based on empirical evidence. The important issue is that in doing so, the question to ask is 
how to lead to national efficiency as opposed to worldwide efficiency.
In addition, Graetz argues that the view taken of efficiency is a too narrow view.
98 Graetz (2001) at 1362.
99 Graetz (2001) at 1370-1371.
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“As I  have indicated, when evaluating these rules (or other international income tax 
provisions), economists today seldom ask how these rules affect the economic welfare o f US 
citizens or residents. Instead, they generally accept worldwide economic efficiency as the 
operative norm, and generally conclude that the United States should follow a policy o f  
capital export neutrality
The starting point for Graetz is Peggy Musgrave’s seminal analysis of efficiency aspects of 
foreign investment,101 an analysis that includes a reference to national efficiency only in the 
form of NN.102
Graetz presents his seven points of criticism to Musgrave’s approach.103 First, he reminds us 
that the work was conducted in the 1960s when the world was quite different from its current 
state. Second, he points out that Musgrave’s assumed, like most economists, a first best 
world, “which markets are perfectly competitive and governments are well balanced”.
Third, Musgrave’s work assumes a dollar for dollar substitution of domestic investment by 
foreign investment. However, Graetz points out that there is evidence to support a claim that 
foreign investment is actually complimentary (rather than substitutive) to domestic 
investment and can provide companies with more capital to finance more domestic 
investments.104
Fourth, Musgrave ignores the individual level of taxation whereas evidence shows that the 
US, for example, receives more taxes from foreign operations of US companies by taxing 
individuals than by taxing the corporations themselves.105 Fifth, the analysis conducted by 
Musgrave took place when the US was the world’s biggest capital exporter thus it focused 
only on direct outbound investment. Today, however, the US is also the world’s biggest 
capital importer (not to mention the amount of cross-border portfolio investment that was 
added in recent years to direct investments) and thus an inbound investment analysis is also 
required.106
Sixth, Musgrave’s analysis does not take into account the reaction of foreign governments to 
the US policy decisions and legislation changes. Due to this point it is necessary to examine
100 Graetz (2001) at 1379.
101 Musgrave (1963) and Musgrave (1969) both referred to by Graetz (2001) at 1380.
102 Graetz (2001) at 1381.
103 Avi-Yonah summarizes some o f the critique on Musgrave’s analysis in Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1609.
104 Graetz (2001) at 1385.
105 Graetz (2001) at 1386.
106 Graetz (2001) at 1387.
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policies at the global level as well as at the national level (i.e. to examine possible reactions 
by other jurisdictions etc.) to ensure that other participators in the markets are not too 
adversely affected by the domestic policies. This seem to be based on the premise that in 
order to achieve a better world we have to ensure that it is better for everyone and not only to 
a selected group of participants.107
The last point is that the analysis overlooks the possibility of improving the welfare of the 
citizens/residents through cooperation with foreign governments.108
The two important points that can be taken from Graetz’s critique are that it is necessary to 
examine each country’s self-interest and not only focus on the worldwide perspective and 
that there are other important policy goals that play an important role in addition to 
efficiency that receives too much attention in policy discussions.
I agree that tax policy, despite the global markets, is a national rather than international 
determination and as such should seek to further national rather than international welfare. In 
the absence of a world tax organization or any agreed upon method for redistributing tax 
revenues among countries and due to the link between taxpayers and government (“no 
taxation without representation”), taxation is to a large extent still based on the determination 
o f policies at the national level. This, however, does not always contradict maximization of 
worldwide welfare.
Graetz is correct in arguing that economic efficiency is not everything and that equity (and in 
my view also inter-nation equity) and foreign policy should receive their appropriate 
consideration. However, this does not mean that the idea (or rationale) behind worldwide 
economic efficiency is not valid. In fact, this rationale seems to support Graetz’s argument.
Looking at the national interest in each country does not prevent countries from achieving 
and maximizing global efficiency. It is quite possible to have a competitive market that 
would strive to maximize the global welfare through the participation of the different players 
each trying to further their own self-interest. Thus, furthering the countries (participants) 
self-interest does not necessarily stand in contradiction with maximization of global welfare. 
The only caveat is that in doing so, countries should ensure not to further their own interest 
at the expense of reducing the overall resources.109 To do that, it is necessary to establish a
107 Graetz (2001) at 1389.
108 Graetz (2001) at 1390.
109 Roxan (2003b) at 6-7.
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redistribution mechanism not only at the domestic level but also at the international level to 
compensate those who become worse off. As discussed above,110 there is more than one 
point of Pareto-efficiency and at the same time, Pareto-efficiency does not tell us anything 
about other considerations outside efficiency. For example, equity. For that reason, it is 
necessary to insert the other considerations and to achieve a Pareto-efficiency that also 
satisfies these other considerations. In the absence of a redistribution method, countries 
would tend to use other considerations to ensure that the allocation of resources reached is 
also favorable to them taking into account other considerations as well. For example, to 
ensure that at the end of the day, they have sufficient funds to allow them to finance their 
public sector. To that extent, some countries considerations might come at the expense of 
efficiency.
An interesting point that is that national self-interest, unlike national neutrality, is dependent 
upon the reaction from other participants (other countries). As a result, in determining what 
is the self-interest of each country, the country has to take into account the acts of other 
countries, which might have an effect on the first mentioned country. In making policy 
choices, a country acting in its self-interest and in an uncooperative environment will tend 
not to take decisions that might result in worsening its position, even if there is a change that 
it would improve its position as a result of the decision.111
Thus, following worldwide economic efficiency should place countries in a position that 
would make everybody better off while not making anyone worse off which in a way is 
embodied also in Graetz’s argument. This, however, is subject to one important caveat. It 
assumes that overall, no country will lose out. Going outside the narrow scope of the 
efficiency principle, in the absence of a redistribution mechanism and coordination, countries 
would tend to adopt different approaches using non-economic policy considerations, as for 
example, foreign policy and subject to domestic restraints, as for example, political 
considerations.
110 See pp. 23-24 above.
111 For example, game theory.
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Competitiveness
"[Tax policy] has traditionally been thought o f  as an entirely domestic 
matter. [But] in an increasingly global world economy, nations can no 
longer afford to design their tax systems without accounting fo r  the 
effects on international trade and investment. ”m
The desire of countries to ensure that their taxpayers are not disfavored vis-a-vis foreign 
corporations (whether it is in outbound or inbound transactions) is a known concern and 
policy aim. This is especially true for more developed countries that are capital exporters and 
wish to ensure that their taxpayers are not “worse o ff’ vis-a-vis “comparable” foreign 
taxpayers (and that other less developed countries are not using aggressive tax incentives to 
pull income flows from developed countries to these less developed countries).113
On one hand, these countries are aware of the risk that if their taxpayers become less 
competitive because of their tax system,114 they risk losing these taxpayers (especially 
corporate taxpayers) who might decide to relocate to a more competitive environment.115 116 
This can result in a tendency on part of countries not to attack or at least to be indifferent 
with respect to outbound ITA.
On the other hand, since these countries are not in a desperate need for foreign investment, 
they may be disinclined to grant all advantages to foreign taxpayers unless there is a serious 
risk of a reduction in foreign investment. For example, inbound ITA that is available to non­
residents that are competing with residents for whom the ITA is not available.117
Over the years, the competitiveness argument has been used both in support and against 
legislative intervention to ITA. This argument is often used in the ITA debate, not always in 
the right way and for the right reasons. In the following section I explore a few of the main 
issues regarding the competitiveness argument to provide the basis for using this argument in 
the discussion elsewhere in this work.
112 Joel Slemrod, quoted by Steinmo (1993) at 156.
1,3 One thing that may be questionable is to what extent the competitiveness o f business entities from country X 
is actually beneficial to country X and to the welfare o f its taxpayers. This question is discussed below. Until 
then, I shall assume that such a link exists and that it is beneficial for country X to have its business entities more 
competitive vis-^-vis foreign businesses.
114 I.e. the tax system becomes (or is at least perceived as) a burden on the ability o f these corporations to 
compete in the global economy.
115 For example, see US inversions techniques discussed briefly below (pp. 102-104).
1,6 This might be more likely in the E U , if for example, the relevant taxpayers can find a better alternative within 
the EU to put their headquarters (or center o f operations) in. To that extent it is quite likely that the UK is more 
exposed to this “threat” than the US.
117 For example, IRC §894(c) and § 1503(d) and the regulations thereunder.
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Neutral Competitiveness and Maintaining a Competitive Edge
Competitiveness as referred to in this work includes two types of competitiveness, neutral 
competitiveness and maintenance of a competitive edge.118
According to the latter, the country promoting competitiveness would try to ensure that the 
use of competitiveness leads to a situation whereby that country and/or its taxpayers are in a 
better situation vis-a-vis other countries (or taxpayers from other countries), not necessarily 
an equal situation. According to the former, the goal is to put both sides on a level playing 
field, by eliminating (or reducing) the effect of tax.
From an efficiency perspective, it appears that neutral competitiveness is preferred as it is 
aimed at eliminating the distortions created by the tax systems. Adopting competitiveness 
with a view of maintaining a competitive edge is similar to a subsidy that is given to a 
taxpayer/transaction to maintain its viability, in situations where such transaction would not 
be viable but for the tax advantage. Such benefit might be defendable in the short-term but 
might not be beneficial in the long-term.
Although it appears, at least from the outset, that these two types of competitiveness are 
quite easy to identify and separate, this in not always the case. The ongoing dispute between 
the EU and the US is a good example to illustrate this point as well as the general problems 
with competitiveness and the other policy considerations that are usually relevant in the 
discussion.
The origin of the this debate is more than thirty years ago when the US decided to, prima 
facie, support its manufacturers in their ability to compete aboard (mainly in Europe) vis-a- 
vis foreign competition but that was not the main reason.
The US CFC legislation, which was introduced less than ten years before that, allowed 
deferral under certain restrictions to manufacturing operations of US MNEs conducted 
abroad, even if the place where such operations were conducted was a low-tax jurisdiction. 
This created an incentive for US MNEs to move their operation abroad, enjoy the lower tax 
rate there and defer their US tax liability until the profits were repatriated to the US.119
118 An alternative definition is given by Roxan who defines the two groups as measures generating competition 
and home response measures which respond to existing competition. Roxan (2003a).
119 Funk (2001).
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Provided sound advice was given, taxpayers were able to structure their affairs in a way that 
would result in unlimited deferral of these profits.
As a result of this “perverse incentive for U.S. corporations to locate businesses activities 
and jobs overseas5,120, the US enacted in 1971 the predecessor of the Foreign Sales 
Corporations (FSC) legislation, the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) 
legislation. This legislation allowed US corporations to set up subsidiaries through which the 
sales of their domestic manufacturing activities would be conducted. These subsidiaries 
would be subject to tax only with respect to part of their profits in a manner that would 
reduce their effective overall tax rate and would make US manufacturing more attractive for 
these US MNEs. To qualify, the subsidiaries had to engage in the sale of export property 
which was property that was held primarily for export, was manufactured in the US, and less 
than 50% of which value was attributed to imports brought into the US. In addition, US 
parents of these DISC subsidiaries were able to attribute to the DISC export profits that 
amounted to either 50% of the export profits or 4% of the gross export sales or a percentage 
that was reasonably determined based on the arm’s length principle.
The DISC legislation was a huge success and within three months from its introduction, US 
MNEs managed to form 1,136 DISCs.121 It did not take long for the European countries to 
sense the advantage granted by this legislation and to file a complaint arguing the legislation 
violated the principles of GATT being an illegal subsidy.
In 1981, a holding of the panel adopting the complaint was accepted by the GATT Council. 
Although the US never accepted that the DISC regime violated GATT, in 1984 the US 
Congress replaced the DISC regime with the FSC regime which effectively did the same 
with the addition of certain technical requirements that were meant to technically (although 
not in substance) satisfy the GATT requirements.122
More years have passed and the FSC was held to be an illegal subsidy. This did not prevent 
the US from replacing it with yet another similar regime but with a different name 
(Extraterritorial Income (ETI)), which was also held to be illegal subsidy. As of today, since 
both the EU and the US have yet to reach an agreement on how to proceed and with a
120 Funk (2001).
121 Ibid.
122
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decision against the US, the possibility of sanctions on US trades from a EU perspective 
seems closer than ever.123
The interesting thing is that this regime was initiated as a measure to preserve work places in 
the US. At the same time, this did not prevent others from arguing that the regime is meant 
to improve the competitiveness of US MNEs vis-a-vis foreign competitors that benefit from 
a more favorable tax system.
According to Funk, “zY appears that the major U.S. multinationals and labor unions are 
hooked on subsidies. The estimated tax benefits run nearly US$4 billion per year and are 
increasing... One o f the few  areas where business and labor interests can agree -  and 
declare cease-fire from their disputes over healthcare and other programs -  is export 
subsidies. ”124
But is it a good policy? It apparently improved the competitiveness of US MNEs vis-a-vis 
foreign competitors. Otherwise, there would not be such a strong opposition from the EU. It 
apparently improved the labor situation in the US adding more work places. Otherwise, it 
would not have received this strong support from the labor unions. So, arguably, it is a good 
policy for the US. Not necessarily.
The US has spent a lot of money sponsoring these subsidies and exemption from tax. This 
money was spent to keep US MNEs competitive while investing domestically to provide for 
domestic work places. I return to this issue below.125 At this point, it would suffice just to 
raise the question whether or not the US would have been better off had this money been 
spent on finding US workers other work places to replace those lost while allowing US 
MNEs to invest move their operations abroad to places which are more efficient for them to 
operate from.126
Competitiveness -  whose?127
Much discussion has been made in the name of competitiveness. Most of the time, the 
discussion is made without explaining what is meant by competitiveness, that is, whose 
competitiveness is it?
123 Bell (2004).
124 Funk (2001).
125 For example, in the context o f cross-border leasing below (pp. 204-207).
126 This question is further addressed below in the context o f political considerations below (pp. 67-71).
127 This question was raised by Avi-Yonah (1999) at 531.
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Basically, there two possible answers: one possibility is that the reference is to 
competitiveness among the countries based on the competitiveness of their tax systems. In 
the world today, MNEs and taxpayers’ ability to invest in more than one country result in
“jurisdiction shopping” which necessitate countries to compete among themselves on
■ 128 investments.
Another possibility is that competitiveness refers to the competitiveness of companies 
resident in the country vis-a-vis foreign competitions.129 There are at least two problems with 
this approach. First, the long-term benefit of such an approach to the country is unclear and 
would depend to a large extent of the type of competitiveness that is contemplated.
Second, even if we only look at the short-term, the link between the competitiveness of the 
corporations and the benefits received by the general public of taxpayers resident in the 
country is not clear. For example, the competitiveness of the business entities may not make 
the members/taxpayers of the country any better off than without the competitiveness. 
Therefore, it might not already be in a countiy’s best interests to create a competitive 
advantage to its resident companies.
This is especially true in the case of MNEs, which are publicly traded130 and whose 
shareholders consist of many different nationalities, not necessarily that of the country of 
residence of the MNE.131
Thus, it is impossible to make an across-the-board use of the competitiveness argument as if 
it is beneficial in all circumstances. Rather, we should revisit this question whenever 
competitiveness is raised and ask whether in the particular circumstances the 
competitiveness that is sought is really in the best interests of the country and represents 
what the country should seek.132
128 For example, Intel which is mentioned by Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1589. An outcome o f  this competition is the 
harmful tax competition that is further addressed below. On this issue, see also Edge (2003).
129 See for example, the discussion regarding the competitiveness o f US corporations where the focus was on the 
competitiveness o f the corporations not o f the country or the economy. In this work, when a reference is made to 
the term competitiveness, unless it is provided otherwise, the reference is made with respect to the 
competitiveness o f the corporations.
130 It is quite possible that the company may not be registered for trade on a stock exchange in its country of 
residence. For example, NASDAQ consists of many non-US companies that are traded on the exchange.
131 In addition, it might be the case that most of the multinationals’ income would come from sources outside the 
country o f residence o f the parent company thus significantly reducing its tax liability in that country o f  
residence.
132 To rephrase Avi-Yonah, what is good for GM is not necessarily good for America (Avi-Yonah (1999) at 537).
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As for the level at which competition is analyzed, this analysis is conducted at two levels. 
First, the countries level where different countries compete between themselves to become 
more attractive and competitive and to attract as much foreign income as possible. I shall 
discuss this level below in the context of harmful tax competition.133 Second, competition 
that is examined at the companies level. It is necessary to identify the competitors before 
analyzing the validity of the argument.
Kingson’s Approach to competitiveness134
The premise upon which competitiveness arguments are usually based is the examination of 
domestic corporations vis-a-vis foreign competitors at the international level. In the US, it is 
often a complaint by US MNEs that US tax laws put them in a competitive disadvantage vis- 
a-vis foreign competitors, usually because of the higher tax burden imposed on US MNEs’ 
foreign income. Based on this argument, US MNEs seek for lower US taxation of active 
foreign income (usually earned through a foreign subsidiary) to make them more competitive 
abroad.135 Such measures, however, might lead to foreign income being taxed more 
favorably and thus encourage US MNEs to incorporate foreign subsidiaries and to transfer 
operations from the US to these foreign subsidiaries.136
Kingson, in his discussion of competitiveness in the US context, claims that the existing 
discussion is too narrow and should include additional comparisons. The comparison should 
not be limited to corporations from country X competing with corporations from country Y 
with respect to the market in country X or in country Y or even in country Z. Instead, it 
should also look at corporations from country X that operate both in country X and abroad 
vis-a-vis corporations from country X that only operate in country X.137
According to Kingson, since the amount of revenue required to be raised as tax from the 
public to finance the public sector is usually fixed, giving up tax on one type of 
transactions/taxpayers might have a detrimental effect on other types of 
transactions/taxpayers that will have to “cover” for the insufficient revenues raised from the 
former group. Apart from questions of equity and efficiency, there are some important
133 See pp. 54-58 below.
134 This part is based on Kingson (1991).
135 The argument is based on the premise that US CFC rules are much wider in their application than other 
countries CFC rules. As a result, US MNEs are subject to current US tax with respect to income earned by their 
CFCs even when such income is active income from the conduct of business. To that extent, according to the 
argument, US corporations are at a competitive disadvantage vis-i-vis foreign corporations.
136 See generally Rosenbloom (2004) and Brewer (2004).
137 Kingson (1991).
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domestic competition issues that might ensue as some domestic taxpayers might be subject 
to a lower tax burden than other domestic taxpayers.
If, for example, country X decides to improve the competitiveness of its resident 
corporations operating both domestically and abroad by reducing the tax burden on these 
corporations while limiting these benefits only to income from abroad, it discriminates 
against other country X corporations that only operate domestically. This can have the effect 
on the competitiveness of country X companies that only operate domestically both vis-a-vis 
other country X corporations that operate both domestically and abroad and vis-a-vis 
corporations from other countries that operate in country X.
To the comparison introduced by Kingson, it is necessary also to add another dimension, that 
the competition that takes place is not necessarily bilateral but can also be multilateral and 
involve taxpayers from more than two jurisdictions.
For example, a corporation resident in country X that operates in country Y does not have 
only country Y corporations as potential competitors but also country Z corporations that 
operate in country Y. Such corporations might enjoy a competitive advantage as a result of 
the interaction of the tax laws of countries Y and Z, a benefit that is not enjoyed by 
corporations resident in country X that operate in country Y.
Outbound and Inbound Transactions (Competitiveness as a two bladed 
sword)
The competitiveness argument does not exist in a vacuum and its scope as well as its 
possible application may vary depending on the nature of investment and its direction, which 
also affects the interaction between competitiveness and other policy considerations.
In the application of the competitiveness argument, several distinctions need to be observed. 
These distinctions apply with respect to tax treatment of cross-border investments in general.
A first distinction is usually drawn between inbound and outbound investments. In the latter, 
the two conflicting interests are usually the desire to keep domestic corporations competitive 
on the one hand and the desire to eliminate the preference for these corporations to invest 
aboard on the other hand. In this context, the competitiveness argument is usually used by 
domestic corporations in support of the former argument and in support of their 
competitiveness vis-a-vis foreign competitors.
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With respect to inbound investments, the conflicting arguments are domestic corporations 
that wish to retain their competitiveness vis-a-vis foreign corporations on one hand and the 
government seeking to attract foreign investments to the county and would only be interested 
in legislative measures as long as these measures do not result in reducing the level of 
foreign investment into the country.
A second distinction is drawn between direct and portfolio investments in each of the two 
categories mentioned above (inbound and outbound).
In the context of outbound investments, the competitiveness arguments would appear to be 
more visible with respect to direct investments as opposed to portfolio investments because 
the former have a more direct link to the business of the corporation.
Another difference between portfolio investments and direct investments is that whereas 
direct investments are only available to domestic corporations with cross-border business 
activities, portfolio investments are also available to corporations that only operate 
domestically.138
In the context of inbound investments, it is necessary to distinguish among three different 
types of investment. The first type involves portfolio investments which countries are usually 
quite interested in attracting and would be relatively reluctant to impose any restrictions that 
might reduce the level of such investment, especially in light of the relatively mobile nature 
of these investments and their sensitivity to tax changes. These investments usually do not 
give rise to any competitiveness argument on the part of the resident corporations.
In contrast, the second and third types, direct investments, are different, as they require a 
balance between the desire on part of the country to attract foreign investment and the desire 
of domestic corporations to preserve competitive edge vis-a-vis foreign competitors.
In addition, in direct investments because of the related parties, tax considerations tend to 
become more important vis-a-vis other considerations. In most situations transfer-pricing 
legislation should address this distinction. This type of legislation, however, is not always 
effective.139
138 See also the equity discussion above (pp. 31-34).
139 For example, equity notes (discussed below (pp. 141-144)).
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A distinction is drawn between existing direct investments and new direct investments. The 
former are more focused only on the structure of the transaction whereas the latter are 
focused both on the location of the investment and on its structure.
A distinction further should also be drawn between measures, which are merely intended to 
put domestic taxpayers and foreign taxpayers on a level playing field and those, which are 
meant to grant domestic taxpayers a certain competitive advantage through the use of the tax 
system. The legitimacy of the former type can also be supposed by arguments based on 
efficiency and equity. However, measures from the latter type are likely to be regarded as 
unjustified restrictions and might at the long-term prove to be detrimental to the country 
adopting them by achieving the contrary result from the one originally intended.
This brings us back to the question of whether countries are willing to relinquish some 
existing benefits today in exchange for a better off overall situation tomorrow. It appears that 
the use of competitiveness as a policy goal can be treated as short-term thinking (short­
sighted) satisfying long-term prospects for limited short-term benefits (gain).140
In addition, a tax policy based on competitiveness may have an adverse effect on other 
countries, mainly trade partners of the country adopting such policy. It would be naive to 
believe that the adoption of such policy would go unnoticed by other countries, especially by 
trade partners and countries that are regarded as potential competitors of the country 
adopting the policy. This last point is addressed in greater detail below.141142
A possible explanation for some of the unwillingness on part of countries to restrict their 
policy only to economically valid competitiveness is the political element. As it is further 
discussed below,143 tax policy is influenced by non-economic considerations, such as 
political considerations and other restraints that result from the structure and operation of 
each country and its institutions. These restraints can explain why some countries may prefer 
to adopt a policy that does not appear to be economically justifiable for the long term or 
adopting an apparently inconsistent approach with respect to certain planning opportunities. 
In that respect, ITA is no exception. This point is further explained below in the context of 
the case studies.
140 Refer please to the history o f the withholding taxes on portfolio interest where a race to the bottom took place 
and nowadays it is quite common to have portfolio interest being exempted by many countries o f source (see Avi- 
Yonah (1998c)).
141 See also the discussion regarding tax competition (pp. 54-58 below) and Professor Graetz’s arguments 
regarding the question o f “beggar thy neighbor” (pp. 41-42 above).
142 Please refer to the discussion below regarding the distinction between competitiveness and harmful tax 
competition (pp. 54-58 below).
143 See pp. 65-72 below.
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Summary
Making the connection between all the parts of the discussion above, we can reach the 
following interim observations:
First, policy decisions are made at the national level and with the intent of satisfying the self- 
interest of the country making these decisions. Yet, such decisions are made within the 
framework of existing principles and are by reference to policy decisions made by other 
countries.
Second, a distinction should be drawn between measures that are meant to create a 
competitive edge and measures that are designed merely to level the playing field and to 
neutralize the distortions that already exist in the markets.
Third, a distinction should be drawn between inbound investments and outbound 
investments and between passive and portfolio investments and active and direct 
investments.
Fourth, a distinction should be drawn between the competitiveness of the tax system and the 
competitiveness of taxpayers (Especially corporate taxpayers resident in the country). The 
former can also be achieved by reducing the compliance and administrative costs and 
making the system more efficient thus requiring less resources to be invested in the operation 
of the system leading to lower tax needed to be raised from the public at large. The result 
should be beneficial to all taxpayers in that country. Although there is an overlap between 
the two types of competitiveness, improving the latter may not necessarily result in any 
benefit to the country whereas improving the latter will most likely improve the 
competitiveness of the resident companies by reducing their tax burden (and possibly also 
reducing their compliance costs, at least in the country of residence).
Fifth, short-term measures should be distinguished from long-term measures. Sometimes, in 
order to improve the competitiveness of companies, certain measures are adopted. These
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measures, which might be influenced by other considerations,144 may lead to a short-term 
benefit, which might prove as a long-term loss. If to use trade principles, it is possible to 
look at worldwide efficiency as being similar to free trade. As McDaniel noted,
“From Adam Smith and David Ricardo on, the main principle o f the economic theory o f
trade has been that o f comparative advantage  This principle highlights the fact that
countries differ in their ability to produce different goods. I f  a country specializes in 
producing the good which it can do most efficiently and trading the good fo r other goods, all
countries are better o ff and can attain a level o f welfare unattainable in autarky Hence,
the economist’s prescription fo r enhancing a country’s welfare has been, fo r  two centuries, 
free trade.”145
Nonetheless, free trade may not always be a feasible option, or more precisely, will not be in 
the policy makers’ best interests.146
144 As for example, political considerations that are discussed below (pp. 67-71).
145 McDaniel (2001) at 166.
146 See the discussion below in the context o f political considerations (pp. 67-71).
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Chapter 3 -  Additional Policy Considerations
Competitiveness, harmful tax competition & cooperation147
At the beginning of the discussion on competitiveness, I presented two types of 
competitiveness and moved to deal mainly with second level, the competitiveness of 
companies operating in the global world. At this stage, it is time to turn over to discuss some 
of the issues surrounding the first level, competition among countries.
A good way to illustrate the challenge is to use an example of a MNE, Intel, for example.148 
Although Intel is a US company, at least at the parent level, it has subsidiaries in many 
different countries and in most of these countries, if not all, Intel enjoys tax benefits which 
have important bearing on its decision whether to invest in that particular country. As a 
result, many countries, including developed countries, are engaged in a competition in an 
attempt to attract such MNEs like Intel to invest in their jurisdiction.149
There are several policies and arguments that revolve around one issue, the degree of 
cooperation and competition among the different jurisdictions in the area of taxation. The 
main question can be divided into two parts. First, what is the right balance between 
competition and cooperation among nations in tax matters and in what areas should one 
concept receive priority over the other. Second, to the extent that competition is good, how 
do we distinguish the good and contributing competition from the bad and harmful 
competition? In discussing ITA, a third question is added, where do we find ITA on the line 
between harmful and good competition? Is it part of the harmful competition measures and 
as such should be curbed or does it constitute good competition and thus should be allowed?
Ault describes this debate in the following way,
“Some see tax competition as a good and healthy thing -  it keeps the Hobbesian Leviathan in 
check, limits the state’s tendency to expend, promotes more efficient governmental services, 
and limits political pandering to domestic interest groups.
147 Obviously, this issue is wide enough in its scope to provide for a full thesis devoted to it exclusively. In this 
short part I do not aspire to conduct any comprehensive or thorough discussion o f  the different policies and 
arguments but merely to raise a few o f the opposing arguments and lay the foundation to the examination o f the 
application o f  ITA in this context.
148 This example is given by Avi-Yonah (2000) at 15.
149 Avi-Yonah (2000) at 15.
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On the other hand, there are those who see tax competition as resulting in a destructive 
"race to the bottom ”. Tax competition causes "bidding wars ’’ in competing for mobile 
activities, ultimately resulting in no tax at all on mobile capital; it make redistributive non- 
benefits-based income taxation impossible; it may require states to shift to other revenue 
sources, force a reduction in capital expenditures to a sub-optimal level; it can prevent the 
implementation o f democratically arrived at tax policy decisions as to tax mix and tax level, 
and generally leaves all countries worse off.
As in many situations which are characterized by polar views, there is an element o f truth in 
both positions. ”150
According to Shaviro,151 there are areas where competition and not necessarily 
harmonization is the appropriate policy that will bring the markets into a state of efficiency. 
A well-known theory supports the idea that to a large extent tax jurisdictions are very similar 
to private companies in the market place. According to this theory, A Pure Theory o f Local 
Expenditures,152 better known as the Tiebout Theory, to a large extent competition and lack 
of controlling monopolies or cartels is the appropriate way for tax jurisdictions to become 
more efficient and to avoid wasteful expenditures on part of the governments.153
This view (of tax competition) is shared to a certain extent by Shaviro, who regards 
international taxation as an area where (as opposed to tariffs) competition and not 
harmonization is the appropriate policy to follow.154
Thus arguably, any attempts to control competitiveness among nations in a way of 
multilateral agreements that would impose some sort of a pre-agreed tax burden on the 
participants (the taxpayers) would result in inefficiency and as such should be avoided.
Steichen, discussing the issue in a European context, argues that harmonization and 
cooperation can lead the smaller countries to waive and adapt their tax systems to 
accommodate the needs of larger countries that find it harder to complete with smaller 
countries, resulting in a “tax cartel” whereby the higher rate of taxation is imposed on the 
smaller countries thus preventing them from effectively competing with more developed
150 Ault (2002) at 2.
151 Shaviro (2002).
152 Tiebout (1956) at 416.
153 Ibid. but c f Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1611 commenting on the compatibility o f  the Tiebout theory to international 
tax and in particular the freedom to move from one place to another and the limitation to benefit taxes which 
appears to be more problematic at the international level.
'*4 Shaviro (2002).
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countries. The risk of a “tax cartel” might also give rise to the leviathan argument according 
to which tax competition is necessary to contain and control government expenditure and 
expansion.155
In addition, Steichen is of the opinion that tax should be regarded as another element in the 
country’s profile, just like its proximity to the markets, its population and its national 
resources.156 Arguably, if some countries may use their geographical advantages to benefit 
their economy and attract investments, why other countries cannot do it by using fiscal 
incentives?
On the other hand of the competitiveness spectrum we have the well-known and often 
recited “race to the bottom” argument, according to which open and uncontrolled 
competition among different tax jurisdictions would lead many tax jurisdictions to a 
substantial reduction of their tax rates and as a result of their tax revenues, in a way that 
would damage the ability of some of these jurisdictions to finance their welfare policies.157
158
This “race to the bottom” argument, however, is based on a premise that is not necessarily 
valid. It assumes that lack of co-operation in tax matters would necessarily lead to the same 
result obtained in the classic game of no co-operation, “the prisoner dilemma”. It ignores 
governments’ ability to make choices, which do not necessarily lead to reduction of rates or 
to harmful consequences.159
The major issue is probably the welfare state and the large existing and future liabilities that 
most of the developed countries (with US in the lead) have to include in their budget. This 
issue puts the more developed countries at a different level from the level of the developing 
countries as far as their minimum budget requirements are concerned.
155 Steichen (2003).
156 Ibid.
157 This is especially so with small tax jurisdictions that have very limited resources but are anxious to attract 
foreign investments to their territoiy, often at the expense o f larger and more developed jurisdictions that cannot 
afford competing with the small jurisdictions, to a large extent due to the budgetary obligations they have towards 
their citizens. According to this argument, there are small jurisdictions, most o f which are jurisdictions that 
provide no welfare or other similar benefits to their taxpayers, are able to afford a very low tax rate mainly 
because they do not have any obligations or do not propose to provide any social or similar services to their 
residents and citizens. These small jurisdictions are able to use what can be referred to as their low maintenance 
costs and attract tax revenues from more developed countries, countries that because o f  their social and welfare 
policies cannot afford to reduce their intake from tax revenues but are forced to due to the competition from these 
small jurisdictions which are free o f these obligations. Obviously, supporters o f competition may argue that this 
competition is a good reason for the more developed jurisdictions to revisit and reexamine their policies and 
priorities and to become more efficient as a result.
158 It is questionable whether this concern should receive any particular attention.
159 Radaelli (2003) at 151-152, discussing other responses governments might choose to follow.
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The OECD and EU initiatives were based on the concept that there are some regimes or 
incentives that attempt to grant taxpayers the tax benefits without the latter “paying the 
price”. In other words, one country attracts the income to benefit from it while the burden 
(the social benefits) is borne by another country. These regimes would usually include ring- 
fencing which is tax reliefs that are only offered to non-residents and are not offered to 
residents.160
In conclusion, tax competition involves not only disadvantages but also advantages. For 
example, tax competition may lead to control over government expenditure and the 
increasing of efficiency. It is more likely that countries with less welfare obligations and 
more efficient governmental sector that also seek a bigger share of the world’s revenues 
would be more eager to engage in tax competition as a method to use their low governmental 
and social obligations in an attempt to increase their share of the tax revenues. Although it is 
possible that in the future the scope of the harmful competition would be wider and include 
query regarding the extent to which small countries should finance the costs of larger 
countries’ social obligations, at present the focus appears to be on situations whereby one 
country is trying to offer tax advantages without bearing the costs.
“Thus another way o f describing the problem is that under tax competition owners o f mobile 
capital are able to benefit from the social arrangements their country supported by general 
government services without paying the social agreed cost. ”,6i
ITA, similar to harmful tax competition, raises some questions of competitiveness among 
jurisdictions and of the ability to substitute between jurisdictions, either completely or almost 
completely.162 To the extent that there is complete or almost complete jurisdiction 
substitution, taxpayers are likely to prefer transactions with jurisdictions that would result in 
ITA and thus lower overall tax burden.
However, there are also some important distinctions from harmful tax competition. Unlike 
harmful tax competition, ITA is, to a large extent, not the result of a deliberate measure 
designed to attract foreign investments into the country, at low or no cost to the host country. 
ITA results from the interaction between the general tax laws of two or more jurisdictions, 
rules that developed over time independent of each other and operate independently which
160 See generally the EU Code o f Conduct of 1 December 1997 (published in the Official Journal o f the European 
Union 6.1.1998 - http ://europa. eu. int/eur-lex/pri/en/oi/dat/1998/c 002/c 00219980106en00020005.pdf 1.
161 Roxan (2003b) at 27.
162 See also, Edgar (2003).
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might also partly explain the availability of ITA. As such it is not a specific measure and 
most like not an intentional measure but rather an unintended mismatch that turns out to the 
taxpayer’s benefit. Yet, its consequences might prove to be very similar and although ITA is 
not included, to a large extent, within the definition of harmful tax competition, it is 
questionable whether ITA should receive similar response as harmful tax competition. 
Unlike harmful tax competition, in case of ITA, it is harder to isolate the part of the 
legislation that creates the ITA as it is part of the general tax system.
Absent harmonization, the reaction is likely to be a specific denial of benefits with respect to 
specific types of transactions. As it is discussed below,163 in examining the experience of 
ITA in both the US and UK, it is possible to reach two interim conclusions. First, it is usually 
the country into which the investment is routed that would act to prevent the ITA. Second, a 
distinction is usually drawn between direct and portfolio investments. Countries that do 
decide to act against ITA would tend to do so with respect to the former but not with respect 
to the latter.
163 In particular, see the discussion in chapter 8 below.
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Revenue Loss
Prima facie, in ITA there should be a revenue loss because the taxpayer is enjoying (whether 
independently or with other parties) a tax advantage for free and, intuitively, someone has to 
bear the cost. That is, there has to be a loss to compensate for the free advantage. However, 
the situation is not always clear and the loss is usually not very easy to identify.
The loss is the result of taxpayers’ ability to structure a transaction that achieves the same 
objective at a lower tax price (either a perfect or near perfect substitute164). This, however, is 
the view from a global perspective. There is a “global” loss because there is no matching at 
the global level and a transaction is structured to achieve a lower tax cost at the global level 
although at the narrow domestic level there is no revenue loss and the transaction is not 
subject to a lower tax burden than a similar transaction would in the absence of ITA (for 
example, a Hybrid instrument that is classified as debt for country X purposes will enjoy the 
interest deduction both when there is an ITA and where there is no ITA). Where there can be 
a loss is if the investment instead of being made in a way that would lead to also higher tax 
revenues is structured in a different way to benefit from the ITA opportunities.165 As a result, 
the country manages to collect fewer revenues due to the change in the investment 
preferences.
If policy is determined at the country level and policy decisions are taken at the country level 
and the main rationale behind revenue loss is the potential harm to the losing country’s 
revenue base without the advantage of a justifying benefit,166 why should it matter if there is 
a loss in at the global level as long as no country suffers any loss as a result?
In that context, the following three questions should be examined.
A Revenue Loss or an Ultimate Revenue Gain
It can be argued, however, that while there might be a revenue loss when focusing on the 
direct tax consequences of the specific transaction, this might not be the situation if a broader 
perspective is adopted with respect to the transaction in question. There might be some 
related gains that would result from the transaction and from the fact that the transaction can
164 Edgar (2003).
165 See also Edgar’s argument on ITA as a low taxed substitute (Edgar (2003)).
166 Arguably, if  less taxes are collected -  the burden is split among fewer taxpayers each required to pay more 
taxes as a result with the possibility o f the country having less funds to finance its operations.
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be conducted in this specific manner and with these specific tax consequences that would 
result in an overall revenue gain sufficient to offset (or even exceed) the alleged revenue 
loss.167
There might be some non-tax and even non-fiscal advantages that result from an ITA 
situation that have to be taken into account when the issue of potential revenue loss is 
discussed. It is quite possible that as a result of the ITA, certain non-tax advantages are 
achieved at the “expense” of the revenue loss.168 Can these advantages, to the extent they 
exist justify the existence of ITA and any revenue loss that results from its existence? Can it 
be regarded as an incentive that would encourage and expand an industry that otherwise 
might not be that popular and thus create more opportunities for tax revenues that would 
ultimately offset the initial loss (a correction of a possible market failure?)? Connecting to 
our discussion above,169 can it be regarded as a measure to correct the market failure thus 
arguably justifying the revenue loss, which might ultimately become a revenue gain?170 Even 
if not, it is possible that despite the disadvantages, there is a justification for the revenue 
loss.171
The link to efficiency leads to another possibility, that the revenue loss is masked by revenue 
gain from other sources, thus becomes “invisible” in general reports and studies.172 Avi- 
Yonah, while discussing the issue of revenue losses in the context of tax competition, refers 
to a recent OECD report on harmful tax competition and comments as follow,
“The recent OECD Report on harmful tax competition argues that tax competition should be
curbed primarily to prevent erosion o f the revenue bases o f OECD member countries......
Unfortunately, the OECD Report contains no numerical data to bolster its claim that tax 
bases are eroding as a result o f harmful tax competition. Aggregate data on tax collections, 
which section III.B reviews, do not support the claim: there is no evidence that overall 
revenue from the personal or corporate income tax in OECD member countries has declined
167 Quite similar to the “spill-over” argument regarding reduction of tax rate as a mechanism to attract new 
investments (or to generate more economic activity) - the increased revenues from other sources associated with 
the increase in investments and their volume are meant to compensate for the loss o f revenues resulting from the 
reduction in the tax rate.
168 For example, if  granting a certain tax benefit (a cost to the country) would result in improving employment or 
expanding an existing under performing industry, Such industries would bring the country revenues that is not 
collected today thus cover (or even more than cover) the initial costs. See also the discussion regarding tax 
competition above (pp. 54-58).
169 See pp. 25-26 above.
170 Alternatively, should it be regarded as a protectionist measure harming free trade and the efficiency o f the 
markets?
171 Cf. the OECD survey on the justification for tax sparing provisions in tax treaties as a mechanism for 
attracting foreign investments (OECD (1998)).
172 For example, increase in revenues from income from labor masking a decrease in revenues from capital.
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as a percentage o f either GDP or total tax revenues from 1965 to 1995. However, these data 
do not distinguish between revenue from labor and revenue from capital, and it may be that 
a decline in the tax revenues from taxing capital is masked by a rise in revenues from taxing 
labor. This hypothesis would be consistent with the findings on changes in the overall tax 
mix reported below in section III.B.”m
Since a country needs to raise a certain amount of revenue to finance its public sector, the 
government will most likely be required to find other source of revenue to compensate for 
the loss of revenues from investments that benefit from ITA. If the government is successful 
in its quest for alternative sources of revenue, this might have the effect of disguising the 
actual revenue loss.
Whose Revenue Loss is it?
This discussion leads us to the second issue, whose revenue loss is it? An objection that 
logically follows in this context is that the revenue loss, even if it exists, cannot be assigned 
to any particular jurisdiction. As a result, we are left with an open answer to the question of 
who is worse off, which countiy loses from the existence of ITA, from this revenue loss.
If we examine the situation of double-dip leasing,174 in both countries the taxpayers are able 
to enjoy tax ownership and its associated attributes. As a result of the asymmetry in the 
direction of the transactions (i.e. no or very few non-ownership leases or no very few 
taxpayer disadvantaged transactions) both countries allow tax depreciation with respect to 
the same property while only one country taxes the income that corresponds to these tax 
depreciations. Prima facie, at the global level, there is a revenue loss as there is no matching 
between the income and expenses (i.e. one deduction too many). Assuming such position is 
maintained, the question is who is the “loser” of the revenue in the case of ITA, if at all. 
Theoretically, if there is a global revenue loss, there has to be also a local revenue loss i.e. at 
the end of the day the loss has to be borne by at least one tax jurisdiction. But which one?
Does the Revenue Loss Warrant Intervention?
Assuming we accept the argument that there is a revenue loss (and assuming that it is 
possible to identify the country in every given ITA situation), we still have to determine 
whether this revenue loss warrants intervention on part of the losing country.
173 Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1597.
174 This example is further discussed below (pp. 168-209).
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This should be a question of cost and benefit taking into account not only considerations of 
efficiency, equity and competitiveness but also considerations such as foreign policy, 
political considerations and administrative feasibility.175 
All these are further discussed below.
175 For example, sometimes the country that suffers from the ITA is not the one that can react to it. A recent 
practical example to illustrate this issue is the Check the Box legislation in the US. As a result o f  the legislation, it 
became possible for many companies to assert a hybrid entity status i.e. to be taxed as a company in their country 
o f residence and as a transparent entity in the US (or vice versa). While the country suffering revenue loss is not 
necessarily the US, the US is probably the country which is in the best position to act against the hybrid nature of 
these entities.
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Unintended Resuit
According to Avi-Yonah one important distinction between harmful tax competition and 
ITA is that the latter was not intended by both countries. With harmful tax competition the 
outcome is intended, at least by one of the countries involved. Arguably, this is clearly not 
the situation with ITA where the taxpayer is using the interaction between the different tax 
systems to her advantage in a way that was not intended by either country. For that reason, 
Avi-Yonah argues that it is far easier to reach a consensus on curbing ITA than to agree on 
curbing harmful tax competition.176
Two questions should be asked at this stage.177 First, does the fact that either country did not 
intend the outcome mean that there is a stronger argument against ITA (or in support of 
curbing ITA)? Second, does the mere fact that the outcome was not intended mean that it 
would be easier to achieve a consensus on curbing ITA?
Theoretically, this argument might be correct since the two countries did not intend the result 
that is achieved and therefore it seems that they will be more inclined to prevent this 
unintended result. This is especially true if our comparable is a situation whereby one 
country adopts a legislation aimed at attracting foreign investments while the other country, 
a capital exporter country, looks for ways to prevent its tax base reduction.
However, this argument assumes one important element, the behavior of the country that is 
“benefiting” from the ITA. Arguably, if one country is getting an advantage from the 
existence of the ITA (whether this advantage is direct or indirect) then this country might not 
be very anxious to give up this advantage, even if obtained unintentionally.178
Thus, it is possible that despite failing to take the possibility of ITA into account during the 
structuring and drafting of the tax system, once it realizes the benefits associated with ITA, 
the country might follow one of these two options. First, it might decide that the ITA in its 
existing version is in line with its overall international tax policy goals and as such allow it to 
continue and exist (Even though it was not planned in advance) or that it has no reason to 
object to its existence. Second, the country might realize that allowing ITA is inconsistent
176 Avi-Yonah (1999-2000) at 173.
177 A third question, what was the intended by the legislation is addressed separately below.
178 This is especially if the current situation is inefficient and it is believed that ITA would lead to Pareto- 
optimum. Moreover, this argument should be regarded alongside other arguments above according to which a 
country may, on occasions, act even contrary to its self-interest in order to maintain some sort o f other benefit 
(see my discussion above, pp. 44-46).
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with its overall international tax policy yet allows it to exist because it furthers other certain 
tax or non-tax goals.
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Chapter 4 - Practical Considerations
Below are, by way of introduction for a further discussion later in this work, three additional 
possible explanations for policy attitude of countries toward ITA. At this stage I shall only 
present the issues and not follow into a discussion regarding the merits of these explanations. 
This discussion will take place later in this work.
Foreign Policy
An important policy issue that is sometimes overlooked in the debate of equity and 
efficiency is the importance of foreign policy in determining international tax policy. The 
US, for example, uses its tax system to further certain foreign policy goals. From a neutrality 
perspective, the use of foreign aid or foreign subsidies is preferable instead of the use of tax 
incentives. By following the former the foreign policy goals are achieved while the tax 
system is unaffected. The support given to the foreign jurisdictions or to investments there is 
outside the tax system and from a pure economic tax perspective, this approach is usually 
preferable because it does not alter the effect of taxes on the participants in the market. Thus, 
for example, the US, as a policy matter does not allow for tax sparing provisions in its 
double tax conventions with other countries (whether developed or developing) despite the 
international norm in this field.179
In certain cases, however, granting subsidies or foreign aid outside the tax system is not 
practical or possible. For example, where a certain country is interested in deterring its 
taxpayers from investing in a certain foreign country. A good example is the way in which 
the US conducts its tax treaty policy and more recently, the expedient approval of the tax 
treaties with Australia, UK and Mexico following the war in Iraq and the support of these 
countries in the US position.180
Thus, foreign policy, instead of other tax principles or policies, is the reason behind the 
implementation / use of a certain tax measure or provision.181 In that way the tax system may 
allow a country to make it more attractive for other countries to cooperate with it.182
179 Cf. the UK, which uses tax-sparing provisions in some o f its tax treaties.
180 In this respect it should be noted that part o f the declared purpose o f tax treaties is to further the relations 
between the two contracting states. In that sense, a tax treaty by its nature, is regarded as an implementation o f  
foreign policy and not only o f narrow tax policy. This is reflected not only in the decision to negotiate a tax treaty 
but more importantly in the substantive provisions o f the tax treaty which may alter the tax consequences o f a 
cross-border investment that is subject to the application o f that tax treaty and may result in disparity vis-^-vis 
investment in other countries which are subject to the application of different tax treaties.
181 Another example is found in the Subpart F rules and in particular the special implications o f investments in 
countries that are on the list o f boycotted countries, a list that is included in the regulations, (IRC §952(a)(3)(B) 
and §999).
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In addition, following the above-mentioned concept of redistribution183 using the tax system 
to further foreign policy goals can become more common. The questions to ask are whether 
the tax system is the place to apply such concepts and to what extent is it justified. With 
respect to the first question, economists and other followers of the efficiency principle will 
probably take the view that the tax system is probably not the place to implement such 
policies. Such policies, to the extent that they are warranted and justified, should be applied 
outside the tax system, for example, through the use of foreign aid. In such way, these 
policies can achieve both the goals of foreign policy on one hand and not hinder other tax 
policy and principles on the other hand.
Such approach, however, may not always be available or feasible. Moreover, since to a large 
extent, countries may regard the tax system as a legitimate mechanism to implement foreign 
policy goals, the use of the tax system for such purposes can be anticipated. Even though 
such use will probably hinder other tax principles and create preferences based on foreign 
policy considerations.
Once ITA is created, foreign policy might serve as a consideration in the decision whether to 
oppose or to allow ITA to continue and take place as such decision is likely to have foreign 
policy consequences.184 Kane regards ITA as an opportunity for a country, like the US, to 
react by disallowing the benefits in a method that would serve as a positive signal to other 
countries of the country’s willingness to cooperate.185 Such an argument, however, assumes 
that intervention is justified and that signaling goes only in one direction. In some situations, 
however, signaling might not be beneficial for a country, because it would not serve as a 
justified policy, for example, with respect to inbound portfolio investment. Sometimes, 
foreign policy might dictate no reaction. A good example is when ITA exists in a transaction 
between the country and another country and the first country wishes to encourage and 
promote the trade relations with that other country. In this case, the act of disallowing the 
ITA might be regarded as a signal in the other direction contrary to the foreign policy 
objective of the first country. That is because such an act might be perceived by the other 
country as a disincentive for cross-border trade and even as an aggressive act meant to 
capture the revenue.186
182 For example, 2001 US -  UK tax treaty, art. 10(3).
183 See p. 35 above.
184 See for example -  Kane (2004) (arguing for the use of ITA as a signaling method in relation to other 
countries).
185 Ibid.
186 For the second possibility -  see generally Shaviro (2002).
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One last point that should be noted is that all the issues discussed above are relevant not only 
with respect to the structure and design of the country tax policies but also on the design and 
structure of other countries’ tax policies. In that sense, it is not only the foreign policy 
objectives of a country that influence its tax policy decisions but also the foreign policy 
objectives of other countries towards the first country that affect their and eventually its tax 
policy decisions.
Political Considerations
“The collection  o f  a ll th ose  in terests in this country represen ts  
w h at the p o litica l system  is -  a n d  the p o li tic a l system  crea tes  
the tax system. A n d  th a t’s  w h y  the tax system  is so r ta  ’ like an 
inner tube that has been p a tc h e d  abou t 150 times. ”m
Another important element that should be mentioned in this respect is the political element. 
As it was recognized long ago, taxation without representation is a tyranny and taxpayers, at 
least in a democracy, have the power to control tax policy or at least to scrutinize it, through 
the election ballots. A decision not to support a domestic company vis-a-vis foreign 
competitors may result in reduction in the work force of the domestic company and lead to 
ramifications on Election Day.188
In modem days, in addition to the classic representation, the ability to get elected is also 
affected by the presence and influence of pressure groups and lobbyists. Thus, companies, 
even in the absence of a right to vote, have influence on the way tax policy decisions are 
made. The influence, however, is usually with those who have the political power sufficient 
to influence and not necessarily with the public at large. A decision whether to allow or 
disallow foreign taxpayers to enjoy the benefits of ITA can be influenced by pressure from 
domestic companies no less than by considerations of revenue loss, efficiency or equity.
For example, throughout the last forty-some years since the introduction of the CFC
legislation in the US, much of the legislation (including the original Act that was passed)
was the result of a compromise between the different pressure groups and the approach taken 
by the Administration.189
187 US Representative Byron Dorgan (1986) quoted in Steinmo (1993) at 160.
188 See the example above. As Funk comments in the context o f the US FSC regime which caused upset in the 
EU, “those measures annoy only Europeans, who do not vote in our elections” (Funk (2001)).
189 The business community in the US is quite powerful politically and examples for its activities in the tax area 
are the different reports that were published in recent years by institutions like the NFTC (for example, NFTC 
(2001). In addition, this was the initial reason for the adoption o f measures against Canadian companies operating
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Political considerations can also explain a decision by a country to support the conduct of 
certain activities by domestic operators although it might be more beneficial from a pure 
economic perspective, to move these activities to another country in the form of contract 
manufacturing.190
Political considerations are more significant where representatives stand for reelection after 
short periods in office, usually not exceeding four years. As a result, representatives would 
tend to focus on short-term gains and are less interested in long-term benefits, especially 
when such benefits can be achieved at the cost of short-term loss.191 Unfortunately, this 
consideration is not always part of the discussion.
The literature both legal and economic on this subject usually divides into one of two 
possible approaches: public interest theory and public choice theory. According to the 
former, government seeks to improve general welfare and society whereas according to the 
latter, the resulting legislation is the result of well-organized interest groups, which operate 
to maximize the benefits of their members (including governmental officials and 
politicians).192
This relation between interest groups and politicians and its affect on tax policy, in its US 
context, is noted by Steinmo as follows,
“Most politicians would agree that the influence o f special interest groups in America often 
undermines their desire to make good public policy. But the rub is that these same officials 
have a competing preference -  they want to get reelected. Getting reelected requires the 
support o f the interest groups.
Most elected officials have not abandoned their desire to make good public policy; they 
merely feel compelled sometimes to prioritize the competing preferences. ”193
in the US that according to US businesses were able to use the inconsistency in the tax laws o f both countries to 
improve their competitiveness vis-&-vis US companies.
190 See for example, the FSC regime in the US, discussed above (pp.45-46).
191 For example, improving the countiy’s long-term economic outlook at the cost o f  moving activities that are 
conducted domestically to be conducted abroad thus freeing local resources to other more activities that are likely 
to be more beneficial at the long-term. In the short-term, the cost is loss o f large amounts o f work places and 
raising unemployment. In the long-term, the country will be better off because it is not able to maintain the 
conduct o f the transferred activities without subsidizing these activities and moving these activities abroad would 
allow that country to buy the same services from abroad at a low price while being able to better invest its 
resources which were partially invested in financing the subsidy.
192 Shaviro (1990) at 6-7.
193 Steinmo (1993) at 198-199.
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By contrast, in the UK, the structure of the political institutions together with the election 
system provide the elected government with a relative strong majority which makes the 
Parliament and its committees role in tax policy rather limited and puts most of this power in 
the hands of the elected government. As a result, it enjoys more freedom and has less need to 
engage in political negotiation to promote its agenda.194 Nonetheless, despite its more solid 
status, the government still needs to ensure its reelection and thus some effect does exist, 
although clearly less than the one that exists in the US where the mechanism is much more 
decentralized and, as part of the system, the power is divided between the executive and the 
legislator and in the latter among a relatively high number of people.
Shaviro argues that public choice and public interest are not exclusive and they omit two 
important considerations that can explain certain events that cannot be explained through 
either of the above-mentioned approaches. In addition, Shaviro argues that the tax system is 
to a large extent at the mercy of outside events that prevent it from following a predictable 
path. In general, his argument seeks to establish that, despite attempts by different scholars 
from different disciplines, there are some important limitations on the ability to predict the 
outcome of tax legislation.195
The two considerations that are omitted from discussion are: first, that proposing and 
enacting legislation is a means of symbolic communication by politicians to members of the 
general public with the result that regardless of the outcome of the legislation, such 
communication can promote reelection.196 Second, the legislative success is a method for 
exercising and demonstrating one’s power.197
An important tool in this process is of course the media and the ability of politicians to use it 
as an effective means of communication. The media allows representatives to collect the 
profits of a legitimate act even if the specific legislation benefiting from such profits is not 
part of their actual agenda.198 For that reason, tax planning that is attacked as inappropriate is 
not necessarily the one, which is more abusive than others. In many cases, the reason for the 
attack is the publication such planning received in the media, publication that lead politicians
194 Steinmo (1993) at 200.
195 As a basis for his arguments, Shaviro is examining the 1981 and the 1986 tax legislations in the US where an 
almost identical combination o f personnel in decision— making positions led to completely different types o f  
legislation.
196 See also Enrich (1996) at 378 referred to by Daniels (2001) at 5 where one o f the reasons mentioned for the 
popularity o f tax incentives is the image factor, the desire o f politicians to appear as taking care o f their voters’ 
interests.
197 Shaviro (1990) at 8.
198 Shaviro (1990).
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to act, even though there might be other more abusive planning opportunities that are still to 
a large extent, private.199 Only recently, in an attempt to regain some of the lost revenues, the 
UK Chancellor announced a crackdown on tax avoidance in the UK.200 The advantage of 
such a move, apart from the economic and monetary advantages, is a perception that big 
corporations are not allowed to get away with creative tax planning and that the government 
is interested in making sure that the tax system is fair.
ITA is a classic example of good use of the media to gain political support. Looking “too 
good to be true” and being used mostly by able taxpayers (i.e. those who can pay the fee -  
either large corporations or wealthy individuals) ITA represents something that looks like a 
sophisticated tax avoidance scheme and would allow politicians to further their interests with 
their voting public. The only limitation is that these politicians would need to be cautious not 
to harm other interests, with interest groups for example, that might conflict with the first 
mentioned interests. When both the individual taxpayers and the big corporations are on the 
same side, the task becomes much easier.
The combination of political interests, interest groups, politicians seeking reelection and 
media can explain some of the debates on tax policy in the US. Two good examples are the 
debates on the use of domestic reverse hybrid entities by foreign investors and on the use of 
competitiveness of US corporations abroad. This point is well illustrated by the recent 
outsourcing debate. With respect to the debate in the US, it was recently commented,
“ When a presidential election year coincides with an uncertain economy, campaigning 
politicians invariably invoke an international economic issue as a dire threat to the well­
being o f Americans. Speechwriters denounce the chosen scapegoat, the media provides 
blanket coverage o f the alleged threat, and legislators scurry to introduce supposed 
remedies.
The cause o f this year’s commotion is offshore outsourcing -  the alleged migration o f  
American jobs overseas. ”201
One last point. A known principle of tax reform (and change in general) is that while those 
who benefit from the reform are not always identifiable, those who intend to suffer are not 
identifiable but also tend to be active in their objection. This principle helps to distinguish
199 It is a known convention that for a successful tax planning to remain successful it must not reach the front 
page o f the Wall Street Journal.
200 Parker, BUDGET 2004: Big rush to crack down on abusive schemes, FT, Mar 19, 2004.
201 Drezner (2004).
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between a “desired reform” and a “practical reform”. The former represents what should take 
place whereas the latter represents what will take place in practice. The more decentralized 
the legislature is, the bigger the difference is between what should take place and what 
actually takes place, as is also reflected in the quote at the beginning of this section.
Implementation
“Taxpayers have becom e g lo b a l; tax au thorities have not. They 
are necessarily national, o r a t best, they w ork  bila terally. Is it 
not obvious that tax authorities a re  fig h tin g  a  losin g  ba ttle?”202
Two issues should be addressed. First, the feasibility and effectiveness of such reform. 
Second, the administrative costs of such reform.
The first issue discussed here focus on the feasibility and effectiveness of such reform. The 
first part relates to the first issue discussed in the previous paragraph. Thus, it is not 
sufficient that the reform is desired and required, it is also necessary that the reform is 
support or at least not objected politically. A good example is the different treatment given in 
the US to outbound use of hybrid entities and to inbound use of the hybrid entities.
In addition, there is no reason to adopt a measure that cannot be properly applied and 
implemented. That is, in deciding whether to implement a certain measure, it is necessary to 
determine whether the country is in a position to administer such reform.
For example, ITA. There are two problems associated with ITA in this context. First, it is 
necessary to identify the existence of ITA in a given transaction. In most cases, regardless of 
the validity of the transaction, the tax authorities are unable to scrutinize it simply because 
they are unaware of it whether this is due to lack of reporting (because a report is not 
requested/required), to the inability on part of the tax authorities to review the reports that 
are submitted or the inability on part of the tax authorities to identify the relevant 
transactions (this latter point is important in the context of ITA because the ITA nature of the 
transaction will normally not be revealed by only looking at the tax return of one party).203 
Second, it is necessary to ensure that the inconsistency is in fact ITA and not the result of
202 Avery Jones (1999-2000).
203 Due to these reasons, among others, tax legislation in both the US and more recently in the UK require 
taxpayers to identify for the tax authorities transactions that might fall into die class o f tax avoidance, including in 
the US transactions that are treated inconsistently in two or more jurisdictions.
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inconsistent reporting of the facts in the two jurisdictions. That is, that the inconsistency 
results from legal inconsistency in the treatment of a similar factual situation by the tax 
systems of the two or more countries involved and not from a factual inconsistency that 
results from improper reporting and has no legal basis.
Even if a country decides to retain ITA, it is still necessary to distinguish the real ITA 
situations from the false ones. For that purpose, it is necessary to identify potential ITA 
situations. That can be done through the use of extensive reporting requirements that oblige 
taxpayers to report and identify transactions that seek to benefit from an inconsistent 
treatment in two or more jurisdictions and by the use of developed exchange of information 
mechanisms among countries to validate and review the information submitted by taxpayers.
Thus, the challenge facing the tax authorities whether ITA is objected to or not, is the ability 
to identify and scrutinize ITA transactions. Any legislative consideration that fails to take 
into account this element would eventually be rendered useless. This bring us to the second 
issue that cost-benefit analysis is not only relevant to the direct revenue loss or revenue gain 
calculation but also to other policy questions, for example, the cost of compliance and the 
complexity of maintaining the system before and after the change.
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Chapter 5 -  Background to the Case Studies 
United Kingdom
Overview
The British tax system which originated in 1799 with the first income tax imposed in 1803, 
is by many accounts, a complex system. The current system is probably best described as the 
outcome of the piecemeal legislation over the years. In the words of one commentator more 
than 30 years ago, “[T]he British tax system was built on brilliant nineteenth century 
foundations, but years ofpiecemeal changes added to the complexity and detracted from the 
logical framework o f the law.”204
The system is built around the more than 200 years old schedular system (as opposed to the 
US concept of “catch all” income definition). An item of income that is not covered by the 
schedules is not subject to tax. In addition, since 1965, capital gains are also subject to tax by 
virtue of a separate Act of Parliament, alongside the income and corporation taxes. Until 
then, all receipts that were characterized as capital (as opposed to income) were exempt from 
taxes as they were not included in any of the schedules.
The UK tax policy was described recently as follows,
“The Government sees the primary aim o f tax policy to be to raise sufficient revenue to pay 
fo r public services, while keeping the tax burden as low as possible. Tax policy needs to be 
based on clear principles. In the UK we see these as encouraging work, savings and 
investment. Fairness between all stakeholders is important, as is avoiding undesirable side 
effects and keeping compliance costs down.
We also need to pay attention to the UK's international competitiveness. We are committed 
to creating the best possible location for investment, to keep taxes on business as low as 
possible, and to ensure that the tax system reflects the modern environment. The focus o f 
recent reforms has been to maintain a low rate, broad/ base system, to reduce distortions 
and market failures, to remove outdated restrictions and to counter avoidance. ”205
204 Chown (1971) at 1.
205 Makhlouf (2001).
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Tiley recognizes four limitations on current UK tax law: the schedular system that 
does attempt to tax what falls between the schedules, the distinction between income 
and capital, the many exceptions from the tax base and the courts attitude towards tax 
avoidance.206
The system does not tax persons but rather income. Nevertheless, for it to apply there has to 
be some type of connection between the income or person and the UK. In general, income 
that has its source within the UK is subject to tax regardless of the residency of the taxpayer. 
At the same time, income from sources outside the UK is subject to tax only if the taxpayer 
is resident in the UK.207 This latter point, however, is too general especially with respect to 
the taxation of non-corporate entities208
UK resident companies are subject to tax with respect to their worldwide income. In 
addition, controlled foreign corporations legislation is in place to ensure that the taxpayers 
do not try to avoid the application of the tax through the incorporation of a foreign 
subsidiary.
206 Tilley (2000) at 25.
207 Colquhoun v. Brooks (1889) 2 TC 490 (HL).
208 The UK tax system distinguishes between the concept of a “domicile”, “an ordinary resident” and a “resident”. 
Different rules o f taxation apply depending on the type of classification the taxpayer in question qualifies for.
Tax Policy
According to the Inland Revenue, one of the important goals is to achieve a competitive tax 
system, which is also a fair system, a system that would attract investments into the UK and 
make the UK into an attractive place to be.209
The Inland Revenue continues and mentions six factors as features of a competitive tax 
system: a low rate and a broad tax base, neutrality, flexibility to accommodate and meet 
business realities and developments in both the business world and capital markets, 
consistency and coherency -  taxing two transactions with similar commercial result alike 
and minimizing the distortions caused by taxation in the decision making process, 
transparency, and responsiveness to market failure.210 In the process, the Inland Revenue 
intends to continue to remove outdated restrictions that exist in the tax system and to 
minimize tax distortions.211
A few years ago the Inland Revenue conducted a consultation process with respect to the 
appropriate system for double tax relief. In the course of consultation, the Inland Revenue 
reviewed the experience with the existing system of foreign tax credit and discussed the 
desirability of moving to exemption as the choice for foreign tax relief method, an alternative 
that was eventually not followed.
Prima facie, the combination of worldwide taxation, CFC legislation and the use of the 
foreign tax credit as a foreign tax relief mechanism would lead to the assumption that the UK 
is following a CEN as one of its policy goal. Not quite.
On one hand, the UK does not allow for a full foreign tax credit and thus technically, it does 
not follow CEN completely because its application of equal treatment to foreign and 
domestic investment is only to the extent that the foreign income is invested in a country that 
does not have a tax rate which is higher than the UK tax rate.212
In addition, the UK has quite generous foreign tax credit rules that allow for example for 
indirect foreign tax credit with respect to the taxes paid by the company distributing the 
dividend on its respective earnings.213 This entitlement applies without limitation of tiers as
209 HM Treasury & Inland Revenue (2003), at 2.
210 Ibid.
2U Ibid  at 5.
212 S.7 9 7 ICTA 1988.
213 S.799-803A and 806A-806K ICTA 1988. This form o f foreign tax credit should not be taken lightly as it 
constitutes over 4 billion pounds out o f approximately 5 billion pounds o f foreign tax allowed each year in credit.
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long as it can be established that there is a link of holding of at least 10% of the shares of the 
lower tier subsidiary from the distributing company to the ultimate UK recipient seeking the 
benefit of the indirect foreign tax credit. In the domestic sphere, a dividend paid by a UK 
resident company to another is completely exempt from tax. While the end result of both 
measures might be the same, it is not always the case.214
On the other hand, the UK, which until recently allowed off-shore pooling in foreign tax 
credit computation, allows today a more limited on-shore pooling in the calculation of 
foreign tax credit. This technique allows UK resident companies with investments in low tax 
jurisdictions and in high tax jurisdictions to “average” the foreign tax paid to reduce the risk 
of excess foreign taxes and to use the foreign tax credit mechanism more efficiently.
Another distinction that exists is with respect to outbound operations in the form of a branch 
and outbound operations in the form a subsidiary. The general rule is that the foreign 
subsidiary’s income should not be subject to UK taxation. The two main exceptions to this 
rule are situations where the subsidiary itself is subject to UK tax (either because it is 
considered as UK resident or because it has a permanent establishment in the UK) and 
situations where the income of the foreign subsidiary is subject to the application of the UK 
CFC legislation.
In discussing tax policy, an Inland Revenue official has pointed out several themes in the UK 
tax policy agenda.215 First, raising sufficient money to fund the operations of the 
government. Second, promotion of fairness in the system. Third, paying attention to the 
UK’s international competitiveness. In the process we should keep in mind the above- 
mentioned distinctions between fair competition and harmful tax competition and between 
measures that are designed to generate tax competition by improving the competitiveness of 
the taxpayers and measures that are designed to respond to tax competition generated by 
other tax systems.216 This latter type of measure is now also subject to limitation imposed by 
the international community and more importantly by the European Union.
In the context of fair and harmful tax competition, while the UK is committed to curb the 
latter, it is also committed to follow the former in improving its system and making the UK
214 Historically, the UK allowed also tax sparing as part o f its treaties. Although some o f the existing treaties still 
provide for such benefit, it appears not be part o f existing practice.
215 Makhlouf (2001).
216 See the discussion on tax competition above (pp. 54-58) and also -  Roxan (2003a).
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the best possible location for investments.217 This is done by either generating tax 
competition or by responding to existing legislation.
The UK is dependent on attracting foreign investments in order to maintain its economy and 
ability to satisfy its budgetary goals.218 One of the features of the UK economy for many 
years is its significant amounts of inbound and outbound investments flows.219 As a result, 
the UK has a strong interest in maintaining an appropriate and competitive international tax 
system that would encourage the continuation of these flows. In addition, it requires the UK 
to remain an attractive market for both foreign and domestic investments and as a favorite 
location for MNEs.220
The UK has low withholding tax rates with respect to interest and royalties (which can be 
reduced even further by an applicable tax treaty) and exempts dividends. Dividends and 
interest received by individuals are subject to lower tax rate.221The corporate tax rate has 
declined over the last decade to a rate of 30% today.222 In addition, some of its generous 
foreign tax credit provisions were designed to be attractive to MNEs and to assist them to 
operate in the UK.223
For many years, the UK, in the absence of natural resources (apart from North Sea oil) based 
its prosperity on strong banking and insurance industries and as a center for financial 
investments and trading. With the establishment of the EU, the UK found itself on the same 
level playing field as countries like Germany and was required to improve its 
competitiveness in order to attract foreign investments and retain its edge. Thus, for 
example, in the context of capital gains, the UK took the approach of not taxing non­
residents with respect to their gains regardless of whether the asset disposed of was located 
in the UK. A better example is the exemption granted to the investment funds management 
industry whereby gains and income of non-residents from investments are exempt from tax 
even though such investments were managed from the UK.224
217 Makhlouf (2001).
218 This ability might be undermined if  potential claims for a refund o f tax paid under a mistake o f law are 
approved with respect to taxes paid under provisions that were later held incompatible with EC law. See Edge & 
Airs (2003).
219 Chown (1971) at 21 and more recently Inland Revenue (1999) at 39.
220 According to the Inland Revenue, UK direct investment earnings from overseas increased from 12bn in 1987 
to 33bn in 1997. UK earnings from overseas portfolio income were 26bn in 1997 while the total investments o f  
UK persons in 1997 were 595.5bn in portfolio overseas investment holdings and 226bn in direct investments. 
Regarding inbound investments into the UK, the amount o f inward direct investment was $120bn in 2000 and 
only $28bn in 2002 (EIU).
221 Discussed by Roxan (2003a).
222 Roxan (2003a) at 488.
223 Ibid.
224 Roxan (2003a).
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Similarly, despite ongoing debate, the UK retains the special regime for the taxation of non­
domiciled residents (“remittance basis taxation”).225 Although, the regime applies with 
respect to individuals (mostly high net worth individuals with foreign source income), the 
regime makes the UK a favorable place to be for such people and as a result has an important 
effect on MNEs and large financial institutions who might be persuaded to move their 
headquarters into the country.
At the same time, this is not to say that there is complete acceptance of schemes that are 
perceived as abusive, at least by the Inland Revenue and Parliament. For example, the 
existence of strict transfer pricing rules, which starting in FA 2004 would apply, subject to 
certain exceptions, both domestically and cross-border and would replace to a large extent 
the thin-capital ization rules226 and specific provisions dealing with income on transfer of 
assets abroad by individuals.227
Moreover, the Revenue has recognized the change in policies as a result of priority changes, 
changes that may make a scheme that was allowed a few years ago unacceptable today. As 
the Inland Revenue has commented,
“It may be that policies, however costly in tax terms, which were seen as defensible in this 
country in times o f scarcity o f foreign currency are not so readily defensible today. 
Companies are now free to buy foreign currency but there are good commercial reasons for  
sticking to the borrowing route. Capital has to be acquired somehow and the Eurobond and 
other Eurocurrency borrowing have become major sources. Also a borrowing in the same 
currency as that o f the outward investment for which the borrowing is used gives protection 
to the investment from major shifts in value. A rise in the sterling equivalent o f  the borrowed 
funds is matched by a rise in the sterling value o f the investment.
It is nevertheless a fact that the cost to this country in tax terms is high and the matter is kept 
under review. To attack relief on future outward investment linked borrowing would call for  
a specific purpose test and would involve the problem o f identification -  fo r  what purpose 
was that particular borrowing used? Companies might be tempted to distort their borrowing 
patterns by financing a United Kingdom investment by foreign borrowing and leaving other
225 Roxan (2003a) at 488.
226 This issue is further discussed below in the context o f the impact of EC law on the UK tax policy.
227 S. 739-740 ITCA 1988, discussed by Roxan at 508.
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accrued resources for outward investment. This might suggest more arbitrary tests none o f 
which would be popular or easy to administer. ”228
A good example for this approach is the adoption of legislation to prevent the use of a 
planning that was commonly used during the 1970s -  1980s and which was referred to as the 
“Delaware Link”, dual residence companies that claimed to be residents of both the US and 
the UK thus entitled to claim tax deductions in both jurisdictions.229
Another good example for this approach is the legislation surrounding the definition of a 
“distribution” for UK tax purposes and in particular, the specific legislation with respect to 
hybrid equity notes. This legislation is discussed below as part of the case studies.230
This approach is also evident in the new US-UK DTC, which includes two specific anti­
planning provisions that were inserted at the request of the UK:231 provisions designed to 
prevent the use of conduit arrangements and provisions designed to make less beneficial the 
use of repo transactions that are treated inconsistently in the US and in the UK.232
The distinction in treatment can be explained in part in the distinction between direct and 
portfolio investments. On one hand, it appears that foreign portfolio investments are usually 
encouraged and the UK has established a relatively attractive system for non-residents who 
are interested to invest in the UK. This treatment includes low or no withholding taxes 
imposed on income and gains from portfolio investments (either by domestic law or by an 
applicable tax treaty), all of which makes the UK an attractive investment location for non­
residents. In addition, the relatively low tax imposed on such income may assist in making 
the financial markets more attractive to foreign investors, increasing the liquidity of these 
markets and making the raising of capital cheaper and assisting UK based companies to raise 
money to finance their operations, making them more competitive.233
The situation appears to be more restricted with respect to direct investments and especially 
financing aspect of direct investments, where the UK has restricted the application of certain
228 Inland Revenue International Tax Handbook, ^[1208.
229 S. 404 ICTA 1988 introduced simultaneously with the introduction o f IRC § 1503(d) in the US.
230 See pp. 141-144 below.
231 The anti-conduit arrangement provision is in Art. 3(l)(n) and Art. 23(4)(c). With respect to the former, for the 
first time in the UK treaty practice, the treaty includes both a anti-conduit arrangement provision and a limitation- 
on-benefits clause. This reflects the different approaches taken by the US and the UK with respect to prevention 
o f tax treaty abuse (Inland Revenue (2003)).
232 Art. 23(4)(c).
233 Although this can be one o f the reasons, there appears to be no indication that this is the express intention 
behind the legislation. Com pare-the US policy discussed below (pp. 96-113).
79
tax advantageous financing methods.234 This more restricted approach can be explained by a 
desire to maintain the competitiveness of UK based multinationals on one hand (allowing 
such transactions might result in foreign based multinationals’ ability to raise cheaper 
finance due to the tax advantage) and by the premise that a financing transaction between 
related parties is more likely to be motivated by tax considerations. Foreign direct 
investments fall into this category.235
234 See, for example, the equity notes legislation in 1992.
235 This is part o f the investment v. ownership balance that is further discussed below (pp. 221-235).
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The European Union
With the decision to join the European Union (EU / EC) the UK has waived certain elements 
of its fiscal sovereignty. While the theoretical waiver took place many years ago, for many 
years, the UK continued to plan, to a large extent, without taking the EU and its tax policy 
into account.236 For example, many of the provisions dealing with export leasing that are 
discussed in more detail below,237 were adopted during the 1970s and amended again in 1997 
and are potentially in violation of EC law principles. Similar examples are the 1992 equity 
notes legislation and more recently, certain provisions of the 2001 US-UK DTC whose 
validity under EC law is uncertain.238
Although the UK tax legislation was changed in recent years, partially as a result of ECJ 
decisions,239 it was only recently that EC law became a relevant consideration in UK tax 
legislation process. In its 2003 Consultation paper, the Inland Revenue amended its past 
failure to address the issue and referred to the need to comply with EC law requirements as 
part of the considerations that led to the abolition of the thin capitalization rules and the 
introduction of new transfer pricing rules that would be applied both domestically and 
internationally.240
“The previous year's offering, in August 2002, had failed to address the big issues o f the 
moment, the impact o f International Accounting Standards and the effect o f  the European 
Court judgments. 2003's consultative document does face up to those issues, at least in some 
degree, but attempts to discreetly close the door when the horse is already half out o f the 
stable. "24‘
The discussion of EC tax policy should be divided into two main parts, internal tax policy 
relating to the establishment and operation of the internal market and external tax policy 
guiding the EC tax policy vis-a-vis third countries.
With respect to the latter, in a recent communication, the Commission has announced the 
following two goals. First, to stop the erosion of certain types of tax revenues, in particular,
236 To a certain extent such approach can be justified as being a pragmatic and practical approach that sought to 
minimize, in absence o f positive direct tax legislation, the possible negative effect o f ECJ decisions on the 
system. It appears that the court’s approach in Saint Gobain to subsequent changes o f domestic law to comply 
with EC law can be seen as supporting the UK “wait and see” approach.
237 See pp. 197-203 below.
238 See generally, Clark (2003) and Craig (2003).
239 For example, the change to UK group rules as a result o f the ECJ decision in C -264/96ICI v. Colmer, and the 
extension o f DTC application to cover branches following the ECJ decision in C-307/97 Saint Gobain.
240 HM Treasury & Inland Revenue (2003), chapter 3, at 15-18.
241 Troup (2003).
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those revenues from taxes on capital. This goal is in line with the EU participation in the 
OECD Harmful Tax Competition initiative and its publication of the “Code of Conduct” as 
part of its own initiative against harmful tax competition. Second, to “improve the 
competitiveness o f European companies and to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world ”242
Internally, the focus has been and is still, to establish and operate an efficient common 
internal market. This goal is set forth in Art. 2 of the EC Treaty,
“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic 
and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in 
Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced and 
sustainable development o f economic activities... ”
For that purpose, Art. 3(1 )(c ) provides that “an internal market characterised by the 
abolition, as between MS, o f obstacles to free movement o f goods, persons, services and 
capital.”
The history and probably much of the present state of European taxation with respect to 
harmonization or even co-ordination in the area of corporate taxation is probably best 
illustrated with the following quotation
“There have been a number o f detailed reports examining the lack o f harmonization o f 
corporate income taxes in Europe and the resulting problems and suggesting potential 
solutions. Despite these efforts, there are still 15 different corporate tax systems operating 
within the EU. ...It is extremely difficult to quantify the costs that the lack o f harmonization, 
or even co-ordination imposes upon the Union. And harmonization, or even co-ordination 
requires individual governments to relinquish control over at least part o f  their ability to 
raise tax revenue. To date, European governments have not demonstrated great enthusiasm 
for corporate tax harmonization, and earlier proposals fo r  greater co-ordination o f 
corporate income taxes within the EU met with considerable resistance. However, the recent 
growth o f international policy initiatives on business taxation indicates a desire to address at 
least some o f the issues that have been causing concern. ”243
242 COM[2003] 726 final at 3 referring to point 5 o f the Presidency Conclusions from the Lisbon European 
Council 23 and 24 March 2000.
243 Bond et al., (2000).
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The EC Treaty includes very few provisions dealing specifically or explicitly with taxation 
and with direct taxation in general. Of these few rules, Art. 94 provides that any positive 
legislation in fiscal matters shall be made only by unanimous agreement of MS. This 
provision has the effect of retaining the power to tax and legislate on tax matters in the hands 
of MS, unless such power is unanimously exercised by the EC in accordance with the 
provision of Art. 94.
At the normative level, EC law impact on MS in the direct taxation matters can be divided 
into three groups.
First, positive legislative initiatives either in the form of directives that are binding on MS 
and are also directly applicable to MS tax systems even without a formal act of incorporation 
into their domestic legislation,244 in the form of conventions that are binding on MS but are 
not directly applicable, or in the form of soft legislation, guiding principles rather than 
binding commitments.
Second, ECJ case law applying the provisions of the EC Treaty. The EC Treaty does not 
include many articles dealing specifically in taxation issues. However, Art. 12, which 
provides the general principle that there should be no discrimination on the basis of 
nationality and Art. 23, 39, 43/48, 49, and 56,245 which provide the rules of the Treaty 
freedoms, freedoms that should be maintained based on the general principle in Art. 3(1 )(c ) 
above. The ECJ, in applying and interpreting the EC Treaty with respect to direct tax issues, 
has found that the EC Treaty freedoms in Art. 23, 39, 43/48 and 56 (and to a more limited 
extent also the non-discrimination requirement in Art. 12) apply to direct taxation questions, 
despite the absence of express reference in the EC Treaty to direct taxation.246
Unlike the situation in indirect taxation where to a large extent tax sovereignty is kept at the 
EU level, MS retain the discretion of how to structure their national tax system and whether 
to shift the tax burden from direct taxation to indirect taxation and vice versa.247
The ECJ has recognized that while MS retain sovereignty and discretion in most direct tax 
matters, these powers have to be exercised in accordance with the principles of EC law and 
subject to the provisions of the EC Treaty as interpreted by the ECJ and avoid any overt or
244 EC Treaty, Art. 94.
245 Freedom on the movement o f goods, o f workers, o f the right o f establishment, o f services and o f capital, 
respectively. These principles are further discussed below.
246 Schon, (2002) at 97 referring to a series o f decisions, and fundamentally, C-270/83 European Commission v. 
France (Avoir Fiscal).
247 Schon (1999) at 915.
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covert discrimination on the basis of nationality.248 As a result, the discretion of MS in tax 
matters when it is necessary to distinguish between domestic and foreign persons became 
much more restricted,249 as MS may not impose discriminatory tax measures on nationals of 
other MS and may not impose tax measures that constitute restrictions or barriers to the 
exercise of the EC Treaty freedoms or which make the exercise of these freedoms less 
attractive.250
Third, Commission communications and ECJ case law on state aids, which are prohibited 
under the EC Treaty Art. 87.
The impact of the first group is relatively restricted, mainly due to the unanimous voting 
requirement for the issuance of directives dealing with fiscal matters. In the years since 
1960, the activity in the area of positive legislation in direct tax matters under the authority 
of Art. 94 has been very limited. For many years there was no legislation in the area251 and 
even today, these positive measures including the parent-subsidiary directive, the merger 
directive and more recently the interest and royalties directive and the savings income 
directive.252 In addition, there is the Arbitration Convention (for the resolution of transfer 
pricing disputes between MS) under the authority of Art. 293. Its use, however, has been 
very limited253
The impact of the second group has been significant and to a large extent was not 
anticipated by MS. In the vacuum that remains in the light of the inaction under the first 
group, the ECJ has taken the initiative and in approximately forty direct tax decisions (and 
some important non-tax decisions), changed the way EC law is perceived by members of the 
tax community.
The third group, the prohibition of State Aids, has developed relatively more slowly than the 
second group and only a few years ago the Commission announced its intention to focus 
more on the application of the rules prohibiting state aids.254 Nonetheless, the prohibition of 
state aids is increasingly important consideration in tax policy and legislation considerations.
248 C-270/83, Avoir Fiscal; Gammie (2003).
249 Schon (1999) at 916.
250 Ibid.
251 With the exception o f the limited directive on capital duty that was adopted in 1969, it was only in 1990 that 
two additional directives (and one convention) were adopted. Even today, there are very few directives in force 
and their scope is rather limited to specific situations. The tax base is far from being harmonized or even 
coordinated.
252 Dir 90/435/EEC (Parent-subsidiary), Dir 90/434/EEC (mergers), Dir 2003/48/EC (Saving) and Dir 
2003/49/EC (royalty and interest).
253 Until today, the convention was used only once, in 2003.
254 European Commission, Commission Notice o f 28/11/1998 OJ 1998 C 384/34.
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The existence of fifteen different tax systems with fifteen different approaches to the taxation 
of income creates distortions as each state is trying to tax the same income but doing so in a 
different way.255
While acknowledging that it is likely that the community would be better off if MS were 
able to agree on a common approach with respect to the taxation of income, scholars argue 
that they will only do it if each MS believes that it can maintain or increase its tax 
revenues 256 Such agreement would benefit the community as a whole as it would result in 
lower tax burden in terms of costs of distortion, jurisdiction and enforcement257
The historical development of the EC direct tax policy establishes a move from 
harmonization attempts towards a more practical, limited and pragmatic approach. Two of 
the main obstacles in adopting a clear policy in the direct tax area are the differences in 
approach among MS with respect to the method of computing and calculating the taxpayers’ 
profits and income and the need for unanimity for the adopting of positive direct tax
258measures.
The application of the EC Treaty by the ECJ
In the absence of an agreement among MS regarding direct tax policy in the internal market, 
the ECJ is exercising its jurisdiction to implement the provisions of the EC Treaty on the MS 
competent authority with respect to direct tax legislation. In the course of exercising its 
jurisdiction, the court is applying the non-discrimination requirement and interpreting the 
treaty freedoms in a wide and liberal way while adopting a narrow and restricted approach to 
possible justifications that are raised by MS.
The EC Treaty Art. 12 prohibits any discrimination of the basis of nationality. In addition, 
Art. 39 prohibits any limitation of the free movement of persons in the EU, Art. 43 and 48 
prohibit any limitations of the freedom of establishment in the EU, Art. 49 prohibits any 
limitations of the freedom to provide services in the EU and Art. 56 prohibits any limitations 
on the free movement of capital in the EU (hereinafter: the “Four Freedoms”).
255 Gammie (2000) at 42:2.
256 Ibid, at 42:3.
257 Ibid.
258 Prats (2002).
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Art. 12 is generally considered as an independent section whose application is not dependent 
upon the application of any other section. Nonetheless, when another prohibition is 
applicable, it takes precedence over the general non-discrimination prohibition of Art. 12.
In discussing the Four Freedoms, commentators generally divide the prohibitions into two 
main groups, discrimination and restrictions/barriers on access to the market. The former 
usually applies to situations examined from a host country perspective whereas the latter 
applies to situations examined from an origin country perspective, although it is possible to 
analyze most of these decisions also on the basis of non-discrimination.259
Discrimination exists where two persons in objectively comparable situations are treated 
differently or when people who are in objectively different situations receive the same 
treatment 260 Discrimination can be either direct (overt) or indirect (covert).261 The latter type 
has been described as occurring when the application of criteria of differentiation (other than 
nationality) leads to the same reason achieved in situations of overt discrimination. The 
acceptance of covert discrimination has resulted in the criteria of tax residence being 
included as relevant criteria as non-residents are more likely to be residents of other national 
states. As a result, where the legislation treats non-residents who are in objectively 
comparable situation differently than residents, there is discrimination.
For discrimination to take place the situations must be objectively comparable. Although in 
general the situations of residents and non-residents are not objectively comparable, 
especially in the case of individuals, there are limited situations in which residents and non­
residents might be considered to be in objectively comparable situations.262
While discrimination is relatively easy to identify and deal with from the perspective of the 
host state, the situation might be more complicated where the comparison is made from the 
perspective of the state of origin.
However, as the ECJ case law establishes, the Four Freedoms should be maintained even in 
the absence of a discriminatory treatment.263 Thus, when a domestic provision (Whether or 
not discriminatory) imposes a restriction on the exercise of the EC Treaty freedoms by a 
state’s own nationals/residents or would result in making the exercise of such freedoms less
259 Layl (2003).
260 C-381/90 Shumacker.
261 C -l 52/73, Sotgiu.
262 C-307/97 Saint Gobain and also C-381/90 Schumacher, C-80/94 Wielcox and C -l07/94 Assher.
263 C -l 18/96 Safir, discussed by Terra & Wattel, at 42.
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attractive than operating domestically, the provision must be amended, unless it can be 
justified.
Restrictions that are the result of a disparity between the tax systems would not amount to an 
allegedly prohibited restriction even though the outcome might be that cross-border 
transactions are less attractive than domestic transactions.264
As Gammie points out, a MS may defend its stand by establishing one of the following two 
arguments: first, the situations in which the taxpayers are in are not objectively comparable. 
Second, there is a valid justification to distinguish between the objectively comparable 
situations.265
Things become more difficult when the court is required to choose between the two 
comparable situations. The situation arose in the case of Marks & Spencer?66 The UK 
Special Commissioners applied the principle of territoriality justifying the grant of loss relief 
to UK subsidiaries of a UK parent while denying similar relief to non-UK subsidiaries of the 
UK parent. According to the Special Commissioners, applying the principle of territoriality, 
the two situations were not objectively comparable and different treatment may thus be 
justified. The decision was appealed to the High Court that allowed a reference to the ECJ 
where the case is now pending.267
A Brief Analysis of the case law
One thing that is clear from the ECJ case law is that the treatment of the counter-party to the 
transaction is irrelevant268 and the fact the transaction or a person is able to enjoy an 
advantageous treatment in one MS is not a valid justification for treating him 
disadvantageously in a second MS.269
“Any tax advantage resulting for providers of services from the low taxation to which they 
are subject in the Member State in which they are established cannot be used by another
264 C- 336/96 Gilly.
265 Gammie (2003).
266 C-446/03 pending.
267 cf. Lyons (2003) who is o f the opinion that the Special Commissioners confused the principle o f territoriality 
with the question o f  whether the two situations were objectively comparable. See also A-G in Bosal who found 
that the two compared situations must be looked at from the perspective o f the origin state taxpayer only. For an 
analysis o f the case from a UK perspective, Evans (2003); For an overview of different possible approaches, see 
generally the articles in EC Tax Review 2003/3 and in particular Gutmann (2003).
268 C-294/97 Eurowings.
269 Ibid.
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Member State to justify less favorable treatment in tax matters given to recipients of services
established in the latter State.”270
Early case law focused on the existence of discriminatory treatment as a basis for the ECJ 
intervention and for the application of the EC Treaty. While Art. 12 does not apply if one of 
the other freedoms is restricted in any way, Art. 12 and the question of discrimination was 
usually the starting point in the discussion by the court. More recent case law, starting in 
1997, has shifted to focus to questions of restrictions on market access. Nonetheless, many 
cases may be interpreted as based on either basis.
A conclusion that a given situation is regarded as discriminatory or involving a restriction on 
market access, does not automatically lead to violation of EC law, as it might be possible for 
the MS to justify the discrimination or restriction. Where the issue at stake involves an overt 
discrimination, then the only justifications allowed are those specifically mentioned in the 
EC Treaty.271
Where, however, a restriction to market access takes place, other justifications, in addition to 
those mentioned in the EC Treaty, may be allowed.
These justifications include the following: the measure is meant to pursue a legitimate aim 
that is compatible with the EC Treaty, can be justified by reason of public interest.272 For 
example, situations of fiscal cohesion,273 prevention of tax evasion274 and fiscal 
supervision.275
In the course of the years, the ECJ has rejected the validity of several justifications including 
loss of tax276 and prevention of national tax avoidance277
270 Ibid. Also referred to by Terra & Wattel (2001) at 81.
271 These are -  public policy, public security and public health (Art. 39(3)).
272 The court formulated four conditions necessary for a successful application o f this justification: (1) the 
measure must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner (2) it must be justified by imperative requirement in the 
general interest (3) it must be suitable to achieve the objective, and (4) it must not go beyond the necessary to 
achieve such goal (C-55/94 Gebhard).
273 Bachmann C-204/90 but cf. C-251/98 Baars, C-35/98 Verkooijan and recently C -l36/00 Danner,; although 
Bachmann established the existence o f this exception, later case law significantly restricted its application. To 
successfully apply the exception the MS has to establish a “direct link” between the income inclusion on one 
hand and the expense allowance on the other. For that purpose, it has to establish that it is the same taxpayer and 
the same tax that is involved (C-35/98 and C-251/98). For a recent discussion by the court, see C -168/01 Bosal 
Holding.
274 C-264/96 ICI v. Colmer cf. limited application in C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst.
275 First recognized in an indirect tax law case (C-120/78 Cassis de Dijon) and accepted in C-250/95 Futura but 
subject to the requirement o f proportionality cf. C-l 36-00 Danner. It should be noted that the proportionality 
standard applies as a general requirement and not solely in the context o f fiscal supervision.
276 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst.
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The court was reluctant to hold that several legislations, originally introduced by MS to 
prevent their tax base erosion and to curb tax avoidance, have been inconsistent with EC law 
principles to the extent they discriminated against non-residents or restricted access to the 
market by favoring domestic investment to cross-border intra-European investments.278
An interesting point is the lenient approach taken by the court towards tax abuse. This is 
compatible with the approach to abuse in other areas (non-tax).279 In a series of tax cases as 
well as non-tax cases, the ECJ has established a very liberal approach with respect to tax 
abuse, indicating that it might serve as a justification only in restricted situations. Not only 
that. According to Terra and Wattel, it appears from the case law that tax jurisdiction 
shopping within the internal market is considered to be a legitimate activity even where the 
sole reason behind the arrangement is to circumvent unfavorable domestic tax rules.280
In the absence of any clear legislative guidance from the Community Institutions regarding 
direct tax policy, it appears that the ECJ will continue to exercise its jurisdiction in full.
In applying the fundamental freedoms consistently and impartially the ECJ is demonstrating
qualities that are essential to courts in any system ofjustice I f  the Member States regard
the fundamental freedoms as corrosive o f their tax systems, let them take the opportunity 
presented by the drafting o f the European constitution to change the situation. ”281
At present, absent agreement, there appear to be two broad paths for MS to follow. MS can 
either apply domestic tax rules also with respect to cross-border transactions (at least at the 
EU level with other MS) or they can apply their international tax rules domestically. 
Otherwise, existing domestic tax legislation might not stand the ECJ scrutiny.
The main problem with ECJ decisions is the lack of clarity resulting from them. The absence 
of dissenting opinions in the court’s judgments and the court’s refusal to explain thoroughly 
the basis for its decisions or to address questions that are beyond what is specifically 
required to reach a decision on the factual situations it is presented with, make it possible to 
have more than one interpretation to the court’s approach and leaves many unanswered 
questions open.
277 Tax avoidance would be allowed only if the provision is narrow enough and specific enough to target only 
situations o f tax avoidance.
278 See generally, C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst (German Thin-Capitalization rules held to be inconsistent with 
EC law).
279 See generally C- 212/97 Centros.
280 Terra & Wattel, at 81-82. They infer from the case law that the court will probably only accept the abuse 
argument if  disregarding the tax effect, the arrangement is completely artificial (at 83).
281 Lyons (2003) at 449.
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The heart of the conflict seems to be as follows. On one hand on the insistence on part of MS 
to continue to legislate and design tax policy and rules based on the difference between 
national residents and non-residents, the border is laid in accordance with the national 
borders. On the other hand, the ECJ insists on applying the EC Treaty consistently with the 
view of one internal market with seamless national borders thus eliminating any barriers 
along national borders (the seamless national borders approach).
The ECJ mandate is to eliminate the obstacles to the creation of one internal market. For that 
purpose, the ECJ is applying the non-discrimination provisions and the treaty freedoms from 
two perspectives, an origin country perspective and a host country perspective. In both 
situations the ECJ will apply the EC Treaty to ensure that cross-border transactions are not 
discriminated against or that there is no obstacle or restriction that would make the cross- 
border transaction less attractive than a domestic transaction. From a neutrality perspective, 
one can argue that the ECJ apply the CIN principle to situations that are examined from a 
host country perspective and the CEN principle to situations that are examined from an 
origin country perspective.282 Thus, the ECJ is trying to establish an equal level playing field 
for both domestic transactions and cross-border intra-European transactions. This, however, 
is not completely accurate.
While the ECJ, in exercising its powers in the light of the EC Treaty purpose, is interpreting 
and applying the EC Treaty to ensure that there are no obstacles or restrictions on cross- 
border transactions within the EU, it does it in one direction only. This limited application 
can result in favorable treatment to cross-border transactions over domestic transactions. 
Thus, for example, in examining CIN in the context of the host state, the court is not looking 
into the treatment of the non-resident in its state of origin. Moreover, even if in the overall 
European result (combining the treatment in both the state of origin and the host state) the 
non-resident would be in an advantageous situation as a result of a level playing field in the 
host state, the host state cannot use this as a justification for a disadvantageous treatment of 
the non-resident by the host state vis-a-vis residents.283 Thus, in effect, the court in its 
analysis employs a very limited concept of neutrality.
“Any tax advantage resulting for providers o f services from the low taxation to which they 
are subject in the Member State in which they are established cannot be used by another
282 Terra & Wattel (2001) 4.2.2.
283 See, for example, C -l75/88 Biehl and C-294/97 Eurowings.
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Member State to justify less favorable treatment in tax matters given to recipients o f services
established in the latter State1,284
In addition, the ECJ does not intervene in situations where in either the host state or the state 
of origin (without taking into account the situation in the other MS, respectively) a cross- 
border transaction is treated in a more favorable way than domestic transaction. Similarly, 
the treatment of the other party to the transaction or the treatment of the transaction in 
another MS is usually irrelevant for the application of the non-discrimination and freedoms 
provisions.
Furthermore, because both CEN and CIN can simultaneously co-exist only to the extent that 
the tax rates in the relevant jurisdictions are the same, in the absence of rates equality in the 
EU, the application of the EC Treaty by the ECJ will not (nor does it seek to) result in 
overall neutrality.
Prima facie, it appears that the ECJ case law creates some sort of a breeding ground for ITA, 
where ITA is not being targeted by the court as a prohibited measure and more than that, MS 
might find their attempts to eliminate ITA being regarded as a prohibited discrimination or 
restriction under the EC Treaty.
In the context of the UK, the number of pending cases before the ECJ is increasing and there 
are already several examples of the impact of ECJ case law on its legislation. It seems that 
there are three main paths in which the UK is going. First, with respect to certain measures 
that were specifically held not to be in compliance with EC law, the UK legislation has 
changed. Second, with respect to other measures that were held not to be in compliance with 
EC law, the UK has chosen unilaterally to adopt legislation that would make its legislation 
compatible. Third, with respect to other measures that were not discussed but whose 
compatibility is doubtful, the UK has chosen to do nothing. With respect to measures coming 
under this third group, it appears that it is only a question of time before these measures 
would be covered under the first group mentioned above.
“With news o f yet more ECJ cases challenging the UK’s CFC rules and the basis o f taxing 
foreign dividends and relieving losses, the most puzzling thing is that there is no 
acknowledgement that a problem might exist in these, or other, areas. . . . I t  is unlikely that 
the silence on these issues is a sign that the Inland Revenue are supremely confident in the
284 C-294/97 Eurowings quoted by Terra & Wattel (2001) at 81.
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strength o f their case. I f  the outcome o f these cases is, as it must be, uncertain, the 
Chancellor appears willing to gamble taxpayers ’ billions on the results o f litigation. ”28S
Things might be even worse, as the chances to win the “bet” are even slimmer.
From a policy perspective, although huge uncertainties remain with respect to the long-term 
impact a few preliminary assertions can be made with respect to the possible impact of the 
EC Treaty and ECJ case law on UK tax policy and legislation. First, although the UK is 
more closely related to CEN as a policy goal, if the ECJ continues with its application of the 
EC Treaty, it is likely that the UK would be led to adopt a CIN approach, while replacing the 
foreign tax credit with an exemption method as it foreign tax relief mechanism. Second, a 
policy goal of preventing UK revenue loss may not longer be feasible, at least not when it 
contradicts the provisions of the EC Treaty. The only apparent alternative available to UK 
policy makers is to follow the second option mentioned above and adopt international tax 
rules to domestic situations as well. The downside is that such policy choice might entail 
higher compliance and administration costs that would impact on the competitiveness of the 
UK companies and of the tax system that according to the Inland Revenue are at the center 
of the current discussions on the corporation tax reform.286
Third, the fiscal cohesion argument in its current status appears to be too narrow to apply in 
most situations.
In addition, to add to the effect of the above-mentioned case law, a MS might be liable for 
damages in case of non-compliance with EC law. In the UK, many claims have been brought 
to claim refund of tax paid under the (wrong) understanding that such tax was actually due 
when it was later discovered, following decisions of the ECJ, that the legislation in question 
was incompatible with EC law.
The mean issue at stake is the period of limitation that exists with respect to such claims and 
when does the count towards the period of limitation begin. This issue is presently before the 
High Court in the UK pending decision.
If the applications are successful, the UK might be required to refund tax paid back to 
taxpayers with the possibility of going back to the taxable year in which the UK joined the
285 Troup (2003).
286 The other alternative is for MS to amend the EC Treaty to include protection o f national revenues as a valid 
justification for adopting discriminatory and/or restrictive tax measures which is probably not feasible. Troup 
(2003).
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EU (the EEC), that is 1974. In such case, the UK might find itself in desperate need for tax 
revenues, a need that is likely to affect its approach to tax planning.287
The prohibition on State Aids288
Another important limitation of the tax sovereignty of MS is the restriction on state aids in 
Art. 87(1). This measure, whose applications can be quite wide, is not always appreciated in 
policy discussions.
In 1998, the EC Commission published a notice including guidelines to the application of the 
State Aids rules.
For the prohibition of Art. 87(1) to apply, the following requirements have to be satisfied:
■ There has to be an aid
■ The aid has to be from the state or through its resources
■ The aid must have result in a distortion of the previous situation
■ The aid must be selective in nature -  it has to be granted in favor of “certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods.”
Thus, it is established that any improvement in the economic or legal playing field that does 
not impose a cost of the state’s resources is not within the scope of Art. 87(1).289
Once the conditions of Art. 87(1) are satisfied, the Commission may initiate a proceeding 
against the relevant MS to force her to remove the state aid and to return the funds already 
provided under the illegal measure.290
One immediate outcome of the application of Art. 87(1) is its direct effect and its possible 
application in situations of harmful tax competition. While both Art. 87(1) and the “Code of 
Conduct” may apply to similar situations (although the application of Art. 87(1) is much 
wider and covers many situations not covered by the “Code of Conduct” while at the same 
time not applying to all situations covered by the “Code of Conduct”), the application of the 
latter does not have the binding effect of the former. Unlike the recommendation form of the
287 See generally, Edge & Airs (2003).
288 See generally, Schon (1999).
289 Schon (1999) at 922.
290 There are only limited exceptions to situation whereby, despite the existence o f  state aid, the MS may not 
return the money from the taxpayer/s who benefited from the illegal measure.
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“Code of Conduct”, MS that violates the prohibition in Art. 87(1) must remove the distorting 
legislation.291
In 1998, the Commission has announced its intention to apply stricter policy with respect to 
state aids provided in the form of selective direct tax subsidies by MS. Nonetheless, the 
enforcement of the State Aids provisions has been quite limited. This is probably the 
outcome the combination of the limited resources available to the Commission (which is in 
charge on bringing a claim to the ECJ) and the limited nature of the possible reward/damages 
that can be obtained as a result of a successful claim292
An interesting point about the prohibition in Art. 87(1) is its interaction with ITA. One 
should pay attention to the increasing importance of ITA in the light of the restrictions 
imposed by Art. 87(1). Art. 87(1) only applies with respect to measures that are selective in 
their nature or apply with respect to certain type of undertaking or products. Art. 87(1) does 
not apply where the aid is regarded a being part of the general nature of the tax system and is 
not designed with respect to a specific type of transaction or with respect to specific type of 
products i.e. it has to be “selective”.293
“While Member States are forbidden from granting direct or indirect funding to specific 
enterprises or groups o f enterprises, it is part o f fiscal federalism that each Member State 
offers broadly designed economic incentives which are — in principle -  available to all 
agents within the economy and do not distort the Common market in specific areas. ”294
Thus, for example, the provision should not apply with respect to depreciation deductions 
even where the tax deductions are more accelerated than the economic depreciation provided 
the benefit is open to all economic agents and even if it causes private undertakings to
295increase investments.
291 In cases where the court finds the Commission complaint against a MS to be justified, the MS may be 
required, in addition to removing the incentive, also to recover the amount o f state aid granted to its taxpayers.
292 Recently, however, three decisions were made by the Commission: IP/04/404 (holding that the planned 
corporate tax in Gibraltar is not in line with EU State aid rules), IP/04/406 (approving the modified German 
environmental tax), and IP/04/405 (holding that an Italian scheme in favor o f  undertakings buying undertakings 
in liquidation infringes EU State aid law).
293 For a discussion o f the difference between the two types of aids -  see generally Schon (1999) above. A  good 
illustration o f the difference is the tax measures adopted in Ireland. In the past, Ireland offered low tax rates with 
respect to companies with certain qualifying manufacturing or trade activities. This special rate was lower than 
the general rate applicable in Ireland at that time and was regarded as an illegal state aid. In contrast, recently 
Ireland introduced a new low corporate tax rate o f 12.5%. Unlike the previous scheme, this low rate applies with 
respect to all Irish companies and is not designed with respect to a certain industry or sector. As such, it is not 
regarded as a selective measure and is regarded as part of the general scheme o f  the tax system, thus not subject 
to the application o f Art. 87(1).
294 Schon (1999) at 930.
295 Schon (1999) at 927-928.
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ITA is generally the outcome of an interaction between one tax system and other tax systems 
and need not involve a special or selective regime for specific type of activities. As such, it 
would usually tend to fall within the scope of the general nature of the tax system, not be 
covered by the state aids provisions.
At the same time, ITA may give rise to similar consequences as those that result from the use 
of selective measures that are caught within the scope of Art. 87(1), similar to a country 
reducing its overall corporate tax rate. I shall return to this point later below.
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United States
“The concern facing this Subcommittee today is that our tax 
code has not kept pace with the changes in our real economy. 
International tax policy remains rooted in tax principles 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s. That was a time when 
America’s foreign direct investment was preeminent abroad 
and competition from imports to the United States was scant. 
Today, we have a truly global economy. ... At one time, the 
strength of America’s economy was thought to be tied to its 
abundant natural resources. Today, America’s strength is its 
ability to innovate:....”296
A General Overview of the International tax system
The US Federal tax system has been said to be based on three underlying distinctions.
The first distinction is between the taxation of domestic persons and foreign persons. The
second distinction is between the treatment of active income and the treatment of passive
income. The third distinction is between the treatment of ordinary income and the treatment 
of capital gains.
According to the first distinction, taxpayers who are considered as domestic persons are 
taxed with respect to their worldwide income regardless of its source. All other persons, 
those regarded as foreign persons, are taxed only with respect to their US source income.
When domestic persons invest abroad then the income should be currently taxed in the US. 
However, if this investment is made through the form of a foreign corporation, then the 
general rule is that the tax system will respect the corporate form and unless the foreign 
corporation has any income from a US source it will not be subject to tax in the US. This 
general rule, however, has many exceptions that would result in the disregard of foreign 
entities’ corporate form and current taxation of the relevant share of their profits (or part 
thereof) in the hands of their US domestic shareholders. Thus, the US controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) legislation treats certain profits accumulated in foreign companies
296 Angus (2002), testifying before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures on International Tax Policy 
and Competitiveness, the House Committee on Ways and Means.
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controlled by US shareholders,297 as if these profits are actually distributed to the US 
shareholders in absence of actual distribution.298
According to the second distinction, active income and passive income are treated differently 
for tax purposes. As a result of this distinction, several inconsistencies in treatment take 
place.
A domestic taxpayer, for example, is more likely to obtain deferral with respect to 
investment abroad where such investment gives rise to active income as opposed to passive 
income. Most (but not all) of the categories included in the CFC legislation target foreign 
passive income. The rationale is understood as targeting passive and highly mobile income. 
In addition, the PFIC and the FPHC legislations are aimed only at US held (not necessarily 
controlled) foreign corporations with mostly passive income. In all these situations, the 
incidence of passive income will, most likely, result in current taxation of the foreign 
income, regardless of distribution, while disregarding the foreign corporation’s corporate 
form.
Similar distinctions exist in the application of the foreign tax credit rules and with respect to 
the treatment of foreign taxpayers operating in the US. With respect to the latter, different 
tests apply with respect to the determination of tax liability and its extent depending on 
whether the income is active or passive.299
Lastly, the third distinction is between the treatment of income and the treatment of capital 
both in timing of the income and in the tax rate that applies.300 I return to this important 
distinction in the context of HFIs below.301
297 The term “US Shareholder” is a term o f art defined to include a US resident holding 10% or more o f the 
foreign company’s voting power or equity (IRC §951(b)).
298 IRC §951-957.
299 In the former case (active income), the income is only subject to tax if  the foreign person is engaged in trade 
or business in the US and to the extent such income is effectively connected with the conduct o f such trade or 
business (where a double taxation income applies, the requirement is usually replaced by the threshold o f income 
that is attributable to a permanent establishment o f the foreign person in the US). If subject to US taxation, the 
income is taxed on a net basis at the applicable US tax rate. In the latter case (passive income), certain types o f  
passive income, or FDAPI (Fixed, determinable, annual and periodic income) as defined by the US Internal 
Revenue Code are subject to US taxation. The tax is imposed by way o f a 30% withholding tax on the gross 
amount. In most cases, a tax treaty between the US and the country o f residence o f the foreign person will 
significantly reduce this withholding rate.
300 Accrual or mark-to-market (income) as opposed to realization (capital) and subject to the new partial 
exemption in the case o f qualified dividends, 39.6% (individuals) or 35% (corporations) as opposed to rates o f  
20% or less in the case o f long term capital gains.
301 For example, pp. 146-147 below.
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In addition, according to Avi-Yonah, the US system is also based on two principles, the 
single tax principle and the benefits principle, 302 that are discussed below. According to the 
former income has to be subject to a single level of tax, no less no more. According to the 
latter principle, the tax rate applicable is allocated in a way in which the country of source 
taxes primarily passive income while the country of residence taxes primarily active
303income.
General Tax Policy 
The Origin
Income tax in the US has its origin from the 1913 Income Tax Act which for the first time 
imposed income tax on a Federal level.304 From its origin the income tax was based on the 
first distinction mentioned above, the distinction between domestic persons and foreign 
persons, taxing the former on a worldwide basis and the latter only on a limited source basis.
The origin of the residence based taxation of corporations can be found in the work of TS 
Adams who supported the imposition of tax on a worldwide basis so that the country of 
residence would tax the income in case the country of source fails to do so.305
Graetz argues that TS Adams, who was one of the most influential figures in the US tax 
world of the first quarter of the 20th century, had several policies in mind while advising and 
supporting tax reform. These were, fairness (or some sense of justice among taxpayers), 
elimination of double taxation but prevention of abuse, preservation of the tax base, easy 
administration of taxation, greater export of US goods and capital, elimination of tax 
avoidance devices, and above all, promotion of the principle of “enlightened self-interest” 
among countries to maintain good tax laws.306Adams disregarded economic policies and 
used other reasons, primarily, fairness, easy administration of taxes and the principle of 
“enlightened self-interest” at the center of his policymaking. Thus, supporting the enactment 
of the foreign tax credit in 1918, he did not use CEN but rather fairness, arguing that in the 
light of the very high rates it would not be fair to subject a taxpayer to double taxation 
(which would result under the foreign tax deduction system that existed then). On the other
302 Avi-Yonah (1997).
303 Avi-Yonah (2000).
304 For the sake o f completeness -  it is necessary to mention that income tax was introduced for the first time 
following the US Civil War. See Brownlee (1996) at 26-27 (it was then later withdrawn and re-introduced in 
1913).
305 Avi-Yonah (2000) referring to the work o f Graetz & O’Hear (1996-1997).
306 For a general description and analysis o f TS Adams’ work -  see Graetz & O’Hear (1996-1997).
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hand, in 1921 when the foreign tax credit limitation was added, the reasons were prevention 
of tax abuse and preservation of the US tax base.307
During Adams times, the tax system respected the separation of the corporate form and did 
not impose current taxation on foreign investments by domestic taxpayers using foreign 
corporations. The application of this principle was restricted with the enactment of the 
foreign personal holding companies legislation in 1937 and later in 1962 with the enactment 
of the controlled foreign corporation legislation and then again in 1986 with the enactment of 
the passive foreign investment company legislation.
The Deferral Debate
In 2001, in a much-debated report308 the US Department of Treasury mentioned the 
following policy considerations as those that were included in the original 1962 debate: the 
desire to promote equity and to promote economic efficiency, to prevent abuse by taxpayers 
but not harm competitiveness.
Until 1962 only a limited number of domestic taxpayers who invested in foreign countries 
through foreign corporations were subject to current US taxation. The rest were able to enjoy 
the deferral and to the extent this income was not repatriated back to the US, the deferral was 
permanent. Ending the deferral would have ensured that to a large extent tax does not play a 
role in determining whether to invest domestically or abroad. This is also the rationale 
behind CEN. This, however, is not completely correct. Nor is it what took place at the end.
There were two types of targeted transactions, those involving passive tax haven income and 
revenue shifting transactions. The rationale for targeting the first type was its nature, passive 
income that did raise any objections based on competitiveness. Again, we return to the 
distinction between active and passive income. Active income -  deferral allowed -  corporate 
entity and foreign person principles -  respected whereas passive income -  none of these 
principles is followed.
Subpart F, however, is more than just ending the deferral on passive income. The second 
type of transactions targeted by the legislation was transactions with related parties that 
despite their apparent active character involved revenue shifting from high tax jurisdictions 
(not necessarily the US) to low tax jurisdictions. In this way, the worldwide tax liability was
307 Otherwise the foreign tax credit might eliminate US taxes completely in a way that would require the US to 
refund / finance part o f the foreign tax paid on the investment.
308 US Treasury (2000).
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reduced, although it was not necessarily the US tax liability. The rationale seems to focus 
here more on the prevention of abuse and maybe equity than on neutrality or economic 
efficiency. This, however, is not very clear.309
The legislation adopted (which to a large extent exists today) was a political compromise 
between the President’s proposal on one hand and the Treasury proposal on the other. The 
President’s proposal which supported a complete end of deferral (also with respect to active 
income) was justified as necessary in the light of “changing economic conditions at home 
and abroad, the desire to achieve greater equity in taxation, and the strains which have 
developed in our balance o f payments position in the last few  year.”310 Among the reasons 
for the President’s proposal was the need to achieve an efficient allocation of resources and 
an equitable treatment of US taxpayers, two aims that did not exist prior to 1962 as US 
taxpayers were encouraged to invest abroad (instead of domestically) and do so through the 
use of a foreign subsidiary (as opposed to a branch).311
The more limited Treasury proposal was based on the premise that the President’s proposal 
was too wide and was likely to harm the competitiveness of US firms operating abroad. To 
preserve the competitiveness of US firms, the Treasury proposal would end deferral only 
with respect to what was referred to as “tax haven transactions”, thus carving out non­
passive income, dividends, interest, rents and royalties derived from active conduct of 
activities if were done with unrelated parties.312
At the end, it was a compromise that balanced between the desire to follow CEN on one 
hand and the need to preserve the competitiveness of US firms abroad on the other hand. 
This compromise resulted in several uncertainties, as I shall further discuss below.
The above-mentioned Treasury report on deferral did not end the debate. On the contrary. In 
the years that followed, much was written on the debate regarding the US international tax 
policies and more specifically on the appropriate scope of Subpart F. In their report, 
following the issuance of the Treasury Report, the New York State Bar Association 
criticized the Treasury for concentrating too much on attempts to justify the existing system
309 An important distinction that exists throughout the CFC legislation as well as other areas o f the US tax system 
is the distinction between active and passive income. In this context, while passive income is almost 
automatically “tainted” and prevented from enjoying the deferral, active income is so “tainted” only when it is 
being “shifted” from its logical business situs for tax reasons.
3i° jjg Treasury (2000) at 111 citing the President’s message.
311 US Treasury (2000) at 118.
3,2 US Treasury (2000) at 113-114.
100
while not examining the impact of the legislation on US multinationals’ ability to compete 
and by failing to examine alternative options to tax foreign source income.313
This is in addition to the National Foreign Trade Commission’s (NFTC) view that the 
current scope of Subpart F is too wide and should be restricted to cover only two 
fundamental cases where deferral is inappropriate. They base their view on arguments of 
equity, competitiveness and compatibility with international norms. According to the NFTC, 
when one company is subject to a heavier tax burden vis-a-vis its business competitors, it 
suffers from a competitive disadvantage. Competitiveness, according to the NFTC was 
recognized to be an important policy consideration back in 1961 when the US had 
dominance in the international markets and US MNEs represented 8 out of the world’s 
largest MNEs. Therefore, today, when the markets are much more competitive and when the 
US is in a much less dominant position, the importance of competitiveness as a policy goal is
314even greater.
In 1998, the Treasury issued Notice 98-11315 and proposed regulations that were meant to 
apply Subpart F to transactions between foreign hybrid entities. Although both notice and 
regulations were withdrawn, they provided an opportunity to discuss the policies underlying 
Subpart F and especially with respect to what is exactly referred to by “active income” and 
where the line should be drawn with respect to the scope of Subpart F.316
According to Avi-Yonah, the problem with Subpart F, thirty-six years after its enactment, is 
that the dichotomy upon which it is based no longer exists. In 1962, there were two main 
groups, active business income and passive tax haven income. Deferral was allowed to the 
former but denied from the latter.317 In 1998, a new type of tax havens exists, manufacturing 
tax havens, where taxpayers are earning active business income while enjoying tax haven 
treatment; a treatment that should have been caught within the scope of Subpart F. The 
assumption that active business income cannot be conducted in low-tax jurisdiction does not 
exist anymore. Otherwise it would be very difficult to explain the dichotomy that was drawn 
between tax haven activity and legitimate manufacturing operations. Although it is 
appropriate for this type of activity to be included within the scope of Subpart F, in the light
3,3 NYSBA CRITICIZES TREASURY’S SUBPART F STUDY, 2002 WTD 9-24.
314 NTFC (2001). Cf. Avi-Yonah’s arguments below.
315 Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433.
316 In addition, and more relevant to our purposes, it appears that as a result o f the withdrawal o f Notice 98-11 
and the proposed regulations (Notice 98-35 ,1998-27IRB 1), Subpart F is probably inapplicable in situations 
which were meant to be covered in the notice and regulations, situations whereby a US taxpayer is using foreign 
hybrid entities to reduce his foreign tax liability by using hybrid entities that are engaged in foreign transactions 
between related parties which escape the application o f Subpart F due to their hybrid nature (they are treated as 
foreign corporations for foreign tax law purposes and as transparent for US tax purposes).
317 Avi-Yonah (1998).
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of the change in practice and of the OECD Harmful Tax Competition initiative (which 
according to Avi-Yonah supports his argument), Congress should amend the legislation to 
include such manufacturing tax haven income within its scope and deny deferral in these 
situations.318 Until then, US-based corporations have the opportunity to earn tax-free income 
abroad through a combination of manufacturing tax havens that enjoys tax deferral and the 
ability to cross-credit foreign tax credits. This provides an advantage to US-based 
corporations with foreign operations vis-a-vis US-based corporations with domestic 
operations and Congress should amend this distortion.319
The Inversions Debate
This discussion continued in 2002, as a result of several successful inversion transactions in 
which US based multinationals converted into foreign held multinationals, without much 
change to their operations and as a result of the relatively high tax burden imposed on US 
based multinationals.320
One of the arguments raised in justification of the inversion transactions was that the US tax 
system imposes a very heavy tax burden on its multinationals thus putting them in a 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign multinationals and in particular European based 
multinationals.321
In the words of the Treasury International Tax Counsel, “[B]oth the increase in foreign 
acquisitions o f U.S. multinationals and the recent corporate inversion activity are evidence 
that the potential competitive disadvantage created by our international tax rules is a serious 
issue with significant consequences for U.S. businesses and the U.S economy. ”322
This competitive disadvantage together with the relative ease in which it was possible for 
non-US resident corporations to operate in the US at the same level playing field (and
3,8 Ibid. cf. Hariton (1998), who argued that it is a political question rather than a technical analysis. This political 
question is whether the US should permit a foreign country to use tax holidays to attract business capital out o f  
the US. To a large extent, the answer, according to Hariton, depends on whether it is a Republican or a 
Democratic Congress.
319 Avi-Yonah (1998b).
320 An inversion transaction is generally a transaction whereby a US-based multinational converts into being a 
foreign-based multinational, with its parent company residing outside the US, mostly in a favorable tax 
jurisdiction. There were many ways, taxable and non-taxable, in which an inversion transaction could have taken 
place. The trigger to the trend in around year 2000 was the drop in share prices (together with losses) o f many o f  
the companies that wished to carry on such transactions, a drop that allowed them to carry out these transactions 
as taxable transactions that were not subject to tax due to the loss on the shares for most o f the shareholders and 
the loss at the corporate level that offset the resulting gains. See generally, NYSBA (2002).
321 NYSBA (2002) at 9-10. The report discusses situations in which these disadvantages are reflected -  for 
example in the ability to offer competitive bids in acquisitions o f foreign businesses and in entering into foreign 
investments, (at 11-12).
322 Angus (2002).
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sometimes even on an higher playing field than US competitors) led several US 
multinationals to conduct an inversion and re-incorporate as a multinational with a foreign 
parent company at a relatively low present cost and with a high potential for long term 
benefit, a benefit that would result from the exemption from US tax of all of the non-US 
business. Following the inversion transaction, which was tax-driven, the multinational was 
not subject to the rules of Subpart F with respect to its worldwide income and in addition 
was able to reduce its US tax with respect to its US income by financing its US operations 
with leverage that would pay deductible interest from the US company to related companies 
outside the US.323
As a result, it was proposed to adopt a two-parts solution. On one hand, to make it harder for 
US based multinational to invert and re-establish themselves as foreign-based multinational 
and one the other hand, make it more difficult for foreign-based companies to operate in the 
US. In other words, to raise their level playing field in the US market vis-a-vis US based 
companies.
Avi-Yonah disagrees with the often use of competitiveness in the policy debate, especially in 
the context of the above-mentioned inversion transactions. Such link between the desire of 
corporations to invert and competitiveness is misleading. After questioning the link between 
the improvement in the competitiveness of US-based multinationals and the welfare of the 
US economy, Avi-Yonah continues to question the link between the inversion transactions 
and the competitive disadvantage in which US-based corporations are located. For example, 
if the US was to adopt a territorial based tax system, would this change stop US-based 
multinationals from inverting? The answer according to Avi-Yonah is no. The basis for this 
answer lays in the rationale behind the inversion transactions. These multinationals are not 
only interested in reducing the tax liability with respect to their foreign source income but 
would also like to reduce the tax liability with respect to their US source income. This would 
not be achieved by a change to a territorial tax system. Competitiveness is not really the
324issue.
Rosenbloom gives a good illustration of the issue,
“No reasonable person would oppose the goal o f maintaining competitiveness o f US-owned 
foreign corporations. The hard question is, what that implies fo r the rules o f tax policy. I f  it
323 In addition to favorable transfer pricing planning that would minimize the extent o f income allocable to tire US 
company. See generally, Avi-Yonah (2002).
™ Ibid.
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implies rules that guarantee the ability o f US-owned foreign companies to stand toe-to-toe 
with foreign firms engaged in similar active business, that is one thing. I f  it implies adopting 
in US law the most taxpayer favorable rules from every other industrialized country, that is 
something entirely different. ”325
Foreign Tax Credit326
Another area of the tax law where the policy can be explored is the rules governing foreign 
tax credit. As it is described above,327 the main rationale for having a credit mechanism as 
opposed to its predecessor, the deduction mechanism, seems to be the desire to achieve 
equity for the taxpayers and to eliminate the double taxation whose burden was perceived as 
cumbersome. CEN was not a concern in 1918 when the original legislation was adopted, 
although many commentators today might try to link it to the discussion. In 1918 when TS 
Adams first added the foreign tax credit to the US tax code, it was added without any 
limitation based on the following justification:
“...if one taxpayer is being taxed twice while the majority o f  men similarly situated are being 
taxed only once, by the same tax, something is wrong or inequitable is being done which, 
other things being equal, the legislator should correct i f  he can. ”328
It was only in 1921 when the first credit limitation was added to the tax code. The rationale 
behind the legislation was to prevent taxpayers from reducing their US tax liability with the 
use of foreign tax credit against the higher foreign tax rates that existed at that time. Since 
then, many changes took place but this limitation remained, together with some additional 
limitations that were added during the years.329
In Notice 98-5,330 the Treasury sought to prevent some of what it regarded as abusive use of 
the foreign tax credit rules by focusing on situations where taxpayers entered into 
transactions that were not economically justifiable but for the foreign tax credit benefits they 
entail. I return to discuss the notice in more detail below in the context of HFIs.331
325 Rosenbloom testifies on need for new international tax plan, 2003 TNT 136-31 at J^5.
326 For a general overview and analysis o f the US foreign tax credit rules, see Dolan.
327 See p. 98 above.
328 TS Adams, International and Interstate Aspect o f Double Taxation, Nat’l Tax A ss’n Proc. 193, 198 as quoted 
by NFTC at 10.
329 In addition to the general limitation, the US foreign tax credit regime uses the “baskets” limitations to prevent 
taxpayers from offsetting credits from one type of income (passive) against income from another type o f income 
(active) and vice-versa.
330 1 998-1 C.B 334; 1998 IRB LEXIS 15; 1998-3 IRB 49.
331 See pp. 162-163 below,
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Many taxpayers, however, regard the foreign tax credit regime as a complex regime that 
results in high compliance costs, distortions and double taxation. According to the NFTC, 
the foreign tax credit regime that was originally enacted with the underlying principle of 
creating equity among taxpayers, leads today to the opposite result by creating artificial 
excess credit situations that prevent the taxpayer from obtaining his fair share of foreign tax 
relief.332
In addition to the direct foreign tax credit, the US tax system allows indirect foreign tax 
credit in the case of domestic corporations holding 10% or more in the shares of foreign 
corporations with respect to the dividend income distributed from these foreign corporations.
333
"The rationale for the indirect credit is the same as the rationale fo r  the foreign tax credit 
generally, i.e., to avoid double taxation o f income. In addition, the indirect credit rules have 
been described as intended to eliminate the disparity that would otherwise exist between 
foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries o f U.S. corporations. ”334
The indirect foreign tax credit provisions are aimed at answering two concerns, the proper 
taxation of international investment and multiple corporate taxation
“The justification articulated most frequently by tax policy experts fo r the current U.S. 
regime for taxing foreign income o f U.S. persons is "capital export neutrality": Income taxes 
should not affect the location o f business investment. From the capital export neutrality 
perspective, dividends from foreign corporations should be treated similarly to dividends 
from U.S. corporations. To achieve this harmonization, § 902 must conform to the narrower 
tax exclusion for domestic intercorporate dividends. Moreover, competing U.S. international 
tax policies provide little support for the current broad credit. Foreign withholding taxes 
and tax treaties complicate the analysis, but have little impact on the conclusions. ”335
I return to the provisions of the foreign tax credit below.336
332 According to the NFTC, the premise on which the limitation preventing the cross-crediting is based is that the 
reduction o f US tax rate would leave many US-based companies with significant excess foreign tax credits. In 
practice, the opposite took place leading to an inefficient foreign tax credit regime.
Unlike the UK tax system, an indirect tax credit is allowed under the US tax system only until the 6th tier 
subsidiary.
334 See generally, Carr & Moetell.
335 Mundstock (1992-1993).
336 See pp. 160-163 below.
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Where do we stand today?
Concluding their above-mentioned report on tax deferral, the Treasury noted that during the 
years and in the light of several developments, Subpart F, in its current version, became 
somewhat outdated.337 Although the Treasury made no recommendations as to the approach 
to be adopted to make the legislation more capable of dealing with the new challenges, it 
stressed that such reform must be made in the light of the fundamental goals of international 
tax which are, to further the goal of equity, to promote the goal of economic efficiency (by 
'"''reducing the disparity between income from US and foreign investments”), to promote 
simplicity and administrability and to promote the goal of consistency with international
338norms.
According to the Treasury, following a careful examination of economic literature, they are 
of the opinion that CEN is probably the best policy when the goal is to maximize economic 
welfare and thus preventing significant tax disparity should remain an important policy339 
These conclusions were not shared by all.340
In a recent testimony before the US Senate Finance Committee, Pamela Olson, a senior 
Treasury official recognized the need for a new international tax plan. According to her 
testimony, the major changes that were made in 1962 did not progress with the economy and 
are no longer adequate to deal with the current state of the economy which became much 
more international. Since then there has been significant changes. Cross-border trade in 
goods increased from just over 6% of GDP in 1960 to over 20% today while trade in goods 
and services represent over 25% today.341 In addition, there has been a significant increase in 
cross-border investments to the US (from just over 1% in 1960 to more than 11% in 2001). 
Moreover, US multinationals represent more than V* of the US output, approximately 15% of 
US employment and their output represents between 50-75% of the US exports annually.342
As a result there is a great concern that the US tax code has not kept up to date with the 
changing economy. Olson focuses on three main points in her testimony. First, the necessary 
changes to be made to the US Subpart F legislation which is far too wide than it should be 
and covers also active income “arising from business operations structured and located in a
337 The three major challenges mentioned by the Treasury are the entity classification rules (“check the box”), the 
growth o f services in the global economy, and electronic commerce.
338 US Treasury (2000) at 98-99.
339 US Treasury (2000) at 99.
340 NFTC (2001).
341 The increase in the amount o f service and its impact on cross-border trade is one o f the most important points 
stress by most commentators on the subject.
342 Olson testifies on need for new international tax plan 2003 TNT 142-32, at paragraphs 111-117.
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particular country from business reasons wholly unrelated to tax considerations”?^  344 
Second, changes necessary with respect to the existing foreign tax credit regime which is 
detailed and complex and has the effect of subjecting certain US firms to double taxation on 
their foreign earned income.345 The overall effect of these two points has the effect of putting 
US based firms at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign competitors who either come from 
countries that use the territorial basis for taxation or have more limited CFC legislation or 
does have so many limitations with respect to their foreign tax credit relief.346 Third, the need 
to reduce the complexity of existing rules which are extremely complex and especially those 
rules dealing with international taxation.347
According to Olson, the impact that revenue-raising considerations have on tax policy raises 
some concerns with respect to sound tax policy decisions,
“Now, there may be other things that we could do that would ameliorate that effect, but one 
o f the concerns that I  have had over the last couple o f years in looking at our formulation o f 
tax policy, is that we seem to make our decisions purely on the basis o f  revenues as opposed 
to sound tax policy. And I  think that we let the revenues derive our tax policy decisions, we 
are probably making some mistakes in terms o f the effect on the economy. ”348
In a following testimony Hines summarizes his study on the competitiveness of US firms 
and comes up with two conclusions. First, that the ownership and activities of multinational 
corporations are highly sensitive to taxation, much more than was thought previously. 
Second, that competitiveness of the world economy has the power to change everything 
about the structure and characteristics of a national tax system that seeks to promote 
economic efficiency. These two conclusions have a dramatic effect on the US tax system that 
is based on principles and ideas that existed in the 1960s and before, when the world 
economy was much different.
The main point in his testimony is the grave effect the current tax system has on the ability 
of US based firms to compete in the world economy. First, Hines argues that according to 
their recent research, the US tax system efforts to tax foreign source income at the same way
343 Ibid  at para. 125.
344 Olson Testifies at Finance Committee’s Second Hearing on International Competitiveness, 2003 WTD 137-16 
(“In other words, in seeking to capture as much passive international income as possible, subpart F  captures a 
large share o f  active income as well, putting the companies that earn this active income at a distinct competitive 
disadvantage.''').
345 2 0 03 TNT 142-32 at para. 126-128.
346 Ibid at para. 204. This point is further explored in Assistant Secretary Olson’s written testimony -  2003 WTD 
137-16.
347 Ibid  at para. 131-133.
348 Ibid  at para. 391.
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it taxes domestic source income is likely to reduce the productivity of the world economy 
and the well-being of Americans. Although some might argue that the difference between 
the US tax system and other countries’ tax systems are not that grave, Hines believes that 
even these differences are sufficient to influence the competitive of US based firms in certain 
markets.
The existing US tax policy is based on the premise that the more US firms invest abroad, the 
less they can invest domestically. As a result, based on the (outdated) assumption that US 
investments are not affecting foreign investments, the more US firms invest abroad, the 
lower the level of US investments will be.349 Thus, national welfare is maximized by taxing 
foreign source income of US firms and worldwide welfare is maximized by allowing foreign 
tax credit. According to Hines, this view fails to recognize the consequences of the global 
competitive market where US direct investment abroad trigger more foreign investments in 
the US.350 Thus, the approach that investment of US firms abroad reduces the level of 
investment in the US is no longer valid.
Based on the inadequacy of the basic premise, Hines overall conclusion is that the current 
policy objective of the US tax system lead to the opposite results i.e. that it is “detrimental to 
the functioning o f world economy and contrary to US interests .”351
Rosenbloom recognizes the problematic state of the current international tax rules and is of 
the view that there is a need for a genuine reform and not just piecemeal changes.
The two major problem areas apart from complexity are the CFC regime and the foreign tax 
credit rules.352
According to Rosenbloom, one of the basic flaws in the existing CFC rules and their 
application is the assumption that all foreign tax jurisdictions stand at the same footing.353 
Current CFC regime should change to impose more restrictions on income not attributable to 
active business income and income that is earned in tax haven jurisdictions. Such income, 
according to Rosenbloom, does not raise a competitiveness concern. At the same time, he
349 Ibid at para. 428-431.
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid
352 For a thorough discussion o f Rosenbloom’s view regarding CFC and the question o f deferral, see Rosenbloom 
(2001).
353 2 0 03 TNT 142-32 at para. 514.
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proposes to introduce an exemption with respect to active business income, an exemption 
that would serve the purpose of maintaining the competitiveness of US businesses.354
The more significant problem is with respect to the US foreign tax credit rules, which 
became amazingly complex.355
As far as the competitiveness argument, despite Avi-Yonah’s important criticism, it appears 
that Congress was interested over the years to promote the competitiveness ability by 
advancing certain measures that improved the position of US-based companies vis-a-vis 
foreign competition.356 These measures suffered a significant setback recently when the 
WTO found both the FSC regime and its successor the ETI regime illegal subsidies.357 As a 
result, the US is forced to repeal the ETI regime. No replacement has been announced. Even 
if there is a new measure to replace the illegal ETI regime, one should wonder, what benefit, 
if any, does that have of the welfare of US residents.
The Foreign Policy Element
As it is already mentioned above,358 in addition to political considerations, international 
relations play an important role in US international tax policy. Although most of the 
academic discussion tends to focus on the elements discussed above,359 a brief look at the US 
tax code and regulations would establish that the US is using its international tax system also 
to further certain (although limited) political goals. For example, as part of the US CFC 
legislation, an income would be regarded as Subpart F income if it originates from a country 
that is on the list of boycotted countries.360 There is no other policy goal that justifies a 
different treatment for this type of income and for that purpose it does not matter if the 
income is passive or active income. Similar provisions exist in the foreign tax credit rules 
which do not entitle a taxpayer to receive foreign tax credit with respect to foreign tax paid 
to a boycotted country.361
354 In a reply to a question by the committee, Rosenbloom commented, “/  realize that this is a political process. 
But, i f  one could move to a prefect system, an ideal system fo r  the United States, in my view we would not tax 
active foreign business income. ” (Ibid at para. 595).
355 Ibid  at para. 596.
356 Among these measures are the former FSC/ETI regimes, the rules dealing with the Subpart F / PFIC overlap, 
the repeal o f §956A, etc.
357 See also Angus (2002).
358 Please refer to the discussion with respect to foreign policy above (pp. 65-66).
359 See pp. 23-64 above.
360 IRC §952(a)(3)(B).
361 IRC §9010).
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At the same time, it is important to recognize that unlike other countries, the US has always 
maintained its unwillingness to grant subsidies to foreign countries through the tax system in 
the form of “tax sparing” clauses, whether it is in domestic law or as part of a DTC.
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Inbound Investments
When examining the US treatment of inbound transactions i.e. transactions by foreign 
persons investing in the US, again the active passive distinction reappears. As discussed 
above,362 there is a basic distinction between the tax regime that applies with respect to 
active income and the tax regime that applies with respect to passive income.
At same time, the US employs separate approaches with respect to withholding taxes. On 
one hand, it imposes a very high withholding tax rate with respect to passive income. This 
rate is usually reduced (significantly) by the application of double tax conventions (and it has 
been argued that the only reason for retaining such high rate is to serve as a bargaining tool 
in the negotiation of new double tax conventions). On the other hand, two important 
categories of passive income are outside the scope of this high rate. The first, exemption of 
capital gains with respect to personal property in the hands of foreign persons.363 The second, 
portfolio interest exemption, with364 the rationale of attracting foreign debt holders and 
promoting the US financial markets to foreign investors.365 This latter exemption should be 
contrasted with the treatment of dividends, which unless a double tax convention provides 
otherwise, are subject to a 30% withholding tax rate.
Another distinction in the treatment of foreign inbound investments can be made between 
direct and portfolio investments. In general, it is possible to argue that portfolio investment is 
treated more favorably than direct investment.366 The difference in approach is seen in the 
level of scrutiny that direct investment transactions receive vis-a-vis portfolio investment 
transactions and can be probably explained as follows: whereas the US is keen in attracting 
foreign portfolio investments into the US capital market, it is not willing to allow foreign 
residents investing directly in the US to gain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis domestic 
multinationals. Attracting foreign investments to the US capital markets improves the 
liquidity of the markets and allows US companies to reduce the costs of finance, thus 
improving their competitiveness in the global markets. On the other hand, allowing foreign 
taxpayers to structure their operations in the US market though the use of advanced 
financing techniques which are to a large extent tax driven, would create an advantage for 
these companies vis-a-vis US companies and would make it much more attractive to operate
362 See p. 97 above.
363 This exception generally does not apply with respect to capital gains from the disposition o f real estate.
364 With respect to this latter exemption, several commentators (including Professor Avi-Yonah) use it as an 
example for the “race to the bottom” argument (Avi-Yonah (1998c).
365 For criticism o f this exemption, Avi-Yonah (1998c).
366 See for example, the portfolio interest exemption and the exception granted to non-resident investors operating 
in the UK through a trader.
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in the US as a foreign company.367 As a result, whether it is for the competitiveness reason 
mentioned above, for the reason of protection of the tax base, prevention of base erosion or 
just to prevent “abusive” application of US domestic laws and double tax conventions, a 
number of anti-planning provisions apply to this type of inbound transactions. An example 
for such mechanism is the earning stripping rules.
This tax planning ability was enhanced in 1996 when the US adopted the “check the box” 
regulations allowing taxpayers to elect the tax classification of their entity (including for that 
purpose, foreign entities). Although the rationale behind the legislation was to simplify the 
legislation that existed at the time by allowing taxpayers to make the choice instead of 
applying a factors test that was to some extent elective, the ability of taxpayers to elect the 
tax classification of their entities resulted in tax advantageous schemes that allowed foreign 
taxpayers to finance their operations in the US on better terms than their US based 
competitors. This led the Treasury and the IRS to introduce the Domestic Hybrid Entities 
regulations. This legislation can be seen as a policy approach by the US in which it has 
emphasized its insistence to ensure that its legitimate expectations are being met. When it 
was introduced, it was added to the already existing regulations dealing with dual resident 
companies368 and with conduit entities.369
According to Kingson, when the US is waiving part or all of its taxing right with respect to 
an item of income it does so based on the expectation that the item of income shall be taxed 
by the other country.370 For many years, the US has insisted on a high withholding tax rate 
with respect to certain types of income, mainly to create a good starting position for its 
negotiators in the course of new tax treaty negotiation.371 In order to maintain the US 
expectations, it should ensure that it does not waive its taxing rights for free.
According to the Treasury, “[Tjhe agreement by the source country to cede part or all o f its 
taxation rights to the treaty partner is predicated on a mutual understanding that the treaty 
partner is asserting tax jurisdiction over the income. ... This principle is central to the 
interpretation o f treaty provisions in determining the extent to which payments received by a 
hybrid entity are eligible fo r treaty benefits. ”372
367 See also the discussion regarding the Inversions Report above.
368 IRC § 1503(d).
369 US Treasury R eg§ l.881-3 regulated under the authority of §7701(1) and § 1503(d) respectively.
370 Cf. the exemption allowed for portfolio interest that is discussed above (p. 111).
371 Kingson (1981).
372 Preamble to regulations under §894 (T.D. 8722) quoted by Ring (2004).
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This strict approach should be contrasted, however, with a more lenient approach with 
respect to outbound transactions. As a general rule, the structure of the US tax system makes 
the opportunities for non-taxation more limited. Although the US imposes relatively strict 
limitations with respect to the appropriate application of the foreign tax credit regime, this 
approach has its limitations, usually with a “competitiveness” tag on it. A good example for 
such limitation is the withdrawal of the above-mentioned Notice 98-11.373
I examine these provisions and others in more detail below.374
373 See p. 101 above.
374 See pp. 159-163 below.
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Chapter 6 - Hybrid Financial Instruments
An area that poses many challenges to tax policy makers, governments and taxpayers is the 
taxation of financial instruments. The existence of an international network of capital 
markets in which transactions can be carried out, its global nature and the relative ease with 
which funds can be transferred freely from one country to another and with which cross- 
border transactions are carried out pose a real challenge to existing tax systems that are 
already challenged by domestic national financial instruments.
Even without looking at the cross-border level, at the domestic level, financial instruments 
pose a significant challenge to the tax systems. Tax systems generally distinguish between 
different types of payments in a way that may lead to discontinuities.375 The relative ease in 
which one product can be re-designed and re-packaged as another product, which mimics the 
former product’s economic characteristics but is taxed differently due to its new structure 
allows taxpayers to achieve a favorable tax treatment at little or no cost.376
With this progress and creativity, a corporation can create its own unique instrument that on 
one hand is capable to achieve the desired legal classification and on the other hand the 
desired economic and tax result.377
As a result, a tension exists between the legal principles that to a large extent regulate the tax 
treatment of the instrument and the economic principles that govern the design and structure 
of the instruments for financial purposes.378 The evolution of this tension has taken place 
both at the domestic level of each tax jurisdiction and at the international level in the inter­
action between the different jurisdictions.
375 For example, the different treatment o f  capital gains and ordinary income and the different treatment o f  
dividend and interest income. For the latter, please refer to our discussion below.
376 The call-put parity is a good illustration to the difficulties faced by tax designers in structuring a tax system 
that is able to deal with the taxation o f financial instruments. The put-call parity is a basic principle o f corporate 
finance that sets up the foundation to many o f the more complex instruments available today. According to the 
parity, an ownership o f a share is economically equal to the ownership o f  a zero coupon bond together with a 
long position on a put option to sell the share and a short on a call option with respect to the share, both options 
being identical with respect to their terms and maturity. See generally, Knoll, (2002-2003).
For example, instead o f owning a share, the investor is able to achieve the same economic result if  he buys the 
bond and holds the two positions in the options. Nevertheless, from a legal perspective, the investor does not own 
the share even if economically he is in almost (or exactly the same) position as if  he owned the share. In that way, 
for example, a fund, which is not allowed to invest in shares, can still achieve the economic outcome o f  
investment in shares even without investing in shares.
377 Pratt (2000) at 1075-1076 (explaining the rationale behind the innovation).
378 See generally, Hariton (1994) and Polito (1992). For example, certain voting rights usually associated with 
shares and do not exist in the absence o f shares even if economically, the return is similar to the holding o f  
shares.
114
The following case study focuses on the taxation of hybrid financial instruments (HFIs). For 
that purpose, I first introduce the distinction between debt and equity which is the basis to 
the taxation of HFIs and move to discuss the way different approaches taken in the US and in 
the UK to the taxation of HFIs.
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The Traditional Distinction Between Taxation of Debt and Equity & Its 
Rationale379
“So long as Congress insists on providing for radically different 
tax treatments of debt and equity capital, lawyers must do their 
best to make the distinction meaningful.”380
Traditionally, tax systems (the UK and the US being no exception) drew a distinction 
between the treatment of debt and the treatment of equity for tax purposes.
Debt is regarded as a loan by the lender to the borrower of funds to be used over time. At the 
end of the time period these funds are to be returned to the lender together with interest, 
which represented the compensation for the use of the funds during that period. As a result, 
if the borrower uses the funds in the course of business, the payment of interest is deductible 
as part of the costs of business. The return of the funds (the principal) is not treated as a tax 
event because the borrower is merely returning the asset he previously borrowed. Regardless 
of the changes in the borrower’s business performance, the same amount381 is due on the 
agreed date. As for the lender, he is not taxed on the return of the funds (again, it was merely 
the return of the asset that was previously borrowed) but only on the interest received. If he 
lends funds in the course of his business then this interest is treated as income of the 
business. With respect to this interest payment, special rules govern its taxation.
On the other hand, if the investment is seen as an equity investment, a different tax treatment 
applies. Any payments made by the company to the investor are treated as a distribution of 
profits, which is not allowed as a deduction for the distributing company. At the investor 
level, the distribution is either taxed as ordinary income in the US and as schedule F income 
in the UK or, in the case of companies, partly or fully exempt from taxation.382 Unlike 
interest payments that, in most situations, are taxed even if not paid, distributions become 
taxable only when paid regardless of the identity of the parties or their relations. The 
rationale underlying the deferral is that the income does not belong to the recipient until the 
time of distribution.383
379 For a general discussion o f this topic, see Edgar (2000); Wood (1999); and in a more US context, Polito 
(1992); Hariton (1994) and Pratt, (2000).
380 Hariton (1994) at 502.
381 Plus a certain amount o f interest that effectively compensates the lender for the time value o f  money.
382 Recent changes in US tax laws allow for partial exemption o f certain dividends received by individuals from 
certain qualified companies (see above in the general discussion on the US). This new measure is limited in time 
and is due to sunset in 2008.
383The traditional company law view is that the dividend exists only from the time it is declared by the 
appropriate body in the company. Thus, in some countries, from a corporate law perspective, the right for the 
dividend amount is only created following a decision by the board o f directors to distribute dividend in the
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When the investor wishes to dispose of his investment, any gains are taxed as capital gains, 
sometimes subject to a preferential tax rate and enjoying certain adjustments of the purchase 
price (usually indexation adjustments). However, no tax is imposed as long as there is no 
realization of the gain on the disposition of the investment, and even then, there are some 
provisions that would defer the tax even further in the case of certain exchanges.384 Thus, 
there is no current taxation of any changes in the value of the investment and any change that 
may take place is taxed only on disposition.385
Thus, on one hand, equity investment enjoys a tax deferral until the dividend is declared 
whereas interest income (on a debt instrument) may be taxed on either an accrual or mark-to- 
market basis even if no actual payment is made.386 On the other hand, equity investment may 
lead in certain jurisdictions to double taxation of the same income once at the hands of the 
corporation and once at the hand of the shareholders whereas income on debt instruments is 
usually subject to only one level of tax.
According to the General Reporter to the 2000 IFA Congress, potential considerations that 
may influence a decision whether to structure the instrument as debt or as equity, include 
also, in addition to the considerations mentioned above, among others: the potential 
exemption from withholding tax of certain interest payments on debt instruments that are 
made to non resident investors and timing differences that may result from different methods 
that are used by countries in recognizing income and allowing deductions. In the latter, some 
countries would tend to recognize interest payments based on an accrual or even mark to 
market basis regardless of whether actual payment is really made (not to mention situations 
where original issue discount rules exist, in which case the discount amount is also 
recognized as income, sometimes even during the life of the debt instrument) whereas 
dividends paid on equity investments are usually recognized only when the income is 
actually received.387
relevant year (this may change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from one type o f share to another (i.e. 
common shares v. cumulative preferred shares). In debt instruments, however, the right to receive the interest 
payments is embodied in the debt instruments documents issued at the time the debt is created.
4 For example, IRC §351 and §368(a) in the US and s. 132 TCGA 1992.
385 Subject to situations where the holder is treated as a trader and current taxation may apply (for example, in the 
form o f mark-to-market).
386 In certain situations, there is no deferral o f tax on income from equity instruments until die actual receipt o f  
the income. For example, in certain countries, CFC regimes regard certain undistributed earnings o f  controlled 
foreign companies as if  distributed to the shareholders. As a result, these shareholders may be subject to tax even 
though no actual distribution is made. See, for example §951-957 o f the US Internal Revenue Code.
387 Duncan (2000) at 23.
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The rationale for the difference is argued to be the different nature of debt and equity. In the 
case of debt financing, the lender is not participating in any way in the business adventure of 
the borrower. He is merely supplying funds for a limited period and thus being compensated 
for his own inability to use these funds during the period of the loan (interest). The lender is 
not taking part of the business adventure and does not expect to receive any gains apart from 
the compensation for the use of his asset, the funds. At the same time the lender is not 
exposed to the risks of loss and regardless any losses the borrower’s business enterprise 
might incur, the lender expects to receive back the full principal plus interest.
In the case of an equity investment, the investor is taking part in the adventures of the 
business of the company in which the investment is made. Thus, he is subject to both risk of 
loss and potential for gain that might result from such adventures. For that reason, there is no 
clear certainty with respect to the amount of return on investment until final disposition of 
the investment. Similarly, in equity’s pure form, the investors have no certainty with respect 
to possible distribution of profits until the actual distribution is made. This basic difference 
in the nature of the investment on one hand and the nature of dividend payments v. interest 
payments on the other, forms the basic difference in the treatment of debt and equity.388
This traditional distinction between debt and equity started to lose much of its original 
rationale as it became apparent that the reasons and justifications that led to the introduction 
of the original distinction in the first place are questionable today.
Several changes in the nature of business and commercial practice have led to a situation 
whereby, especially with large publicly traded companies, little difference exists between 
equity and debt. The former limited risk debt became much more risky, equity investments 
became not much riskier than debt investments and equity investors became less actively 
involved in the adventures of the corporate.389
According to Edgar, the first best solution would be to apply a comprehensive accrual 
method to all instruments and to have shares subject to bifurcation as well, whereby every 
instrument is divided into a bet element (where the gain/loss is unexpected) and a time value 
element (where the gain/loss is expected), each part being tax separately.390
388 See also Hariton (1994).
389 For example, as Polito rightly points out, not all shareholders are in the same position and not all creditors are 
enjoying the same protection from risk. Moreover, since not all companies are exposed to the same degree o f risk, 
a shareholder o f  company A might be more protected from risk than a creditor o f company B. Yet, based on the 
debt-equity distinction, the former will be taxed on the premise that he is exposed to greater risk than the latter, 
and vice versa. (Polito (1992). A similar position is taken by Hariton (1994) and Wood (1999).
390 This proposal is further discussed in the following pages below.
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However, while shares theoretically should be subject (at least partially) to an expected 
return based system together with other debt instruments, this is not possible as long as 
countries continue to adopt a corporation tax that imposes tax on the profits at the hands of 
the corporation.391
Edgar concludes that as a result of some barriers corporate income tax is not replaced with 
accretion or expected return taxation with respect to equity. Nonetheless, because some 
countries regard the corporate income tax as a proxy for an investor level tax on the share 
gains, this view underlines attempts by these countries to reduce the inconsistency between 
the treatment of equity and debt by the use of an imputation system that treats the corporate 
level tax as a withholding tax for the shareholders.392
Thus, a distinction is maintained in the tax treatment of equity instruments on one hand and 
of debt instruments on the other hand, even though economically some of these instruments 
might be similar one to another. The main feature of this different treatment is the 
deductibility of interest paid on debt and the lack of such deductibility for distributions paid 
on equity. As a result, if we have two instruments, one equity and one debt, that are perfect 
substitutes, the difference in treatment creates a potential for tax benefit at no cost.393
“The perfect or near-perfect substitutability o f debt and equity entails little or no efficiency 
cost, and only revenue loss; imperfect substitutability involves some sacrifice in the desired 
pattern o f cash flows, and some efficiency costs.
The substitutability o f debt and equity is attractive solely because o f the inconsistency in the 
tax treatment o f expected returns on these two instruments.’'’294
The problem is that the root to the distinction is based on a legal premise and lies in the 
“proprietary view” of the corporation. According to this view, the corporate enterprise is 
equated with the residual interest of the shareholders who are treated as the effective owners 
of the underlying assets whereas the debt holders are considered as outsiders.395
391 Edgar (2000) at 300-301. These barriers are beyond the scope o f our discussion and are mentioned in Edgar 
(2000) at 301-302.
392 Edgar (2000) at 302-303. Thus, debt is usually preferable where the combined tax at the shareholder and 
corporate levels is greater than the expected investor level tax on gains. When it is the opposite then equity is 
usually preferable.
393 Polito (1992).
394 Edgar (2000) at 298.
395 Edgar (2000) at 39.
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The alternatives to this approach are all based on the economic premise that the functions 
performed by debt and equity are very similar because both types provide a certain rate of 
return in exchange for the provision of capital to be used by the corporation.396
“In general, the expected return on shares is higher than the expected return on debt simply 
because the amount and timing o f the cash flows from shares are subject to a greater degree 
o f contractual contingency than are the amount and the timing o f the cash flows from debt. 
Apart from this difference in degree o f risk and the commensurate rate o f return, debt and 
equity serve the same function economically, and conceptually there is no fundamental 
difference between them. ”397
Whereas debt has a predominantly time-value element with a limited upside and an assured 
minimum return, equity has a predominantly unexpected return element that is dependant on 
the company’s performance. The upside is quite high but so is the downside and the risk for
• • t • 398not receiving any return on the investment.
This, however, blurs when financial instruments that combine elements of debt and equity 
are introduced. Whereas the basic difference between pure debt and pure equity is relatively 
clear, there are many other instruments that are located in the middle of the two extremes and 
this seemingly clear distinction is blurred.399 For example, it seems clear that common voting 
shares are equity investments whereas a one-year loan carrying interest of 8% is a debt 
instrument. However, how should we classify a non-voting cumulative preference share? 
Will our classification change if the shares are also redeemable at the option of the holder 
after three years? Will our classification change, if, instead of being redeemable, the shares 
are convertible to common shares of the issuer company at the end of two years? Will it 
change if the conversion is to be made at the option of the issuing company or to shares of a 
third company unrelated to both the issuer and the holder of the preferred shares? Should a 
convertible debt instrument be accorded the same treatment as a bond that is issued with a 
call option or a warrant?
396 This alternative approach also explains the existence o f the expected return element in equity investment.
397 Edgar (2000) at 93.
398 Edgar (2000) at 93-94.
399 If we take the view supported by Edgar that both debt and equity are functionally similar to each other and are 
essentially comprised o f the same elements, a bet element with a time value element, the boundary between the 
two groups lies in the degree and extent o f each o f the two basic elements in the final instrument. An instrument 
with a significant bet element and a restricted time value element would be closer to equity and vice versa. The 
problem, however, is once again, where to draw the line. Unless we adopt a single treatment to both groups, we 
are forced to draw a line, which is arbitrary and is likely to lead to discontinuities and arbitrage opportunities. In 
fact, as long as the distinction is a matter o f degree, it will always be arbitrary. For the problem o f line drawing in 
tax law -  see generally Weisbach (1998-1999).
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Moreover, if we adopt an economic approach to evaluation and classification of financial 
instruments, we imply that all other legal attributes of the instruments are irrelevant. Apart 
from the possible disadvantages of this approach, such an approach would represent a 
significant departure from existing standards. To the extent it is not fully adopted by all 
countries, it is likely to result in possibilities for unresolved double taxation as well as many 
opportunities for ITA.
A first best solution for the treatment of financial instruments would probably be one similar 
to the above-mentioned comprehensive accrual regime. This, however, is probably not a 
practical option and thus a distinction is drawn between debt and equity.400
In the light of the given distinction in the treatment and the exclusion of equity from the 
expected return or accretion tax basis, it is necessary to decide how and where to draw the 
line between equity and non-equity instruments. In the absence of a first best solution, 
however, the combination of an existing difficulty in rationalizing the different treatment of 
debt and equity together with the continuing innovation in the creation of new financial 
instrument that makes it harder to draw a clear line between debt and equity, appears to lead 
us to a distinction which is both technical and arbitrary.401
400 This discussion is beyond the scope o f this work. See generally, Edgar (2000) and Weisbach (1998-1999).
401 Weisbach (1998-1999).
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Hybrid Financial Instruments
“In the cross-border context, f o r  exam ple, h yb rid  instrum ents  
m ay secure a  deduction  in one ju r isd ic tio n  w ithou t the inclusion  
o f  incom e in another ju risd ic tion , th ereby redu cin g  the co st o f  
fin an cin g  or enhancing return. They are  often u sed  by  
m ultinational corporations to  m axim ize or op tim ize  tax  an d  
fin an cia l position s an d  b y  investors to  ach ieve h igher y ie ld s . In 
general, h ybrid  instrum ents m ust be  carefu lly s tru c tu red  an d  
docum ented in order to  secu re the d e s ired  resu lt under each  
reportin g  regime. ”402
A HFI is defined as “a financial instrument that has economic characteristics that are 
inconsistent, in whole or in part, with the classification implied by its legal form. Such an 
instrument may possess characteristics that are consistent with more than one tax 
classification, or that are not clearly consistent with any classification.”403
Examples for such instruments are participating debt obligations that are debt obligations on 
one hand but allows participation in the profits (a clear equity characteristic) on the other 
hand, profits sharing instruments and contingent debt instruments that are debt instruments 
whose interest and principal payments are contingent on the business performance of the 
borrower.
As I discuss further below, most of the discussion with respect to HFIs is conducted at the 
domestic level where the arbitrary nature of the distinction between debt and equity together 
with the difference in their tax treatment challenge tax systems to deal with the classification 
of instruments that possess features of both debt and equity.
Since, however, HFI are at the borderline between debt and equity, they present taxpayers 
with planning opportunities also at the international level, as they are more easily adaptable 
to achieving an inconsistent tax characterization in two or more jurisdictions. While most tax 
systems accept the dichotomy in treatment between debt and equity, tax systems developed 
independently and created their own approach to distinguishing debt from equity and interest 
payments from dividend distributions. Where there are differences in the position of the
402 Connors & Woll (2002).
403 Duncan (2000) at 22.
122
dividing line, such differences often result in a risk of double taxation or an opportunity for 
double non-taxation.
Reasons for using HFIs
HFIs may be issued for tax reasons but a significant number of them are actually issued for 
non-tax reasons.404
Madison, in his 1986 article, mentioned several non-tax reasons for corporations to issue 
HFIs. 405 Among these reasons, HFIs are a source for “cheap debt” because their equity 
features (including their convertibility) make them more attractive for holders and allow 
issuers to borrow at lower rates than the rate that would be required in the absence of such 
equity features. HFIs allow investors that are subject to certain regulatory constraints to 
invest, thus increasing the number of potential investors and raising the price of the HFI (the 
market segmentation theory).406
If, in addition to the equity features, the issuer is able to structure the instrument so that it 
would be classified inconsistently in two or more tax jurisdictions, an additional benefit 
would be achieved as a result of the lower tax that would be imposed on the instrument.
Sometimes, however, the use of HFIs can be a method for bridging the taxpayers’ objectives 
in raising capital with the investors’ objectives in seeking an investment407
For example, taxpayers wish to avoid the (unfavorable) full or partial double taxation that is 
usually associated with equity investments while retaining other non-tax benefits associated 
with equity investments 408 To the extent taxpayers are able, they will attempt to create HFIs 
that substitute for existing debt or equity instruments while obtaining the non-tax benefits 
that do not exist in the generic instruments.
A HFI may also be issued for pure tax reasons or for a combination of both tax and non-tax 
reasons. Although the direct reason is tax related, the overall motivation for entering into the
404 Ibid. Among the reasons used by the IFA general reporter are regulatory or accounting limitations and the 
desire to retain/achieve certain risk level.
405 Madison (1983-1984) at 467.
406 Ibid, at 467.
407 Hariton (1994).
408 For example, high credit rating. Issuing hybrids that allow the parties to enjoy the preferential tax treatment o f  
debt finance while not suffering the low rating disadvantages usually associated with debt finance. To a certain 
extent, this ability is now restricted following recent financial scandals including the collapse o f Enron.
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transaction is to obtain lower cost finance and the method for achieving this goal is through 
optimal use of the tax systems.
At the international dimension, the most familiar tax reason is double benefits, the ability to 
use the advantages of both debt and equity characterization and in particular, the ability to 
receive equity treatment at the shareholder level (no tax or reduced tax) together with debt 
treatment at the corporate level (deduction for “interest” payments).
How to Deal with HFIs?409
Based on the assumption that this distinction in the treatment of debt and equity is not 
removed, it is necessary to decide how tax systems should approach and treat HFIs that 
basically combine both debt and equity features.
The difficulty in articulating a consistent and useful method for the distinction between debt 
and equity and for the taxation of hybrids is illustrated by Hariton,
“Characterization o f hybrid instruments involves placing instruments on this continuum and
drawing arbitrary lines. This is not an impossible task The difficulty lies in the fact that
debt and equity evidence a relationship between two classes o f investors in a corporate 
enterprise, and a creditor can be said to avoid business risk only in relation to another 
investor who participates in that risk. Any time characterization is based on such a 
relationship, one can get lost in an “infinite loop ” where each investment appears to both 
more and less equity-like than the one to which it is being compared.... I f  the question is still 
“how much do investors participate in relation to other investors in the same business? " 
then I  think the distinction between equity and debt still can be drawn along a graspable 
continuum, without getting lost in an infinite loop. ”410
With the integration and globalization of financial markets, given the insistence of different 
tax systems to maintain the distinction between debt and equity, it appears that an analysis of 
where exactly to draw the line should not be limited to the domestic level, dealing with each 
tax system separately, but has to be dealt with simultaneously at the inter-nation level, by 
coordinating among the different tax systems and their respective choices of policy.
409 For a discussion o f  the theoretical possibilities, see generally, Wood (1999), Edgar (2000); The practical 
application o f this issue in the context o f the US and UK tax legislation is discussed below (pp. 127-163).
4fo Hariton (1994) at 501-502.
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In the absence of such cooperation, while it is possible that several discontinuities might be 
removed at the domestic level, such discontinuities are likely to remain at the inter-nation 
level.411
In the General Report to the 2000 IFA Congress dealing with the taxation of HFIs, the 
starting point was that “all tax systems distinguish between different classes o f financial 
instruments through the use o f rules that are, at least at the margin, arbitrary.5,412 413
However, as a recent survey of several countries established, the approach often differs from 
one country to another,
"Some countries assign primary importance to the legal form or financial accounting o f an 
instrument in determining its classification for tax purposes. In others, the economic 
characteristics o f the instrument can have equal or greater importance. Many countries 
combine elements o f each approach. In some countries, the tax authorities may challenge the 
form that a taxpayer has adopted fo r a transaction, but the taxpayers are not similarly 
entitled to disavow their own form. In other countries, taxpayers may determine the tax 
treatment o f a financial instrument by reference to its economic substance even i f  that 
substance is inconsistent with the form o f what they have chosen. ”4N
Tax neutrality requires that economically equivalent instruments be taxed in a similar way. 
The problem is, of course, to determine the level of equivalence that is required for two 
instruments to be taxed in a similar way and the level of difference that is required to justify 
different treatment.415 In addition, once again possible conflicts may arise when two 
instruments represent equivalent economic substance but different legal rights.
Apart from the alternative of taxing debt and equity alike, either partly or completely,416 thus 
eliminating the distinction, there appear to be several main alternative approaches to taxation 
the debt-equity distinction and taxing hybrid financial instruments. All these alternatives are 
based on the premise that, justified or not, the distinction and the resulting discontinuity will 
remain part of the tax system. The aim is to achieve the most efficient and consistent way of
411 Moreover, it is quite possible that the domestic law is reformed with the aim o f  eliminating discontinuities at 
the domestic level thus creating new discontinuities at the international level.
412 Duncan (2000) at 29.
413 See also Edgar (2000) at 308. Arguably, in a first best setting, there would be no distinction in the tax 
treatment o f  debt and equity.
414 Duncan (2000) ibid.
415 Helminen (2004) at 57.
416 These alternatives including the following: to tax debt like equity, to tax equity like debt, or allow some o f  the 
equity investments to be treated as debt thus only partially eliminating the difference in treatment. See generally, 
Edgar (2000) and Wood (1999).
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taxing financial instruments. Among the many methods that have been suggested are the 
factors approach, the facts and circumstances approach, the bifurcation and the two-stage 
bifurcation and also the integration approach.417
To summarize the discussion so far, one can say the following: First, the distinction between 
debt and equity, while possibly justifiable in the past, becomes less and less justifiable in the 
present as the distinctions between debt and equity becomes blurred. Second, despite the 
above, tax systems continue to draw an arbitrary line between the debt and equity and to treat 
each group differently. There are different approaches to deal with the distinction between 
debt and equity. Even if the same approach is chosen, there is still more than one way of 
applying the same approach 418 And in fact, as it is further discussed below, this distinction is 
approached differently in different countries.
The Identification of the Instrument
An essential step in the determination of the tax treatment of a given instrument is to identify 
the instrument419 For that purpose, it is necessary to determine what is the instrument and 
what is included as part of it. For example, if company X issues a preferred share and a 
forward contract to A, an investor. Should the preferred share and forward contract be 
treated each as separate instruments or should there be an integration of both instruments in 
the light of the similarity in the identity of the two parties. Another example is of a share 
with a warrant. Should the share be regarded as an instrument separated from the warrant?
The answer to this question is not always clear and tax systems approach this issue 
differently. Sometimes, even within the same system, different approaches are followed. For 
example, the US system applies both integration and bifurcation to certain financial 
instruments 420 Similarly, the UK system tends to treat convertible debt as one instrument 
containing a debt instrument and an option to buy shares while treating debt instruments 
issued with warrants as two separate instruments. As a result, different treatment applies in 
these two cases.
417 For a discussion o f the bifurcation see generally Edgar (2000) Ch. 6; for a discussion o f  the two-stage 
bifurcation as well as some of the other above-mentioned methods, see Wood (1999).
418 A good example is bifurcation that can be applied in different ways, each time resulting in a different 
outcome. See generally, Egdar (2000). Similarly, a factors approach may lead to different results if  the weight 
and importance allocated to the different factors vary from one jurisdiction to another.
419 This question is also crucial for the purposes o f tax neutrality and tax equity as it represents the basis for the 
determination o f whether similar instruments are treated similarly and different instruments are treated 
differently.
420 For example, IRC § 1059 treating a “short against the box” as a combined position, imposing constructive sale.
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United Kingdom
General Overview
When we examine the differences between the treatment of debt and the treatment of equity, 
we realize that the UK system is relatively in line with our general discussion above. The 
fundamental difference between debt and equity, at least at the issuing company level is that 
interest on debt is allowable as a deduction whereas distribution that is usually associated 
with equity is not. Similarly, dividends are taxed mostly on a realization basis (when 
received by the shareholder) whereas interest payments may be taxed on an accrual or even 
mark to market basis. This interest can be either stated or unstated interest (for example, 
original issue discount).
In addition, interest income is usually taxable in the hands of the recipient as ordinary 
income under Schedule D case I or III whereas dividend income is either exempt in the case 
of UK resident corporate recipient or subject to tax as schedule F income in the hands of 
non-corporate recipient. Different provisions apply where a non-resident company makes the 
distribution to UK residents. Such distributions are generally subject to tax in the hands of 
the UK corporate or non-corporate recipient under Schedule D case V.421
Another important distinction between equity and debt is that equity holders are usually not 
entitled to any regular payment or to the repayment of their investment. At the same time, 
while an equity share may be subject to preferential tax rates when it is disposed of by its 
holder, upon such disposition, the selling shareholders usually pays tax on the undistributed 
profits as well. Thus, unless the share is disposed of or the undistributed profits are 
distributed to the shareholders, there is usually no tax imposed on these undistributed profits 
apart from the corporation tax imposed on the corporation itself.422
Nonetheless, despite the existence of this deferral as a result of the realization approach (the 
wait and see approach) that is adopted for the taxation of dividends, once the dividends are 
distributed such earnings are subject to an existence of double taxation, first time at the 
corporate level and second time at the shareholder level. Such double taxation does not exist 
in debt finance.
421 Under Schedule D case I or case V.
422 Today, following the enactment o f the substantial shareholding legislation, if  the investment qualifies as a 
substantial shareholding within the definition o f the corporation tax legislation then the disposition is exempt 
from tax.
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The underlying justification for the distinction between debt and equity appears to be the 
difference in the risk inherited in the instruments. Equity instruments have high degree of 
non-payment risk and the return is not guaranteed, as there is no obligation to pay dividends 
and the claims of shareholders are subordinated to the claims of all other creditors. Debt, on 
the other hand, is regarded as a lower risk investment offering a guaranteed return.423
From an issuer perspective, an important element is the deductibility of the interest 
payments. Under UK tax law, interest is deductible if the instrument is regarded as debt and 
unless there is another provision that denies the deductibility of the interest payment.
In determining the tax consequences of a given instrument for UK tax purposes, we are 
required to answer a two-part question. First, what is the appropriate character of the 
instrument and is it within the loan relationship regime. Second, what is the appropriate 
treatment of the payments made with respect to the instrument and should these payments be 
treated as equity distributions outside the loan relationship regime or as interest payments 
within the loan relationship regime?
Moreover, in certain circumstances as further described below,424 even if the instrument is 
treated as debt, while the instrument itself is not recharacterized as equity, the payments 
associated might be recharacterized as “distributions” within the meaning of s.209. Thus, it 
is only the cash flow that is being recharacterized, while the instrument itself is kept as is, for 
all purposes.
The starting point in the analysis is with the legal characterization of the instrument. Once 
the legal characterization of the instrument has been established, the following questions 
have to be asked. First, is the instrument regarded as loan relationship? To the extent it is, 
then income paid on the instrument as well as income paid upon the disposal or maturity of 
the instrument are all treated based on the loan relationship rules. Second, to the extent the 
instrument is not regarded as a loan relationship, it is necessary to determine whether one of 
the specific provisions apply to it. If one of these provisions applies, then payments made on 
the instruments are treated under loan relationship but payments made upon the disposal of 
the instrument are usually taxed as capital gains. This would generally apply to convertible 
securities, index linked and asset linked securities. As part of Budget 2004, the government 
has announced its intention to amend the rules to include a bifurcation provision with respect
™ lbid.
424 See pp. 139-144 below.
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to certain assets which contain a derivative element425 into a loan relationships part and a 
derivative contracts part. The loan relationships part will be fully within the loan 
relationships rules. The derivative contract part will be taxed under the capital gains rules 
(where s.92 and s.93 apply today) while the index-linked element will be exempt426
Third, even if the instrument is not within loan relationship and not covered by any of the 
specific provisions, although the instrument itself is treated under the capital gains tax rules, 
it is still possible for payments made on the instrument during its life to be classified as a 
“distribution” thus disallowed as a deduction for the payor.
T he L oan  R elationship Legislation427 
The UK scheme of taxing capital finance is described is the following way
“All forms o f corporate debt come within the loan relationship rules. Equity-linked finance 
only comes partly within the loan relationship rules. UK borrowers are obligated to account 
fo r liabilities under capital instruments in accordance with FRS 4 and FRS 5. There is no 
specific accounting standard covering debt assets. In general these will be recognized on the 
balance sheet at either cost (accrual basis) or fair value (MTM). In the former case 
recognition o f profits and losses will be deferred until realization or some triggering event. 
In the latter case all value changes will go through the profits and loss account.”*2*
The reasons for adopting the loan relationship rules are summarized by the Inland Revenue 
as follows,
“The idea behind the legislation was to move away from a rigid income/capital divide in the 
way in which taxation was applied to an approach which looked at the overall position, 
either the return received or the total outlay, and taxed or relieved that overall outcome. The 
legislation follows accountancy practice quite closely in recognising profits and 
expenditure. ”429
As Southern has commented,
425 For example, convertibles and asset linked securities that are discussed below.
426 Inland Revenue (2004) REV BN 25.
427 See generally, Southern (2002).
428 See generally, Southern (2002) at 93.
429 Inland Revenue, CT12000 - Company Taxation Manual.
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“It is a commonplace that the policy o f this legislation is to keep within the capital gains 
regime gains on equity and equity-related instruments whilst bringing into the pure income 
regime debt and debt-based products. Hence debt is taxed on an income (accruals) basis, 
while equity is taxed on a capital gains (realization) basis. However, this statement tells us 
nothing whatsoever about whether, in any particular case, an instrument comes in part or as 
a whole within one regime or the other. ”430
In this respect the UK adopted two different methods for the taxation of hybrids: bifurcation 
and assimilation. In the former, the instrument is bifurcated into its different parts and each 
part is taxed as a separate instrument. In the latter, the entire instrument is brought within 
one category and taxed accordingly.431
Thus, while the loan relationship regime has removed the need for a capital / income 
distinction for instruments that are included within its scope, it is still not wide enough to 
cover all instruments and applies, with some exceptions, only to instruments that come 
within the definition of a “loan relationship” or to related transactions. This is in line with 
Edgar, who argues that as long as there is a separate tax imposed on the corporation’s profits, 
there can be no comprehensive accrual.432
The first step is to determine the nature of the instrument based on its legal form, as opposed 
to accounting treatment or economic substance. It is generally accepted that when an 
instrument is referred to as a share for UK company law purposes, such characterization will 
be respected also for tax purposes.
The starting point is usually with the characterization accorded to the instrument under 
general commercial law, a characterization that in most cases is respected for tax purposes as 
well.
“There is no general rule to require debt to be recharacterized as equity fo r  UK tax 
purposes, or vice versa. Thus, i f  an instrument is treated in law as share capital it will be 
treated as equity fo r  UK tax purposes: ”433
430 Southern (2000) at 256.
431 Southern (2002) at 118.
432Edgar (2000). In essence, the UK system can be seen as adopting a definition o f  debt while anything that is 
outside the definition is taxed as equity.
433 Connors & Woll, (2002) at 231.
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In analyzing the legal form of an instrument we need to examine the rights and obligations 
that are associated with the instrument. For example, where the instrument is a share, a 
reference should be made to the articles of association of the company issuing the shares to 
ascertain these rights and obligations. It has been commented that in general and subject to 
two well-defined exceptions, the legal characterization given to the instrument by the parties 
shall be respected. First, in situations where the English Doctrine of a Sham applies. That 
is, where the parties call an instrument a share, for example, while they intend it to be 
debt.434 The second exception is situations to which the Ramsay Doctrine applies.435
Is the Instrument within the loan relationship rules?
Once the character is determined, it is necessary to decide whether the interest is within the 
loan relationship rules. Loan relationship only applies with respect to companies that are 
subject to Corporation Tax in the UK.436 A “loan relationship” is defined as including a 
money debt arising from a transaction that is regarded as a transaction for the lending of 
money.437 This definition consists of two parts. First, the instrument has to be a “money 
debt”. Second, if the first part is satisfied, then it should be established that the money debt is 
arising in a transaction that is regarded as a transaction for the lending of money.
A money debt is a debt that is or has been a debt to be settled by the payment of money or by 
the right to settlement under a debt, itself being a money debt. This definition includes also 
debt that has the option to be settled in that way, either by the election of the debtor or of the 
creditor.438 A debt that results from rights conferred by shares cannot be treated as being 
issued in a transaction for the lending of money and therefore would be outside the scope of 
loan relations.439
An instrument that is not within the definition of “money debt”, either because it is not 
regarded as a transaction for the lending of money440 or because it is not a debt, is outside the 
loan relationship rules and subject to capital gains tax treatment. In certain circumstances, 
however, payments made with respect to that instrument may, nevertheless, be subject to
434 As it was described by Diplock LJ in Snook v. London & West Riding Investments, Ltd. [1967] 1 All ER 518, 
528: “fo r  acts or documents to be a “sham", with whatever legal consequences follow  from this, all the parties 
thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the rights and obligations 
which they give the appearance o f  creating.” See also recently, Hitch v. Stone [2001] STC 214.
435 This exception, however, is relatively narrow and should not be regarded as a judicial rule o f  economic 
substance or o f substance over form. A discussion o f the Ramsay Principle is beyond the scope o f this 
dissertation. In general, see Tiley (2003). See also VanderWolk (2002).
436 S.80(1) FA 1996.
437 S.81(1), (2) FA 1996 as amended by FA 2002 Sch 24, para 2. See also Southern (2002) at 31.
438 S.81(2) FA 1996.
439 S.81(4) FA 1996.
440 For example, convertible securities or credit given on purchase.
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different rules, due to the application of specific anti-avoidance legislation. This issue is 
further discussed below.
If the instrument is regarded as a “money debt”, it is still necessary to establish that it is a 
transaction for the lending of money. If this condition is not satisfied, then only the payments 
of the instrument are to be included within the loan relationship rules, whereas any disposal 
of the instrument itself will be subject to the capital gains tax legislation.
The legislation contains a list of certain excluded instruments, which do not come within the 
loan relationship rules. Shares are usually outside the scope. Ordinary shares and also 
preference shares are usually outside the scope of loan relationship but permanent interest 
bearing shares in building societies are. As it was summarized by Southern, “everything on 
the equity side o f the debt/equity border is outside the loan relationship rules'**1
Instruments that are outside the Loan Relationship regime but are 
affected by its application
Three types of HFIs fall outside the loan relationship rules but the loan relationship rules are 
still applied to them. These are convertibles, asset-linked and index-linked securities.
Convertibles
A convertible security is basically a bond with an option for the holder to convert it into a 
pre-determined amount of shares in the issuing company, an option that adds equity 
characteristics to it. On conversion no consideration is paid to the issuing company and any 
subscription that is to be paid to the company by the holder is set off against the amount 
represented by the bond.442
On conversion the shares come completely within the capital gains provisions. The loan 
relationship regime does not apply in general to convertibles due to their quasi-equity 
characteristics, the future conversion into shares makes the instrument into a future equity, 
which puts them outside the scope of a “money debt”. Nonetheless, this regime applies with
441 Southern (2002) at 51. Thus, any instrument that represents pure equity interest in a company cannot be a loan 
relationship. Shares in a company, for example, is defined in FA 1996 in a way that share is deemed to be any 
share that may entitle its holder to receive distributions, thus including preference shares (CCH, Online Library, 
at para. 133-010 referring to FA 1996, s. 103(1)). According to Southern, in the Inland Revenue’s view, most 
debts, which are legally money debts, are intended to be covered in the definition o f loan relationship. Thus, there 
should be no distinction between a simple debt on one hand and a debt issued as a company security on the other 
hand.(Southem (2002) at 42). See also CCH Online Library at para. 133-010 quoting to that effect the Inland 
Revenue press release regarding the original legislation (REV 21 o f November 28, 1995).
442 Southern (2002) at 118.
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respect to all interest on the convertibles prior to the conversion and to all other profits and 
losses arising to the issuer (but not to the holder). The latter is subject to capital gains tax 
with respect to such profits or losses.443
The beneficial tax treatment of convertibles is summarized and explained by Southern,
“An investor in a s. 92 security gets a beneficial tax treatment, because capital movements 
are taxed on a realisations basis under the capital gains tax rules, and taxation o f the gain 
can be deferred indefinitely by a share exchange, or exempted under the rule fo r  disposal o f 
substantial shareholding. This stems from the basic philosophy underlying the loan 
relationship and derivative contacts rules, that equity-based returns are to be taxed under 
the capital gains rules, while debt-based returns are to be taxed under the income rules. 
Interest returns disguised as dividends or capital are to be taxed under the loan relationship 
rules. This is the reason for the change to the s.92 rules.”444
According to the Inland Revenue, s.92 and S.92A FA 1996 are meant to ensure that 
companies are unable to manipulate the terms of the security to ensure that they get the most 
advantageous tax treatment.445
From a holder (creditor) perspective, if certain conditions are satisfied, the instrument does 
not come within the loan relationship regime and the capital gains tax shall apply. These 
conditions are the following:446
■ The rights attached to the instrument include a provision that entitles the holder the
right or option to acquire shares in the issuing company as a result of the
conversion.447 These shares are limited to “qualifying ordinary shares” or
“mandatory convertible preference shares”;448
■ The instrument does not come within the definition of a “relevant discounted
security” or an “excluded indexed security”;449
443 Southern (2002) at 118-119.
444 Southern (2002) at 120.
445 Inland Revenue, CFM6100 - Taxing loan relationships: convertibles etc: introduction
446 S.92 FA 1996 as amended by s.72 FA 2002;. In FA 2002 the section was amended and additional 
requirements were added thus limiting the advantageous treatment o f s.92 to a more restricted group o f  
instrument.
447 S.92(l)(b) FA 1996.
448 S.92(2)(bb) FA 1996; “Mandatory convertible preference shares” are defined as shares that must be converted 
within 24 hours from their acquisition into “qualified ordinary shares” which are shares that are either listed on a 
recognized stock exchange or shares in a holding or trading company and are shares that carry a right to dividend 
or other profit share in the company (this right cannot be a right only to a fixed rate o f dividend) (see generally, 
Inland Revenue, CFM 6130).
449 s.92(l)(d) FA 1996.
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■ Upon issuance of the instrument, there was more than a negligible likelihood that the 
rights to acquire shares would be exercised to a significant extent;450
■ The right to acquire shares must be fully exercised so that it ends the creditor 
relationship that existed before. Cash is only allowable with respect to fractional 
shares entitlement not exceed 5% of the value of the shares;451
■ The extent of share acquisition upon conversion is not determined by reference to 
cash value provided for in the provision or ascertainable by reference to its term s452
In addition, the following two requirements have to be satisfied:
■ At the time of issuance, there is no connection between the issuer and the holder of 
the convertible security453
■ The security cannot be a security whose disposal would fall to be a trading receipt in 
the hands of the holder454
If the security satisfies all the above-mentioned requirements, then according to s.92(2) FA 
1996, the preferential capital gains treatment shall apply and the only items to be taken into 
account under the loan relationship rules are the interest and any exchange gains and losses. 
All other items are outside the loan relationship rules and the conversion to equity is subject 
to a rollover relief455
Thus, the pre-conversion interest payments made on the instrument will not enjoy the 
deferral and be taxed on the basis of loan relationship rules. The treatment of s.92 is regarded 
as very beneficial because it allows the taxpayer to enjoy the preferential capital gains rules 
with respect to most of the income. This preferential treatment, however, has led to many 
attempts by taxpayers to come within the scope of s.92 FA 1996. Extensive anti-avoidance 
legislation was added, narrowing the scope of s.92 and creating certain anomalies in the 
process.456 For example, convertible securities (as defined in s.92) cannot be issued to 
connected persons; the conversion according to the convertible security must be made in full 
(i.e. debt must be fully converted) and the convertible security cannot give the shares a pre­
determined value.
450 S.92(l)(e) FA 1996.
451 S .92(l)(ee) FA 1996.
452 S .9 2 (l)(c ) FA 1996.
453 S.92(1E) FA 1996, “connection” is defined by s.87(3)FA 1996.
454 S.92(l)(f) FA 1996.
455 S. 132 FA 1996.
456 Inland Revenue (2002) in Appendix 2d: Anti-Avoidance-Targeted Measures, Clause 9.
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FA 2002 also added what is now S.92A FA 1996 that deals with the borrower and limits the 
debits that the borrower can bring into account.457 For example, expenses with respect to 
issuing shares on conversion and with respect to acquiring shares to be offered in exchange 
of the security can no longer be brought into account by the borrower.458
With respect to any items that are treated as loan relationship, their ascertainment should be 
made based on an authorized accrual method.
Asset-linked Securities
Asset linked securities is another example of a quasi-equity type of instrument. This type of 
instruments is very similar to a regular loan or a bond issued by a company whereby the 
holder (Creditor) agreed to transfer a stated amount of money at the beginning of the period 
and to receive an amount at the end of the period (the principal). This principal is usually 
determined by reference to a chargeable asset.
According to the legislation, a security is deemed to be linked to a chargeable asset if the 
redemption price is calculated by reference to the change in the value of the chargeable asset 
i.e. if the calculation is a multiple of the nominal amount of principal by this change in 
value.459
In distinction from interest payments that are payments made for the time value of money, 
the payment in asset-linked securities does not represent that time value of money but rather 
the changes in the value of a chargeable asset over the period of the security. A chargeable 
asset is defined quite restrictively as either a interest in land or a qualifying ordinary share 
which includes all shares apart from fixed rate preference shares and non-participating 
shares.460
An asset-linked security is treated as securities within s. 132 TCGA 1992 thus being within 
the capital gains tax rules.461
“Where the return is fully linked to the changes in the value o f an asset, the lender's position 
is the same as i f  it owned the asset. The lender risks a loss i f  the asset falls in value, but will
457 S.74(l) FA 2002.
458 S.92A FA 1996, CF6170- Taxing loan relationships: convertibles etc: conditions for the borrower.
459 S.93(6), (7) FA 1996.
460 S.93(10) and (12A) respectively.
461 This rule applies only to capital gains. With respect to losses, in order for the loss to be relieved it has to come 
within the debt on security rules.
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benefit from any increase. FA 1996 recognises the 'capital type' risk o f such loan 
relationships and, in certain circumstances, excludes profits or losses arising on them. The 
chargeable gains rules then apply to such profits and losses, although the loan relationships 
legislation applies to any interest payable or receivable. ”462
The scope of this provision is further limited by FA 2002 with the introduction of new S.93A 
dealing with guaranteed returns introduced by s.76 FA 2002. An interesting feature of this 
legislation is its integrative approach to taxation of the financial position.463 In essence, the 
legislation provides that when an asset-linked security (which in itself, as discussed above, is 
subject to the capital gains provisions) is held together with another position, in a manner 
that is designed to produce the taxpayer with a guaranteed return, the two assets will be 
treated as one instrument. The rationale behind this provision is that capital gains treatment 
should not be extended to a taxpayer that in effect enjoys the same benefits of a debt i.e. risk­
free, fixed guaranteed return on his investment. This rationale is evident in the wording of 
s.93A(3).464
This appears to be quite an unconventional approach taken by the UK legislator and that is 
for two main reasons.465 First, the approach adopts an economic substance approach to the 
taxation of the financial position by comparing the instrument to a cash flow with similar 
economic attributes (a loan) and taxing it accordingly. Second, and more significantly, 
because it combines two separate positions taken by the same taxpayer and treats them as a 
single instrument taxed based on its economic (as opposed to its legal) substance. The effect 
of this provision is to take an otherwise equity instrument and classify it as a debt instrument.
As a result of this legislation, the position is taxed under FA 2002 schedule 26 para 6, as a 
derivative contract.
Warrants
As it is described above,466 warrants are similar to long-term securitized call options. 
Warrants can be issued with bonds, securities (equity and debt) or with shares and entitle the 
holder the right to subscribe to either shares or bonds at a fixed price in the future.
462 Inland Revenue, CFM5910 - Taxing loan relationships: asset-linked securities.
463 Cf. the new proposal in Budget 2004 to bifurcate instruments.
464 S.93A(3). This rationale was also mentioned by the Inland Revenue (Inland Revenue, CFM5925 - Taxing loan 
relationships: asset-linked securities: guaranteed return).
465 Cf. the formalistic approach taken in Citibank Investment Ltd  v. Griffin [2000] STC 1010, discussed below in 
the context o f warrants.
466 See pp. 120-121 above.
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When a debt is issued with warrants it gives rise to two separate instruments, a debt 
instrument and a warrant. According to financial reporting standard such issue constitutes a 
debt and equity issue and requires the proceeds to be apportioned between them.467
For tax purposes, the treatment of the investment depends on whether it falls within the 
scope of s.92 FA 1996 to be treated as a convertible security. In general, warrants issued with 
debt that do not come within the definition of convertible security are likely to be treated as 
two separate instruments, an option and a pure debt.468 With warrants, the warrants are 
treated as separate from the debt instrument with which they are issued. Thus, capital gains 
treatment only applies to the warrants and not to the bonds or other debt instruments with 
which the warrants are issued. The court’s formal approach in characterizing instruments is 
reflected in the decision in Citibank Investment Ltd v. Griffin,469 where the court insisted in 
following the legal substance of the transaction and refused to recharacterize two sets of put 
and call options into one loan transaction.
The case involved an “equity box” tax planning whereby the taxpayer held a set of put 
options and a set of call options, both on the FSTE All Shares Index. The two sets of 
contracts were cash settled with the same exercise date. The two sets were also structured in 
a way in which the amount payable was predetermined if the two sets of options were 
payable on the same day.470
The narrow issue was whether a gain made on the “equity box” investment constitutes a 
capital gain on qualifying options or income. The Inland Revenue took the position that 
treating the two sets of options together, the investment was like a zero coupon bond giving 
rise to income that should be subject to tax as ordinary income on an accrual basis. It should 
be noted that the other party to the transaction was subject to tax on an accrual basis and was 
able to deduct the payments made on an accrual basis (as part of its trade).
The Special Commissioners took a formal view of the transaction and refused to re­
characterize it as a loan.
467 Southern (2002) at 147 referring to FRS 4.
468 For example, a warrant issued with a debt obligation may not qualify under s.92 FA 1996 if the option can be 
satisfied without using the option (i.e. making the conversion) or if the extent o f  share acquisition upon 
conversion is determined by reference to cash value provided for in the provision or ascertainable by reference to 
its terms. In these situations, s.92 will not apply.
469 [2000] STC 1010.
470 For an illustrative description o f  the facts -  see Southern & Southern (2000).
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“The legal analysis o f the transaction reveals that they were options and not loans. It follows 
that the legal nature o f the transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax consequence is 
still an option and not a loan. To recharacterise the two options as a loan would be to 
disregard the legal form and nature o f the transaction and to go behind them to some 
supposed underlying substance. ”471
This firm view of the commissioners was justified by the form (the legal nature, in the words 
of the court) taken by the taxpayer, which included, among others, the use of an ISDA 
master agreement which is an agreement for the making of options and not for the making of 
loans/72
In dealing with the argument that the two sets of options were planned to be exercised 
together and that the transaction did not incur any risk for the taxpayer who basically 
“guaranteed” a pre-determined return for himself, the Special Commissioner, continued with 
their very formal legalistic approach and noted that,
“Mr. McCall argued that the transactions were not options because, taken together, they did 
not have the normal concomitants o f options, namely choice and risk. However, statutory 
definition o f qualifying option in the legislation makes no mention o f choice and risk. Also, 
although the amoimt payable to the taxpayer company was predetermined i f  both options 
were exercised together, what was not predetermined was the amount payable under each 
option. That did depend on the operation o f the share index. Although we have that the 
intention o f  the parties was that both options should be exercised together, there was 
always the possibility that one option could be assigned before exercise with the consent o f  
International; accordingly, each option did have an independent existence. ”473
As additional support for their position, the Special Commissioners pointed to provisions 
dealing with default under the agreements, provisions that were suitable for options and not 
for loan agreements.474
On appeal to the High Court, the Inland Revenue tried again to challenge the treatment of the 
transaction based on the Ramsay Principle and treat the transactions as one transaction 
outside the scope of qualified options, thus subject to ordinary income treatment. This 
challenge failed mainly because the court adopted a relatively narrow view of the Ramsay
471 [2000] STC 1010 at para. 53.
472 Ibid, at para. 54.
473 Ibid, at para. 57 (emphasis added).
474 Ibid, at para. 58.
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Principle475 and held that it is an exhaustive test, the satisfaction of the requirements set forth 
by the court in Furniss v. Dawson being a precondition for its application. These conditions 
were not satisfied in the case at hand -  the absence of practical likelihood for the pre-planned 
events not taking place (the taxpayer could have terminated the position earlier) and the lack 
of steps with no commercial purpose made the Ramsay Principle inapplicable.476
Southern, commenting on the decision of the Special Commissioners, mentioned the 
significance of the decision to taxation of financial instruments477
“However, the same issues are directly relevant to the tax treatment o f guaranteed equity 
bonds, where the insurance company issuing the bonds enters into a derivatives contract 
with a bank in order to provide the return needed to fund  the bonds. The whole basis o f this 
structure is that the return on the backing transaction will in the hands o f the insurance 
company be taxed as a capital gain and not as income. Moreover, the case raises in a 
distinct, simple and inflexible form the basic issue, whether a cash-settled derivative 
requiring a substantial up-front payment is a loan relationship. A t a fundamental level, the 
case asks the question: what is the nature o f legal fact? To these questions, the Special 
Commissioners have produced penetrating and perceptive answers.,>478
S.209 D istributions
As it was discussed above,479 apart for the existence of certain specified exceptions, the UK 
tax system does not often recharacterize an instrument in contrast with its legal form. 
Instead, alongside respecting the legal form of the instrument, tax laws may alter the tax 
consequences of a given instrument if it is believed that another treatment is more 
appropriate. For example, if a payment is made by a company to a debt security holder, it is 
possible for that payment to be characterized as a “distribution” instead of an “interest”, if it 
believed that a distribution is the more appropriate characterization. In that way, the 
instrument does not loose its debt characterization. Since, however, the interest payments 
made with respect to the instrument are recharacterized as a “distribution”, the issuer is 
unable to claim a deduction and the holder is treated as if he received a “distribution” as 
opposed to interest payment.
475 The court made reference to the test in Furniss (Inspector o f  Taxes) v. Dawson [1984] STC 153 where the 
tests for applying the principle were formulated.
476 Ibid.
477 The law regarding the specific tax planning that was discussed in this case was changed by later legislation.
478 Southern & Southern (2000) at 665.
479 See p. 128 above.
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The method for disallowing the deduction of the interest is by regarding part or all of the 
interest payment as a “distribution” for UK tax purposes thus unallowable as a deduction. 
The rationale behind the legislation is two-fold. First, it seeks to preserve the integrity of the 
corporate-shareholder taxation by ensuring that payments would not go ffom the company to 
shareholders in disguised form thus avoiding the treatment of a “distribution” for tax 
purposes and debt/equity distinction. Second, it seeks to ensure that such distributions, being 
a capital payment, are not allowed as a deduction against the company’s profits, thus 
reducing the company’s tax liability. Our analysis is conducted at two different levels, the 
issuing company’s level and whether the payment is allowed as a deduction and the level of 
the holder and whether the payment is treated as a distribution.
A distribution from one UK company to another company that is subject to corporation tax 
in the UK is not chargeable to corporation tax in the hands of the recipient.480 It is, however, 
chargeable to income tax in the hands of a non-corporate recipient.
S.209(2) ITCA 1988 defines a “distribution” for the purposes of Corporation Tax Acts. As 
well as applying to cover conventional situations of dividend distributions (including capital 
dividends), s.209(2) is wide enough and covers situations whereby there is a distribution out 
of the assets of the company in respect of shares in the company which does not represent 
repayment of capital or is not made in exchange for new consideration481 In addition, 
s.209(2) also covers interest payments made on a security issued by the company that exceed 
the reasonable commercial rate.482
In all these situations, the effect of s.209(l) is to recharacterize the payment as a distribution. 
As a result, the tax treatment that applies is of a distribution from a company to its 
shareholder.
Another situation in which s.209 applies is to interest payments made by a thinly capitalized 
company.483 In general, a company is regarded as being thinly capitalized if its debt:equity
480 S. 208 ITCA 1988.
481 S.209(2)(b) ITCA 1988.
482 S.209(2)(d) ITCA 1988.
483 According to s.209(2)(da), for the thin capitalization rules to apply, the following two conditions have to be 
satisfied:
The issuing company is a 75% subsidiary o f the other company or both are 75% subsidiaries o f a third company, 
and
All or part o f the distribution represents an amount, which would not have been paid to the other company in the 
absence relations, arrangements, or other connection (apart ffom the securities in question).
If the two conditions are satisfied, then s.209(2)(da) applies and the payment (or part o f it) is recharacterized as a 
distribution. 209(2)(da) does not apply with respect to situations that are already dealt with by other parts o f  
s.209. In addition, s.209(2)(da) only applies with respect to payments made to companies that are not subject to 
UK corporation tax (s.212 ICTA 1988).
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ratio is high. The Inland Revenue usually takes the position that any rate above a 1:1 rate is 
outside the reasonable range and thus interest paid by such companies are potentially subject 
to the thin capitalization rules. There is, however, no official safe harbor.
Looking only at s.209, it would appear that the provision applies with respect to all types of 
transactions, both domestic and cross-border. This, however, is modified by s.212, which 
effectively limits the application of s.209 to cross-border transactions. The legality of this 
provision has been doubtful and it became even more doubtful in the light of the 2002 ECJ 
decision in Lankhorst-Hohorst.m  In that case the ECJ held that the German thin 
capitalization rules which treated German residents differently than non-residents was 
discriminatory and in violation of EC law.
Even prior to the decision, it was argued that the legislation stands in contrast to EC law and 
also possibly treaty law.485
As a result of the ECJ decision, in a recent technical note, the Inland Revenue has announced 
that legislation will abolish the thin capitalization rules and replace it with strict transfer 
pricing rules that would apply to both domestic and cross-border situations.486
Equity Notes
Another situation that is covered by s.209 is the issuance of equity notes. Prior to the 
legislation in 1992, equity notes were used for two distinct purposes. First, UK resident 
companies and financial institutions used this type of instrument when raising finance in the 
capital markets. Despite the possibility for inconsistent tax treatment, the long maturity 
period made such finance option less attractive. The second purpose in which equity notes 
were used was in financing controlled corporations resident in the UK. In that way, foreign 
parent companies, especially US residents, were able to finance their UK subsidiaries while 
also enjoying the tax advantage of obtaining a deduction in the UK without incurring a 
corresponding inclusion of the income in the foreign country of the holder.487
484 C-324/00; The UK government asked to be added as a party in this case.
485 Tiley (2001) at 799.
486 the only exceptions are medium-sized companies and small companies to which the transfer pricing rules 
would not apply. With respect to the former, the Inland Revenue may apply the rules in exceptional 
circumstances. This ability does not exist with respect to the latter.
487 Edge (1992).
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The second group was described by the Inland Revenues as “a hybrid instrument which 
appears to be debt to the United Kingdom but equity in the United States.... A United 
Kingdom controlled group may also try to use the equity note to obtain a double deduction. 
Instead o f a direct borrowing by the parent to fund, for example, new overseas investment, 
the borrowing may be made by a US subsidiary. ”488
Instruments from the first group had usually long maturity with restricted obligation to repay 
principal prior to maturity except for on liquidation and were super-subordinated being only 
narrowly above preference shares. Nonetheless, these instruments retained their debt nature 
under general law.489 Applying S.209, absent special relations the only possible challenge 
could have come from the provision aimed at result-dependent instruments, which did not
1 • 490appear to apply to equity notes.
As long as the notes issued between associated persons were issued on the same terms as 
notes issued to unrelated parties (the first group above), Edge was of the view that s.209 was 
not applicable as long as the thin capitalization rules were satisfied.491
The effect of this planning was, according to the Inland Revenue, a reduction in the tax bill 
and thus a loss in revenue in both the US and the UK.492 A challenge was brought by the 
Inland Revenue against the use of equity notes between multinational companies. The 
Special Commissioners maintained the interest character of the payments made under the 
equity notes. They based their decision on two main grounds. First, the specific words of the 
applicable tax treaty did not prevent such payments from being interest. Second, the 
payments did not come with the scope of s.209.493
As a result, following a Special Commissioners’ decision and to prevent a potential loss of 
up to £150 million per year, it was decided to counter this planning option through 
legislation. In the words of the Inland Revenue: ‘To avoid a lengthy period o f doubt in the 
event o f the case going through the Courts, F2A92/S31 legislated specifically against the 
equity notes making an addition to the list o f payments which are treated as distributions 
under ICTA88/S209.”494
488 Inland Revenue -  International Tax Handbook, para. 1249-1250.
489 Edge (1992).
490 Edge (1992) referring to s. 209(2)(e)(iii).
491 At that time the thin-capitalization rules were different from the current rules discussed above.
492 Inland Revenue, International Tax Handbook, para. 1250.
493 Edge (1992) at 10.
494 Inland Revenue, International Tax Handbook, para. 1251.
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The legislation adopted was aimed only at the second type of equity notes, those issued by 
associated companies, associated companies being defined at a relative high threshold of 
75%, targeting “certain undated and long-dated debt instruments that were issued on an 
inter-company basis by United Kingdom resident companies to fund  additional capital 
investments, to provide working capital or to re-finance existing bank facilities.5,495 It left 
untouched equity notes that were issued to parties who were outside this definition. Yet, the 
rationale expressed was to prevent the exploitation of the inconsistency.
“Those schemes which were identified exploited the asymmetry in the treatment o f equity 
notes in the United Kingdom and in the United States. But the legislation to counter such 
schemes is written in general terms.... Basically it covers any lending which is perpetual, 
that is with no particular redemption date, or is very long-term loan (over 50 years). It also 
includes loans which, although they appear to be for a term o f less than 50 years, are, at the 
instigation o f the borrower, capable o f becoming longer term or non-repayable loans.”496
The legislation has, however, an additional important limitation imposed by s.212. The 
equity notes legislation only applies, despite its wide definition, in situations where the 
company holding the instrument is not within the charge to Corporation Tax.497
As it is possible to note from the section, the approach taken is independent of foreign law. 
While foreign law may be inconsistent in its application and result in an opposite 
characterization, the UK tax principles that determine the tax classification and treatment of 
the instruments (including s.209) are applied independently from foreign law. The end-result 
might be the same and the taxpayer would not be able to claim double benefits. Yet, this 
result is achieved by a “limited import” of part of criteria that is used in another country to 
characterize instruments (using the long maturity factor to characterize the payment on a 
debt instrument as a “distribution”). This was done only for the purpose of denying benefits 
although the instrument should be entitled to such benefits had the application been limited 
to the domestic approach only.498
495 Briffett (1992).
496 Inland Revenue, International Tax Handbook, para. 1251.
497 The same rule applies also with respect to the thin-capitalization rules mentioned above. In both cases, the 
original section is wide enough and covers both domestic and cross-border situation. However, S.212 restricts the 
application o f these two sections only to cross-border situations. This approach is very interesting in the European 
context as it is likely, following the ECJ decision in Lankhorst-hohorst that similar legislation in the UK (as well 
as in the rest o f Europe) would be under scrutiny. The way in which the legislation is structured, however, is quite 
interesting as it does not apply only to non-residents but rather to those taxpayers who are not within the tax 
charge o f the Corporation Tax. It is to be seen if the ECJ would regard this as a covert discrimination or as a 
restriction on one o f the freedoms o f the Treaty of Rome, thus inconsistent with EC law (see further, our 
discussion o f  EC law in the context o f s.209(2)(da) above (p. 141)).
498 One o f the reasons for that is the inapplicability o f the transfer-pricing provisions to equity notes. Transfer- 
pricing provisions usually seek to prevent shifting between two related taxpayers, usually from two different
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The legislation was criticized for its reliance on US tax characterization of an instrument for 
determining the availability of the deduction in the UK499 and for denying benefits for an 
instrument merely because of an inconsistent treatment in another jurisdiction.500
The above-mentioned reliance was made in direct contrast to the established principle that 
foreign tax law does not have any effect on UK tax law. In a question of UK tax 
characterization of foreign income or foreign entity, the decisions is made by applying UK 
tax principles while referring to foreign law (company law, for example, but not foreign tax 
law) to assist in the application of UK tax principles. Foreign tax law has no impact on the 
determination of UK tax liability.501
Treatment of foreign income — Memec and the availability of indirect 
foreign tax credit
The taxation of foreign income received by UK residents is determined by UK tax law based 
on a determination of the nature of the payment, which is made as a question fact and based 
on foreign law. Thus, in determining the UK tax consequences of a receipt that is received 
by a UK taxpayer the first step is to determine its nature and characteristics under the 
applicable foreign general law and then apply UK tax law to those characteristics to 
determine its UK tax treatment.502
In the context of foreign tax credit, the foreign tax credit is usually determined by reference 
to the tax treaty between the UK and the foreign country.
If a tax treaty applies than the foreign tax credit (including the indirect credit) is determined 
according to the provisions of that treaty. A few years ago, in Memec,503 the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the possibility of inconsistent treatment in the two relevant jurisdictions by 
holding that for the purpose of applying the indirect tax credit provision, the word 
“dividend” does not have the meaning as defined in the dividends article of the treaty but
jurisdictions, shifting that would not have been possible but for the special relations. Transfer pricing does not 
apply when a less beneficial investment is chosen over another investment as long as the chosen investment is 
priced at arm’s length. That has essentially happened with equity notes. This explains the argument raised by 
Edge (Edge (1992)) and I return to this issue in the analysis below (pp. 223-224).
499 Briffett (1992).
500 Edge (1992) at 13.
501 See generally, Inchyra v. Jennings [1965] 42 TC 388, Archer-Shee v. Garland [1931] AC 212, Baker v. 
Archer-Shee [1927] AC 844, the discussion in Tiley (2000) [^60.3 and in the next paragraph.
502 See generally, In Reid's Trustees (1949) 30 TC 431.
503 Memec p ic  v. IRC [1998] STC 754.
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rather the definition of the country applying the treaty which in that case was the country of 
residence, the UK.
Following the decision in Memec504 and the practice in the area of double tax relief, it 
appears that, in the absence of a clear provision to the contrary, a UK resident company 
receiving an income payment on a HFI from a foreign company should be able to receive 
both the tax credit with respect to any withholding taxes paid by the foreign payor505 and the 
indirect tax credit with respect to that income as if it was a dividend payment provided the 
income is treated as dividend under UK tax laws, even if it is not classified as a dividend in 
the country of the payor.506
For example, in the 2001 US-UK tax treaty, the foreign tax relief provision was structured to 
disallow indirect foreign tax credit in certain situations. This special rule can serve as an 
additional support for the view that in the absence of a clear provision to contrary, the 
indirect foreign tax credit should be available if the receipt is classified as a dividend in the 
country of residence.
505 In this case, according to the practice that now is also included in the OECD commentary the country of 
source applies the treaty and determines the applicable provision based on the character o f  the income under the 
treaty (and if necessary under its tax law). The country o f residence in applying the direct tax relief provision 
accepts and follows the characterization given in the country o f source, even if  such characterization is contrary 
to the characterization that would have been given under the laws o f the country o f  residence in the absence o f a 
treaty.
506 See also, Avery Jones et al (1999) and Avery Jones et al. (1996).
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United States
The US takes a different approach to the distinction between debt and equity.507 In general, 
the issues are quite similar. In the US, as it is in the UK, debt finance has advantages over 
equity finance. For many years, the US has followed the classical system of taxation of 
corporations, which meant that the profits of the corporation were taxed twice, once at the 
corporate level and then once again at the shareholder level. This has changed in 2003, with 
the introduction of a partial dividend exclusion as part of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act 2003.508 The new legislation applies with respect to US corporations 
distributing a dividend to US resident individuals and with respect to qualified foreign 
corporations distributing dividends to US resident individuals.509 This change in the law 
made it much more beneficial for US resident individual shareholders to invest in equity than 
it used to be under the classic system.510
If the payment is classified as either a distribution other than a dividend or as an interest 
payment, then this payment is subject to tax.511 In the former case, it is usually taxed as 
capital gains possibly subject to preferential tax rate, while in the latter case; it is taxed as 
income according to the marginal income tax rate of the recipient.
With respect to corporate shareholders, as long as the shareholder is a US resident 
corporation and the distributing corporation is a US corporation, partial or full exemption 
may be allowed with respect to inter-company dividend distributions.512 
If, however, the payment is classified as a distribution other than a dividend or as an interest 
payment than it shall be subject to tax in the hands of the receiving corporation.
At the issuing corporation level, there is a general preference on part of taxpayers towards 
interest characterization mainly due to the deductibility of these payments in the calculation 
of the corporation’s profits.
507 There has been extensive writing on the topic. See generally, Bittker & Eustice, Bittker & Lokken, Conlon & 
Aquilino (2001); (Plumb (1970-1971) and Freeman et al (2002).
508 Pub. L. 108-27.
509 For non-US resident individual shareholders, the existing treaty withholding taxes still apply.
510 This change is, however, limited in time and is expected to sunset in 2008.
511 IRC §316 defines a dividend. In addition, there is a complex and well-developed legislation that attempts to 
prevent certain distributions from enjoying a beneficial capital gains treatment by avoiding the dividends 
treatment (§302-307).
5,2 IRC §243.
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In the following pages I describe the approach taken in the US with respect to other 
classification of instruments, an approach, best described as a factors approach, that was 
challenged and as a result has been developed mainly a purely domestic context.
A good way to start the discussion of this complex part of the law that is currently governed 
mainly by a labyrinth of not always consistent case law and IRS pronouncements and 
rulings, is to use the following passage by Plumb that was written in 1971 and is still very 
relevant today,
“In many ways -  some obvious and well known, others more subtle -  the federal tax law 
draws a sharp distinction between the tax consequences o f debt and o f stock, o f interest and 
o f dividends; but it provides no definitions o f those concepts. The Supreme Court once said 
that such terms are “well understood" and “need no further definition but a “jungle ” o f 
several hundreds court decisions which “defy symmetry” have, in the ensuing quarter 
century, proved the error o f that assumption. The Supreme Court has declined every 
subsequent opportunity to clarify (or perhaps to add to) the confusion, and proposals o f  
several prestigious groups fo r the amendment o f the statute have found no support in 
Congress. Now the Congress has passed the ball to the Treasury, with a broad authorization 
to establish, by regulations, standards for distinguishing debt from stock for all purposes o f  
the Internal Revenue Code. ”513
Since then, with the above-mentioned grant of authority resulting in proposed regulations 
that were subsequently withdrawn, the confusing state of the law is still the same if not 
worse, due to the addition of some new case decisions and administrative rulings over the 
last thirty some years. Nonetheless, Plumb’s analysis is still relevant today. In the following 
few pages, I shall try to briefly discuss the outstanding issues as they stand today.
The authority under §385
The starting point is §385, which was first added to the Code in 1969. Although case law 
existed well before its introduction and has continued to exist with no less importance during 
the thirty-plus years that have passed since, it is impossible to truly understand the state of 
the law in this area without understanding first this statutory provision and the failed 
attempts over the years to introduce regulations to govern the classification of instruments 
for tax purposes.
513 Plumb (1970-1971) at 369.
147
§385(a) provides as follows
"The Secretary is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or 
appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated for purposes o f 
this title as stock or indebtedness (or as in part stock and in part indebtedness). ”514
Section 385(b) provides for factors that should be considered, among others, as part of a 
facts and circumstances test in determining the nature and character of the instrument. These 
factors are:
“(1) Whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified 
date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate consideration in money or money's 
worth, and to pay a fixed rate o f interest,
(2) Whether there is subordination to or preference over any indebtedness o f the 
corporation,
(3) The ratio o f  debt to equity o f the corporation,
(4) Whether there is convertibility into the stock o f the corporation, and
(5) The relationship between holdings o f stock in the corporation and holdings o f the interest 
in question. ”515
In 1989 §385 was amended to include a provision whereby a characterization that is given to 
an instrument by its issuer shall be binding on its holders unless the latter notify the 
Commissioner that they do not accept the characterization given by the issuer.516 Thus, 
theoretically, with a proper notice, there is no prohibition on the holder to adopt a 
characterization that is different ffom the one adopted by the issuer.
In 1980 pursuing the authority granted by §385, the Treasury issued proposed regulations for 
the classification of instruments in an attempt to replace to the case law facts and 
circumstances test with a more precise mechanical test. According to the proposed 
regulations, the “all or nothing” approach was maintained but the multiple factors case law 
test was replaced by a quantative bright-line test whereby a hybrid is classified as debt if 
50% or more of its fair value is represented by debt features. Alternatively, an instrument is
5,4 IRC §385(a).
515 IRC §385(b).
516 IRC §385(c).
148
classified as equity if the value of the equity factors exceeds 50% of the value of the entire
517instrument.
As a result of these regulations, taxpayers and their advisers began to plan their affairs so 
that they manage to qualify within the provisions of the proposed regulations. One of these 
attempts was the creation of “adjustable rate convertible notes” (ARCN) which bore interest 
at below market rate but offered additional interest payments based by reference to dividends 
paid by the issuing company on its stock. Additional features of the ARCN were a 
conversion to common stock of the issuer at a conversion rate that was equal to the then 
market value of the shares and redemption at a price below issue price. The combined effect 
of these two features was to almost enforce conversion to common shares of the issuer.518 
The link to the proposed regulations was in an analysis that was prepared by the investment 
bankers according to which 55% of the value of the ARCN was derived from their debt 
features and only 45% of their value was derived from their equity feature. Thus, applying 
the bright-line test of the regulations, ARCN were to be classified as debt. The IRS dealt 
with this issue first in Revenue Ruling 83-98 and then by withdrawing the proposed 
regulations. In Revenue Ruling 83-98 the IRS analyzed the tax treatment of an ARCN and 
found it to be equity based on the analysis that most of the value of the ARCN is attributable 
to equity features.519
Nonetheless, despite the conclusion in the ruling, the Treasury decided to withdraw the 
proposed regulations that provided taxpayers with planning flexibility.
“In course o f dealing with ARCNs, the Treasury Department became aware that it was 
fighting a losing battle. The ‘bright-lines ’ in the Section 385 Regulations provided rules that 
the Service could utilize in testing whether an instrument was debt or equity, but they also 
provided taxpayers (and their advisors) with a playing fie ld  on which instruments with 
significant equity characteristics could easily be classified as debt fo r tax purposes. The 
possibility o f increased interest deductions under Section 385 Regulations seriously 
jeopardized the fisc. ”520
Following the ACRNs and the withdrawal of the proposed regulations, debt:equity debate 
arose again with respect to the issuance of the MIPS (monthly interest preferred stock). The 
interesting point regarding the issuance of MIPS is with respect to the reasoning behind it
517 Freeman et al (2002) at 654.
518 Ibid.
519 Freeman et al (2002) at 658.
520Ibid.
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“The MIPS structure is, in reality, more o f a GAAP accounting and rating agency play than 
it is a tax play, but, unfortunately, it was billed as a tax play by the general financial press 
and, therefore, the Treasury department reacted to it. ”521
The MIPS structure522 is comprised of a partnership or an LLC used as a special purpose 
vehicle and is transparent and classified as a partnership for US Federal income tax purposes 
(Although different classification as a wholly owned subsidiary is given for corporate law 
and local tax purposes). The LLC issues preferred interests to the public for cash. The 
preferred interests are dividend yielding. The money raised on the issuance is loaned to the 
company and the latter is then paying interest on the loan. Because of the transparent 
(partnership) classification of the LLC, the interest income paid by the company on the loan 
is attributed to its interest holders which is the public that hold a majority interest following 
the issuance of the MIPS. Thus, for tax purposes, we have a loan from the public to the 
company. At the same time, for accounting and rating agencies purposes the transaction is 
viewed as an minority interest issuance by an affiliate and thus recorded on the balance sheet 
as an issuance of shares by a subsidiary and not as debt, making the balance sheet look much 
healthier from the company’s perspective.
The Service did not perceive it that way and responded in Notice 94-47 and Notice 94-48.523
The Service was concerned with two equity features that were associated with hybrids that 
were classified by taxpayers as debt. These features were relatively long maturity (based on 
the decision in Monon Railroad v. Commissioner,524 which classified an instrument with a 
maturity date of 50 years as debt) and repayment of the debt with shares of the borrower. At 
the same time, the Service tried to maintain the general approach whereby all factors have 
similar importance in the classification of financial instruments, none of them being 
controlling and classification should made on a case-by-case basis taking into account this 
approach. This resulted in a confusing and sometime contradictory notice.525
The notice starts by stating its aim, to scrutinize instruments that are classified as debt for tax 
purposes and as equity for other purposes, for example, regulatory or rating purposes, and 
adding that “/ OJf particular interest to the Service are instruments that contain a variety o f
521 Freeman at 667.
522 The following description is based on Freeman at 668.
523 1994-1 C.B. 357; One reason for the issuance o f the notice was the reliance by taxpayers on a previous notice, 
Notice 85-119, which was applied by taxpayers without giving sufficient attention to its particular facts.
524 5 5 T.C. 345 (1970).
525 Hariton (1994) at 505.
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equity features, including an unreasonably long maturity or an ability to repay the 
instrument's principal with the issuer's stock. ”526
The notice then briefly review the facts and circumstances test applicable in classifying 
instruments. In its overview the notice mentions a list of examples for factors that are used in 
the application of the facts and circumstances test. Interesting to note is the last factor 
mentioned on that list, “whether the instruments are intended to be treated as debt or equity 
for non-tax purposes, including regulatory, rating agency, or financial accounting purposes.”
Then, the notice provides, in apparent contradiction with its stated aim, that “[NJo particular 
factor is conclusive in making the determination o f whether an instrument constitutes debt or 
equity. The weight given to any factor depends upon all the facts and circumstances and the 
overall effect o f an instrument's debt and equity features must be taken into account. ”527
This does not prevent it from changing approach and focusing again only on unreasonably 
long maturity and ability to replay with issuer stock.528
Hariton criticizes not only the notice but also the approach. He comments on the self­
contradictory and unhelpful approach of the Notice529 and argues that the analysis of whether 
a given instrument is debt or equity cannot be made while including factors as the 
instrument’s non-tax classification or its label.530 According to his view, the analysis should 
not be made following a checklist but rather by examining the relationship among the 
different type of classes and holders within the same corporation.531 He disagrees with the 
formula approach or with the factors approach to classification and adds that a revenue 
guidance explaining why in their view a specific instrument should be classified in a 
particular way would be beneficial.
Hariton concludes that “[T]he new financial environment merely emphasized what was 
always true: One cannot draw this line by searching for characteristic attributes. Rather,
526 Notice 94-47 at 357 quoted by Hariton (1994) at 503.
527 1994-1 C.B. 357.
528 See also Hariton’s criticism on this contradictory nature o f the notice.
529 On one hand, the Notice provides that the two above-mentioned factors are controlling and on the other hand it 
argues that for a factors approach, all factors being relevant and no specific weight is attributed to either one. The 
self-contradiction can be illustrated by using an instrument which has all the necessary debt features with only 
one equity feature, very long maturity date. Based on the Notice, would such an instrument be classified as equity 
only due to its long maturity? Compare to the approach adopted by the courts below (pp. 153-156).
530 Hariton (1994) at 521.
531 Hariton (1994) at 522.
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one must analyze the relevant facts with a view to understanding the corporate structure and 
how the particular investment fits in. ”532
In a few relatively recent IRS decisions, the Service has accepted a characterization of an 
instrument that was inconsistent with its foreign law characterization. Thus, in I.L.M  
200134004,533 the Service accepted a characterization of an instrument as equity for US tax 
purposes although the instrument was characterized as debt for foreign law tax purposes. 
Similarly, in FSA 200142005,53A the Service accepted the taxpayer’s position that a 
transaction that is characterized as a loan stock for Australian tax purposes, should be 
characterized as an equity for US tax purposes, and in FSA 200145005,535 the Service 
accepted that a debt that was paid solely in shares of the issuer (voting common shares) 
should not be treated as debt despite the fact that the issuer was able to deduct the payments 
made on the debt.536 In addition, in FSA 199922012,537 the IRS concluded that notes issued 
by a US subsidiary (together with cash) to its foreign parent company in exchange for 
redemption by that company of shares of the issuing company, should be treated as debt. The 
focus was on the ability of the taxpayer (the US subsidiary) to borrow from unrelated third 
parties for the purpose of redeeming its stock on similar terms to the terms of the notes, and 
the existence of sufficient cash flow to service the debt on the notes.538
Thus, basically, the Service seems to agree that in determining the characterization of the 
instrument for US tax purposes, it is US tax law that should apply to determine the 
characterization and the characterization under foreign law should not be taken into account. 
More precisely, it appears that the Service did not treat a consistent characterization as a 
condition in the characterization of an instrument and accepted that possibility of 
inconsistent characterization. This, however, is subject to certain limitations that were 
imposed by the courts on the taxpayer’s ability to choose the character of the transaction, 
limitations that increase the importance of the form in determining the tax treatment of the 
instrument. These limitations are discussed below.
532 Hariton (1994) at 524.
533 2001 WL 961299 (IRS CCA).
534 2001 WL 1250258 (IRS FSA).
535 2001 WL 1402895 (IRS FSA).
536 Although, as Connors and Woll note it was not characterized as equity either (Connors & Woll (2002) fn. 24).
537 1999 WL 358204 (IRS FSA).
538 Blessing (2002) at 1009.
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Case Law
Plumb in his seminal article describes the difference between a shareholder and a creditor as 
follows
“The ‘vital difference between the shareholder and the creditor, ’ it was said in an early case 
is that the 'shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the risk, and the 
profits o f  success, the creditor, in compensation fo r  not sharing the profits, is to be paid  
independently o f the risk o f success, and gets a right to dip into capital when the payment 
date arrives. ’ ‘The classic debt ’ is said to be ‘an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain 
at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable 
regardless o f the debtor’s income or the lack thereof While some variation from this formula 
is not fatal to the taxpayer’s effort to have the advance treated as a debt for tax purposes... 
too great a variation will o f course preclude such treatment. ”’539
He then moves on to define a hybrid instrument and to discuss the way in which the courts 
are attempting to classify this hybrids, despite the very close resemblance of some hybrids 
are to other instruments, as for example, cumulative preferred stock.
“Nonetheless, the courts, focusing primarily on the four corners o f the instrument, 
undertook, by a process o f “minute comparison of, and effort to differentiate, the 
multitudinous microscopic details, ” to draw the distinction that the law required to be 
made.”540
Plumb names thirty-two different factors, divided into four different groups that are applied 
by the courts in such determination. Over the years, the courts have used a selection of these 
factors on a case-by-case basis, the type of factors and their relative weight in the decisions 
changing from one case to the other and from one court to the other.541
According to two leading commentators, “[T]he expectation o f the parties that a security 
will provide fo r a timely repayment o f principal, plus a reasonable rate o f return, subject to
539 Plumb (1970-1) at 404.
540 Ibid.
541 Plumb divided them into four different groups: first, factors that involve the formal rights and remedies o f  
creditor as distinguished from those o f shareholders. Second, factors whose existence has a bearing on the 
genuineness o f the intention to create a debtor-creditor relationship. Third, factors whose existing has a bearing 
on the reasonableness or the economic reality o f the intention (also referred to by Plumb as the risk factor). 
Fourth, factors that have no proper evidentiary weight of them but are described as being “merely rhetorical 
expressions o f a result”. (See Plumb (1970-1971) at 411-412).
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limited contingencies, is consistent with the treatment o f the security as debt. The lower such 
expectation, the less certain debt characterization would be appropriate. ”542
While a comprehensive analysis of the case law is beyond the scope of this work, a brief 
overview of it together with the reference to Plumb’s article above, allows us to get a flavor 
of the different factors commonly used by the courts in their analysis.543
In Nestle Holdings v. Commissioner,544 a transfer of funds was made from a foreign parent to 
its US subsidiary and the question was whether these funds should be respected as debt or 
recharcterized as equity.545 The Tax Court respected the debt characterization and allowed 
the interest expense despite the inconsistent reporting by the taxpayer to the SEC. The 
following factors supported the decision: the taxpayer was able to establish an objective 
evidence of an intent to create a debtor-creditor relationship; there were reasonable 
projections that supported the repayment of both the interest and the principal; a timely 
repayment of both interest and principal was established; the taxpayer was able to borrow on 
similar terms from unrelated third party financial institutions; the related party debt was 
reduced in the following years.546 This last point allowed the court to attribute less 
significance to the fact that the return of the loan depended to a large extent on the success of 
the acquired asset.547 The decision was reached despite the fact that the funds were used to 
purchase a capital asset, the use of debt financing (as opposed to equity financing) was due 
to tax considerations, and the taxpayer’s debt:equity ratio was relatively high in comparison 
to the industry.548
The Tax Court in Full Service Beverage v. Commissioner,549 imposed a strong limitation on 
taxpayers’ ability to use HFIs with inconsistent classification. In that case, the taxpayer 
sought to recharacterize preferred shares as debt. The taxpayer based his claim on the special 
characteristics of the shares, which paid dividends without reference to the profits of the 
company, dividends which were paid on specific dates and if not paid incurred interest. In 
addition, the shares had a fixed date of redemption.550 The court based its decision on the
542 Conlon & Aquilino (2002) at 1[B2.04[2].
543 According to many, Plumb’s article is the starting point for most attorneys dealing with this area o f the law. 
An analysis based on the article and some o f the more significant recent cases, is sufficient to establish the 
approach taken by the courts in this field (see generally, Conlon & Aquilino (2002) at ^[B2.04[l]).
544 T.C. Memo. 1995-441.
545 Connors & Woll (2002) at 184.
546 Blessing (2002) at 1006.
547 Connors, ibid.
548 Blessing (2002) ibid. but note Connors who comments that the court found the taxpayer not to be thinly 
capitalized.
549 T.C. Memo. 1995-126.
550 Connors & Woll (2002) at 185.
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form of the instrument, the fact it was the form chosen by the taxpayer, the consistent 
treatment of the instrument by the taxpayer as equity, the fact that some rights of the holders 
were subordinated to rights of creditors (reference was made to the rights on dissolution) and 
that the holders have participation right in the management of the company.551
Moreover, it appears that even if the taxpayer was able to establish that the instrument was 
more likely than not debt, it would not be sufficient and a strong proof (based on the 
requirement in Coleman v. Commissioner) would be required to persuade the court to 
disregard the form and follow the substance of the instrument on an application by the 
taxpayer.552 It appears that in these situations, to be able to enjoy a debt characterization, the 
taxpayer is required to satisfy the stricter Danielson strong proof test, although it is 
questionable to what extent, if at all, the court will be willing to accept a debt 
characterization when the instrument in question is in the form of a share.
These rules represent important exceptions to the general approach of economic substance 
where the taxpayer is limited to the choice of the form of the transaction. These rules of the 
courts limit, in practice, taxpayers’ ability to choose the economic substance of the 
transaction (instead of its form) and represent an important restraint on the availability of 
ITA.
In Estate o f Mixon v. Commissioner,553 the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit used 13 
factors in its determination. These factors were the following: the name given to the 
certificates evidencing the indebtness, the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date, the 
source of payrtients, the right to enforce payments of principal and interest, participation in 
the management of the issuer, the status of the holders in relation to regular corporate 
creditors, the leverage of the issuing company, the intent of the parties, the source of the 
interest payments, the identity of interest between the parties (i.e. whether they have a 
common objective or conflicting interests), whether the issuing company is able to obtain 
loans from unrelated third parties outside the lending institutions, the failure of the debtor to 
pay on due date, and the purpose of the use of the funds -  the extent to which they were used 
to acquire capital assets.554
551 Ibid.
552 Ibid. In Taiyo Hawaii Co. v. Commissioner, the court required a consistent use o f the substance o f the 
instrument by the taxpayer in order for it to accept a claim to disregard the form in favor o f the substance.
553 464 F2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972).
554 At 402.
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More recently, in Laidlaw v. Commissioner555 the Tax Court, relying mostly on the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, mentioned that although the instrument was debt 
in its form, according to the above-mentioned factors of Estate o f Mixon,556 the instrument 
should be characterized as equity. Among the factors applied more significance was 
attributed to the lack of principal payment, the circularity of the money used to pay the 
interest payments, the high leverage of the issuer and to the later change of the instrument to 
debt payable upon demand.557 It should be remembered, however, that the decision was 
influenced to a large extent by the failure of the taxpayer to introduce supporting 
documentation.
Statutory Provisions
The statutory provisions in this area can be divided into two groups. The first, statutory 
provisions dealing with the question of interest deductibility. Second, statutory provisions 
dealing with the availability of Dividend Received Deduction (DRD). Both the interest 
deduction and the DRD represent an important benefit associated with the desired finance 
method that allows the two parties to reduce, fully or partially, the double taxation burden.
In an equity investment, the availability of DRD means that the company treated as the 
shareholder will be able to enjoy full or partial exemption from taxation with respect to 
dividends income it receives, thus remove, even if partially, the risk of double taxation. In a 
cross-border transaction, the DRD is replaced, in most situations, with an indirect foreign tax 
credit that is available to corporate shareholders holding 10% of the voting shares of the 
issuing corporation.558
In debt financing, the availability of the interest expense at the borrower’s corporation level, 
allow the parties to avoid the double taxation as the recipient of the interest income is usually 
taxed with respect to that income.
To achieve the benefit of double non-taxation (both domestically and cross-border), the 
taxpayer would seek to structure the transaction in a way that it would provide the issuer 
with the full interest expense and will not be included in the taxable income of the holder 
(for example, by allowing the holder to enjoy indirect foreign tax credit that would reduce 
his domestic tax liability).
555 RIATC Memo 198,232 (1998).
556 Ibid.
557 Ibid.
558 IRC §902.
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In the following paragraphs I will deal with the domestic rules regarding the deductibility of 
interest expense with respect to both domestic and cross-border payments. Following this, I 
will turn to deal with cross-border anti-planning legislation.
The Deductibility of interest
One of the main benefits associated with a debt classification for tax purposes is the 
deductibility of the interest payments as an expense in the calculation of the borrowers 
taxable income. A possible way of discouraging the use of a particular instrument without 
altering its tax characterization is by disallowing the benefit of deduction to the payments 
made on this instrument.
§ 163(a) allows taxpayers to deduct interest expenses from their taxable income. For the 
expense to be deductible, it has to satisfy three cumulative conditions: it has to be an interest, 
it has to be paid or accrued in the taxable year and with respect to indebtness.559 There is 
extensive case law on the meaning of both interest and indebness and how to distinguish 
these two terms from many similar concepts.560 In addition, there are several statutory 
provisions that are designed to assist in that process and to limit the application of the section 
only to payments that the legislator believed come within the definition of interest on 
indebtness.561
Interest was defined by the Supreme Court as a “compensation fo r the use or forbearance o f 
money f 562 taking outside the scope of the provision payments that are not compensating for 
the use or lack of use of money.
In addition, special rules were enacted to deal with payments made on certain instruments 
and with respect to certain transactions, even if such payments were in essence interest 
payments that, but for the statutory prohibition, would qualify for a deduction under § 163(a). 
According to Bittker and Lokken, the restrictions on the broad grant of deductions by 
§163 (a) “have accumulated gradually but relentlessly over the years. The earliest o f the 
restrictions, now found in s.265(a) (2), disallows interest on indebtness incurred or continued 
to purchase or carry tax-exempt bonds. The common sense basis fo r this rule -  that the
559 IRC § 163(a) (“all interest pa id  or accrued within the taxable year on indebtness.”).
560 For an overview o f the issues and case law, see generally Bittker & Lokken, at Ch. 52.
561 For a list o f the statutory provisions, see generally, Bittker & Lokken, f52.1.1. The discussion below is limited 
to a brief overview o f the provisions that are more related to our general discussion, the distinction between debt 
and equity and the availability o f interest deduction on HFIs.
562 Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 US 488, 498 referred to by Bittker & Lokken at ^[52.1.2.
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interest should not be deductible because it is a cost ofproducing income that is exempt from  
tax -  is also the root o f the subsequently enacted limitations.”563
Among these statutory limitations are denial of the deduction of interest on some 
unregistered debt instruments, denial of the deduction of interest on obligations payable in 
equity, and denial of deduction of interest on a debt instrument that is in substance equity.564
According to §163(1), interest paid on a disqualified debt instrument is disallowed in 
deduction. A disqualified instrument is an instrument issued by a corporation and payable in 
equity of the issuer or a related party. In general, to satisfy the requirements, a significant 
amount of the principal or interest has to be payable in equity either through a right of 
conversion to shares of the issuer that is included in the instrument or through an option for 
payment in equity exercised at the option of the issuer. Where the option for payment in 
equity is exercised at the option of the holder, the instrument may still be regarded as 
“payable in equity” if it is substantially certain that the option will be exercised. On the other 
hand, even if the conversion is at the option of the issuer, the instrument may nevertheless 
not qualify if the conversion price is substantially higher than the market price of the issuer’s 
shares.565
In addition, according to §163(j), interest expense is denied, wholly or partially, if the 
interest is paid to a related person and the paying corporation is regarded as leveraged (the 
payor’s debt: Equity ration of more than 1.5:1 and the payor’s net interest expense exceeds 
50% of its “adjustable taxable income”). Similar rules apply with respect to payments to 
unrelated persons where such persons are exempt from US Federal tax (for example, non­
residents).
This rule also referred to as “earning stripping rule” was introduced in 1989 and was subject 
to a legislative debate in 2003 when proposals to amend it were introduced. The proposals 
were part of the move to make inversions transactions less beneficial for taxpayers who 
engage in them. The New York State Bar Association described the different proposals as 
follows: “The proposals would significantly expand the current earning stripping rules by 
deleting or modifying the existing debt-to-equity safe harbor, modifying the substantially
563 At f  52.2.1. Later in their analysis the commentators criticized the use o f denial o f  interest expense as being 
inappropriate in the light o f the policy goals behind the exemption o f interest on bonds issued by state and local 
authorities (see generally, ^52.2.3).
564 Ibid.
565 See generally, Bittker & Lokken at ^52.7.3.
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adjusted taxable income percentage limit, and )in the case o f the Bush Proposal566) adding a 
new interest disallowance rule that would apply in circumstances where the US. 
subsidiaries o f a foreign parent are more highly leveraged than the overall worldwide 
group. In addition, carryovers would be curtailed.567”568
Additional Specific Cross-border legislation
In addition to the specific provisions aimed at restricting the amount of interest deduction on 
certain instruments similar to the above-mentioned provisions, there are also other provisions 
that are targeted at restricting domestic law and tax treaty benefits only to those persons who 
are with in the group of intended beneficiaries. These provisions are aimed at certain 
multiparty arrangements making use of intermediaries and certain types of hybrid entities. 
Although not directly aimed at HFIs, they have an important effect as they act to restrict the 
availability of tax benefits sought, including ITA. With respect to ITA, it can be argued that 
these provisions basically limit the availability of ITA only to those transactions that lack (or 
have a limited measure of) artificiality. As such, it does not act to limit the ITA but rather the 
artificiality.
Anti-conduit regulations569
Following the addition of §7701(1) to the Code in 1993, the Treasury was given the authority 
to issue regulations dealing with various multi-party or "conduit" financing arrangements570 
to recharacterize these transactions as transactions among directly two or more of the parties 
if necessary to do so to prevent the avoidance of US taxation.571 The proposed regulations 
were issued in 1994 but were relatively limited in their application as they were issued under 
§881 and were in effect confined to withholding taxes. Moreover, as Bitkker & Lokken note, 
despite the wide authority granted by the Conference Report in 1993, the regulations adopted 
a relatively narrow definition of a “financing arrangement” not including within its scope 
guarantees and equity investments. The latter issue was partly dealt with in the final 
regulations issued in 1995, which includes in its definition of “financing arrangement” equity
566 Provisions included in the Bush Administration’s Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals.
567 Under the law prior to the change, the taxpayer was able to carryover the amount o f disallowed interest to be 
used in future years, subject to earning stripping limitations.
568 New York State Bar Association, (2003).
569 See generally, Bitkker & Lokken at 1|15.03[6]. For an overview o f the operation o f these regulations, see Yu 
and Lisecki (2002).
570 One example for these types o f transaction is the use o f back-to-back loans with an intermidiary to obtain 
access to the benefits o f a certain favorable tax treaty.
571 ABA Section o f Taxation (2001) at p.2-3. According to Ring (2004), §7701(1) represents a codification o f the 
general import o f the decision o f the Tax Court in Aiken Indusries v. Commissioner and later Revenue Rulings 
that followed.
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investments, which have debt-like features. On the other hand, the final regulations include 
75 exceptions whereas the proposed regulations only had sixteen.
§894(c) and regulations572
In 1997 temporary regulations were issued dealing with the availability of treaty benefits 
with respect to US source fixed determined annual, or periodic payments (FDAPI). The 
rationale behind these regulations was to limit the availability treaty benefits from foreign 
persons using US LLCs.573 This move was strengthened by the addition of §894(c) which 
also grants regulatory authority to issue regulations to deny or limit treaty based withholding 
tax rates and other treaty benefits with respect payments made to or that are attributed to 
entities are treated as partnerships or other transparent entities.
To complete the legislative work, in 2002 final regulations were issued to deal with 
payments made by Domestic Reverse Hybrids (DRH).574 575 An important limitation is the 
related party limitation which generally requires the US person paying the dividend to be 
related to the DRH at the time of the payment and for the DRH to be related to a foreign 
interest holder at the time the DRH makes a deductible payment for US tax purposes to that 
foreign interest holder.576
Basically, like the above-mentioned anti-conduit regulations, §894(c) and the regulations 
that were issued in accordance with its authority are designed to provide a back-stop to the 
existing treaty residency and limitation-on-benefits rules by limiting the benefits o f the US 
tax treaties network to entities that were intended to benefit from such network.
Outbound Financing 
Foreign Tax Credit
Under §901, a US domestic taxpayer is entitled to claim foreign tax credit with respect to 
foreign tax it paid on its income, subject to the limitations imposed by §904(a) and §904(d). 
The former limitation is designed to prevent US persons from claiming foreign tax credit that 
would reduce their overall tax burden below the amount they would have paid if the only tax 
imposed on their income is US tax (the general limitation). The latter is meant to reduce the
572 See generally, Bitkker & Lokken ^fl5.03[7]. Yu and Lisecki (2002) and Maiorano Treadway & Zive (2003).
573 These regulations were eventually finalized in 2000 (T.D 8889).
574 A US entity (usually an LLC) that is classified as a pass-through entity (a partnership or a branch) for US tax 
purposes and as a separate taxable entity for foreign tax purposes.
575 US Treasury Reg.§1.894-1(d)(1) issued under the authority o f both §894(c) and §7701(1).
576 Yu and Lisecki (2000) at 946.
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taxpayers’ ability to cross-credit different types of income by dividing the credit calculation 
according to separate baskets. However, as Blessing points out, these limitations are 
essentially a political compromise which is meant to limit taxpayers’ ability to cross-credit 
and do not prohibit taxpayers from doing so as long as they keep within the four comers of 
the law.577
In addition, §902 allows the taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation to claim an indirect 
foreign tax credit also with respect to foreign taxes paid by another corporation. Under §902, 
a US domestic corporation is deemed to have paid the taxes that are paid by a foreign 
corporation with respect to dividends distributed by that corporation to the US corporate 
taxpayer who is a shareholder of the foreign corporation.578 These taxes, which are deemed 
paid by the US taxpayer under §902, are then credited under §901 subject to the limitation 
imposed on foreign tax credit by §904(a).
To qualify for the indirect credit under §902 the taxpayer must meet both the ownership test 
and the dividend test, which basically require the taxpayer to hold at least 10% of the voting 
stock of the foreign corporation and do so on the date the dividend is received.579
According to the regulations, “dividend” for the purposes of §902 has its usual meaning for 
US Federal tax purposes under §3 1 6.580 Thus, in effect, as long as the payment comes within 
the definition of §316, it will be regarded as a dividend for the indirect foreign tax credit, 
even if the payment is classified under foreign law as not being a dividend. This approach is 
consistent with the view that unless provided otherwise, US Federal tax rules are supreme 
both in the international dimension and vis-a-vis applicable state laws.581 The rationale 
underlying this approach is based, among other considerations, on the need to ensure that US 
foreign tax credit is not granted with respect to tax on income which is US source income. 
Thus, the determination of the nature of the income and its amount is done by applying US 
tax principles.582
In Notice 98-5,583 the IRS has announced its position with respect to what it referred to as an 
abuse of the foreign tax credit system. In this notice, the IRS focused on two types of
577 Blessing (2002) at 1059.
578 Where the foreign corporation is a CFC, §960 might apply with respect to distributions under Subpart F. See 
generally, Bitkker & Lokken 72.9.1.
579 See generally, Bitkker & Lokken at 72.9.2.
580US Treasury Reg. §1 .902-l(a)(ll).
581 For an analysis o f the relations in the international dimension see generally, West (1996). For an analysis o f  
the relations between the Federal income tax law and state law with respect to the definition o f a dividend, see 
Bitkker & Lokken at 92.1.2.
582 See generally West (1996).
583 1998-3 I.R.B 49.
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transactions. First, transactions that are essentially a purchase of income streams that are 
subject to foreign withholding tax with the intention of using these foreign withholding taxes 
to maximize the taxpayer’s US foreign tax credit position and thus reduce its US taxes. 
Second, ITA transactions in which according to the IRS, the taxpayer is exploiting the 
inconsistencies between the foreign tax system and the US system and enjoys duplicated 
benefits, once in the foreign jurisdiction and once in the US. According to the IRS, in the US 
the taxpayer is receiving foreign tax credit benefits by abusing the system.
The approach taken in the notice is to define abuse by reference to whether the expected 
economic profit from the transaction that gives rise to the foreign tax credit is not substantial 
in comparison with the claimed credit.584 In applying this test, the foreign tax paid is 
regarded as a cost.
Example 4 in the notice illustrates the Service’s view of what is an abusive use of a HFI. In 
that example, a US company incorporates a foreign subsidiary that purchases a preferred 
stock. The preferred stock is expected to pay an annual dividend. The purchase is financed 
mainly through an advance from a foreign investor residing in the foreign jurisdiction of the 
foreign subsidiary. The remaining sum is from a capital contribution made by the US parent 
to its foreign subsidiary. The advance from the foreign investor is a hybrid, characterized as 
debt for US tax purposes and as equity for the foreign jurisdiction tax purposes.
The inconsistent character of the foreign investor’s interest in the foreign corporation results 
in an increase of the US taxpayer’s share in the corporation (when examined from a US 
perspective) and as a result an increase in the US taxpayer’s credit entitlement which is 
regarded as an abuse by the Service. It is interesting to note that the Service did not seek to 
reclassify the foreign investor investment based on foreign tax law principles.585
Notice 98-5 refers to regulations to be issued. Connors & Woll argue that authority for such 
regulations is doubtful. They reason this view by arguing that Congress has already severely 
limited the ability of taxpayers to use foreign tax credit by enacting the baskets limitations in 
§904(d), limiting the taxpayers’ ability to cross-credit different items. They add that such 
regulations may also be inequitable if they do not provide for a safe harbor or exception for 
transactions undertaken for non-tax reasons. Lastly they refer to the decision of the Court of
584 Ibid. Blessing (2002) p. 1064; Bittker & Lokken ^[72.5.3.
585 Doing so would to depart from existing principle of US tax law whereby US tax law is applied to determine 
the tax liability (see generally West (1996)). In addition, it might also introduce new complexities in the 
application o f the law including the risk that foreign tax credit might be given also with respect to US source 
income.
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Appeals in IES Industries v. Commissioner586 as an authority for questioning the rationale 
behind Notice 98-5587
586
587
253 F.3d 350 (8th Circuit 2001) rev’g 84 AFTR 2d 6445 (N.D Iowa 1999).
Connors & Woll (2002) at 206-207.
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Summary
There are five points that I tried to establish in this case study. First, that the treatment of 
HFIs depends on the distinction between debt and equity, a distinction that has lost its 
rationale in light of the modem day use of HFIs and is maintained, to a large extent, by 
drawing an arbitrary line between instruments that come within the definition of debt and 
those that come within the definition of equity. Second, although the distinction in the tax 
treatment of debt and equity is common to many countries, the application of the distinction 
in practice differs from one country to another and results in differences in the location of the 
exact distinction. When I examined the two countries that are the subject of this work, I tried 
to establish that the difference in location of the distinction is due to the combination of a 
different approach that is taken with respect to the taxation of financial instruments in 
general (economic substance v. legal form or legal substance) and years of reaction to 
domestic attempts to challenge the distinction in a domestic setting.
Third, HFIs by their nature are located on the distinction between debt and equity. This 
results in their common use for tax planning in a domestic setting, attempting to achieve a 
better treatment vis-a-vis more conventional instruments like debt or equity. The difference 
in approach between the tax systems coupled with the development of international capital 
markets, allow taxpayers to use HFIs also in an international setting in an attempt to enjoy 
the inconsistencies in treatment to their advantage.
Fourth, despite the development in financial markets and the increase in cross-border 
investments, tax systems, as evidenced in the case of HFIs, subject to cooperation in the 
relief of double taxation and exchange of information, still operate individually and without 
any reference to the treatment of the taxpayer in another jurisdictions. There are several 
limitations on the availability of ITA in HFIs.
Fifth, the simultaneous challenge both at the domestic level and at the international level 
creates a link and a tension between the two levels. Any change in the classification of 
instruments or payments at one level affects the treatment at the other level, requiring 
countries to take into account both domestic and international consequences of their 
approach.
At the practical current law level, we have to examine two simultaneous events -  the interest 
deduction resulting from the debt classification on the one hand and the availability of the 
indirect foreign tax credit resulting from the equity classification on the other hand.
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Looking at the instrument from the issuer’s perspective, the question is whether the interest 
deduction granted to the issuer as a result of the debt classification in the issuer’s own 
jurisdiction is dependant upon its tax treatment in the other jurisdiction. Similarly we should 
examine whether and to what extent the availability of the indirect foreign tax credit given to 
the holder with respect to the payment received on the instrument is dependant on its 
characterization in the other jurisdiction at the hands of the issuer.
In the absence of explicit premise that reliance should exist, it is necessary to determine 
whether or not an implicit premise exists in a way that the availability of either benefit is 
dependant on the treatment in the other jurisdiction. According to West, there are two 
possible outcomes to this question. First, if we take the view that benefits granted by the 
literal language of the legislation can only be revoked or denied by a condition or provision 
that is specifically stated in the legislation, then absent such limitation, the benefit should not 
be denied, even if the result is at odds with the purposes of the statute and regulations.588
On the other hand, application of a more purposive interpretation would lead us to deny the 
benefit granted by the legislation if the result of applying the statute or regulations is at odds 
with the underlying purposes of the legislation, even if such result is achieved by literal 
application of the statute and regulations.589
The approach adopted by West is a halfway approach according to which the literal 
interpretation of the legislation should be followed “unless the result is so clearly at odds 
with the law ’s purposes that it is reasonably certain that the transaction would have been 
explicitly carved out from the scope o f the law had it been considered by the legislators.”590
In HFIs, in the absence of clear rationale for the distinction between debt and equity, the 
relevant consideration is where the jurisdiction in question decided to draw the line between 
debt and equity. Thus, prima facie, the first step is to apply the technical rules to determine 
the nature of the instrument and if the instrument is debt, the first step is followed by a 
second step which requires us to examine the existing legislation to determine whether the 
payment retains into interest treatment or not. In both the US and the UK, the legislation 
does not require any reference to be made to foreign law or to the tax treatment of the 
recipient.
588 West (1996) at 183.
589 West (1996) at 183.
590 West (1996) at 184.
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In analyzing the interest deductions in the US, West reaches the conclusion that interest 
deductions cannot be denied only on the basis that the income was not taxed at the hands of 
the foreign recipient.591 Thus, it can be argued that if the instrument is regarded as a debt 
instrument and the income paid on it is not otherwise disallowed (for example, earning 
stripping rules), then the interest payment should be allowed in deduction.
The recent Supreme Court Decision in Gitlitz592 should further support this view that in the 
absence of a clear provision in statute or regulations, the deduction should be allowed, 
especially since there are certain measures that are meant to either recharacterize certain 
types of instruments (in which case, the payment is not likely to be regarded as interest 
payment) or to disallow the deduction in the relevant year.
In the UK, in general, to be eligible for the interest deduction it is not sufficient for the issuer 
to establish that the instrument is classified as debt and that the income is classified as 
interest but also that none of the provisions denying the deduction of the interest is 
applicable in that case. In other words, if the instrument is classified as debt, then the 
payment is prima facie deductible interest payment unless there is a specific provision in the 
legislation that provides otherwise.
The important point is that in all the steps that are followed to determine the taxation of the 
payment, no reliance is made to foreign law or to the treatment of the instrument or the 
income under foreign law or to whether or not the other party is being taxed. Like in the US, 
there are certain rules that only become applicable if the payment is not subject to UK tax. 
However, once applied, they do not refer to or rely upon the possible classification or 
treatment in another country of either the instrument or the income paid on it.593
West’s approach is also relevant with respect to the indirect foreign tax credit. Generally, if 
we consider the purpose behind the legislation, the indirect foreign tax credit rules are meant 
to reduce the multiple tax burden that is imposed on corporations at the international level by 
providing for a mechanism that would alleviate the third level of taxation in cross-border 
transactions, thus applying in cross-border transactions the same concept that is applied in 
domestic law by the dividend received deduction or the dividend exclusion rules.
591 West (1996) at 184.
592 Gitlitz v. C.I.R. 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
593 In 1992, the use o f equity notes resulted in legislation that used criteria that was “imported” from another 
jurisdiction but did not require the treatment in the UK to be determined in reliance with the treatment in another 
jurisdiction.
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In the UK, the underlying foreign tax credit is granted in accordance with the relevant 
provision in the applicable tax treaty (even in the absence of a tax treaty, the provision is 
applied as if there was a treaty). In general, in the application of a treaty with respect to the 
underlying foreign tax credit, the definition of a dividend that is used is the UK definition 
(and not the definition of the country of source). This general rule does not apply if the treaty 
includes a specific definition that would apply (specifically) also for the purpose of the 
underlying foreign tax credit or if there is a specific limitation in the treaty that prevents the 
UK underlying foreign tax credit from applying.594
In the US, domestic law defines dividend in §316 and this definition is referred to in 
application of the indirect foreign tax credit provisions under §902.595
Thus, in both countries, despite the underlying rationale behind the indirect foreign tax credit 
rules, the definition referred to in the application of these rules is the definition under 
domestic law and there is no reliance or reference to the definition in the country of source.
594 See, for example, 2001 US-UK tax treaty, Art. 24(4)(c).
595 US Treasury R eg.§1.902-l(a)(ll).
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Chapter 7 - Cross-border leasing
Background
A lease is one of several finance options available for taxpayers. Unlike most other financing 
options like equity investment and debt investment, leasing provides a method for taxpayers 
to use the value of their business assets and the expected revenues from these assets in the 
future as a financing tool to assist them in the acquisition of these assets.
Outside the tax context, a lease can be defined as contract essentially stipulating the 
separation o f ownership o f an asset and the right to use it; ”596 In the legal and tax context, a 
lease has to be distinguished in its definition and scope from other similar types of 
transactions.
In the tax context, it is necessary to determine who is the owner of the asset for tax purposes 
because such ownership usually allows taxpayers to enjoy the benefits of depreciation 
deductions with respect to the asset. In addition, many jurisdictions provide generous 
depreciation deductions that exceed commercial depreciation as a method for encouraging 
taxpayers to invest and to acquire new assets to be used as part of their business. It is thus 
necessary to ensure that the benefit provided is received by those who were intended to 
receive it in the first place.
Originally, leasing was treated as a rental transaction. This resulted in the lessor being 
treated as the tax owner of the asset and the person entitled to enjoy the depreciation 
benefits.597 Such lessor was thus able to enjoy the generous depreciations deductions both to 
defer and to shelter income he had from other sources. The solution was to transfer the 
ownership to the lessee thus denying the lessor the ability to use the depreciation deductions. 
In practice, different countries followed different methods to achieve this goal of limiting the 
benefits of depreciation deductions only to those who were intended to be covered by it.
Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between two types o f leases, financial lease and 
operating lease.
In broad terms, a finance lease involves a lease in which the lessor passes most of the 
economic attributes of ownership to the lessee, even though the lessor retains the legal title
596 Gao (1999) at 17.
597 See generally below in the discussion o f the UK tax treatment o f  leasing transactions and in Tiley (2003).
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to the asset. This type of transaction resembles a secured finance whereby the lessee is the 
owner of the asset which is secured to the lessor who provides the finance.
An operating lease represents the complete opposite. Under an operating lease, the lessor 
retains most of the attributes of economic ownership and the lessee is awarded mainly with 
the right to use the asset for a period that is shorter than the useful life of the asset. At the 
end of the period, the asset returns to the lessor. This type of transaction resembles a simple 
rental transaction.
Not all countries follow this distinction. In 1990, the International Fiscal Association 
discussed cross-border leasing. In the introduction to the topic, the General Reporter 
identified three main approaches taken by countries in the treatment of lease transactions. 
The first approach is the legalistic approach where the legal owner is regarded as the owner 
of the asset for tax purpose. An alternative approach is the economic substance approach 
whereby the economic owner of the asset as the tax owner of the asset (similar to the above- 
mentioned distinction).598 In addition, a third method has developed, a middle position 
between the economic approach and the legal approach.599
During the discussions, it appeared that the different delegates were unable to agree on a 
common uniform definition for finance lease and operation lease and on a common approach 
to the taxation of leasing transactions.
Thus, in an attempt to limit the availability of accelerated depreciation deductions only to 
those transactions and taxpayers who were intended to be covered by the legislation, each tax 
system followed a different approach leading to the creation of a disparity among the 
different systems, a disparity that allows taxpayers to simultaneously enjoy the benefits of 
accelerated depreciation deductions in two tax systems by structuring the transaction in a 
way that satisfies the requirements of each system. To illustrate this, in the following case 
study, I focus on the different approaches taken by the US and the UK both domestically and 
with respect to cross-border leasing transactions where special measures were adopted to 
limit the availability of these depreciation benefits.
598 The mere fact, however, that two countries follow the same approach does not mean that they adopt the same 
rule for distinguishing between different transactions. For example, it has been possible for a long time to arrange 
a transaction in a way that on one hand the period o f the lease would not exceed 80-85% o f the usual life o f the 
property and on the other hand would be long enough to constitute at least 90% o f the depreciable life o f  the 
property for German tax purposes. In that way, both the US lessor and the German lessee would qualify as tax 
owners o f the property, each in his own country (see also Cozart).
599 Lindencrona & Tolstoy (1990) at 30.
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Reasons for entering into a leasing transactions
There are many reasons for entering into leasing transactions, some are tax reasons and some 
are non-tax reasons. Overall, leasing transactions are not a new type of finance and it dates 
back to the 19th century and even before.600 One commentator even went back to around 
2010 BC.601
Modem leasing, however, goes back to 1956 in the US602 and more widely to the 1960s 
when the first leasing companies were established in the industrial countries.603 In theory, the 
main difference between leasing and other financing alternatives is that in leasing it is the 
leased equipment which is borrowed, instead of the funds.604
Taxation is an important element in the evaluation of which finance option to be used in a 
given situation.
Leasing is essentially a financing transaction. Ideally, efficiency and tax neutrality require 
that tax should not be a consideration in the determination which method of finance should 
be used. For example, finance lease and secured loan should receive the same tax treatment. 
Similarly, operating lease and rent should be treated the same.
However, the benefit of accelerated depreciation granted to the owner of leased property 
together with the different approaches taken by different countries with respect to the 
characterization and treatment of leases and ability to transfer the attributes of ownership 
under a lease, all create distortions that allow leasing to be more beneficial that similar 
methods of finance. For example, secured loan and finance leasing should be treated 
similarly. In some occasions, however, leasing proves to be much more beneficial.
One example is of a loss corporation that wishes to invest in new equipment. The 
corporation cannot use the benefit of the depreciation deductions because of its losses. If the 
finance lease, unlike a secured loan, treats the lessor as the owner of the property, the lessor 
is able to use the benefit of the depreciation deductions and pass the benefit (or part of it) to 
the lessee (who is unable to use the benefit at all) by way of lower fee or lower interest 
payments on the lease. As a result, despite the economic similarity, there is a clear after-tax
600 Park (1981) at 107.
601 Nevitt & Fabozzi at 21.
602 Ibid.
603 Lindencrona & Tolstoy (1990) at 22.
604 Ibid.
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distinction between the two methods of finance.605
Since, however, different countries approach the taxation of leasing differently, differences 
result not only domestically between leasing and similar financing transactions but also 
internationally between treatment of similar leasing transactions.
Outside the tax context, leasing has several advantages over other methods of finance. First, 
it allows the borrower, the lessee, to raise more funds with respect to the same equipment. 
While it is usually uncommon for banks and other financial institutions to loan funds that 
represent 100% of the secured property, in leasing the lessee is receiving finance in an 
amount that equals the cost of the leased equipment. As a result, the lessee’s cash flow 
position is improved vis-a-vis a conventional debt financing.606 Second, whereas regular 
borrowings appear on the borrower’s balance sheet as liability thus increasing its leverage, 
leasing is not treated as a liability. Moreover, leasing can more easily adapt to balance sheet 
considerations.607 Third, it is possible that from a commercial law perspective, lenders would 
prefer using leasing instead of traditional loans to ensure better standing in case of 
bankruptcy of the lessee. Since ownership in a true lease is usually vested in the lessor, it 
may better protect the provider of the funds (the lessor in a two party lease and the third 
party lender in a three-party leveraged lease) in case of default or bankruptcy of the lessee.608 
Fourth, leasing is a flexible instrument that can be adapted and “tailor made” to match the 
specific needs of the specific customer.609
Especially in a time where the need for finance is high and companies seek to minimize their 
finance cost, leasing becomes more popular due to some of its non-tax advantages and the 
fact that it allows companies to raise more money with the use of similar property.610 
Naturally, tax advantages can prove very helpful as well.
Sigao provides a list of more than ten advantages for leasing to a lessee (over other 
alternatives for finance). Out of these advantages, only one is tax oriented. The rest of these 
advantages include, among others, certainty, sound hedge against inflation, avoidance of 
share ownership, avoidance of loan covenants or capital investment restraints, provision of
605 In the UK, the Inland Revenue has announced its desire to change the leasing rules and treat finance leases and 
a selected number o f operating leases as transferring the ownership to the lessee making him the taxpayer entitled 
to depreciation deductions. See generally Inland Revenue (2003).
606 Cozart at 9.
607 Lindencrona & Tolstoy (1990) at 22.
608 Park (1981-2) at 112.
609 Lindencrona & Tolstoy (1990) at p.22.
610 Fabozzi, ibid.
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constant cost financing, allowance of more flexible cash budgeting, etc.611
At the same time, tax has always been an important motivation.
“One o f  the principal attractions o f leasing as a source o f finance derives from the finance 
lessor’s ability to take advantage o f tax depreciation which cannot be utilized immediately 
by the user, while the user is still able to enjoy many o f the risks and rewards o f economic 
ownership. ”572
A good example to such a situation is given by Clayson,
“But what i f  the user does not have the ‘tax capacity ’ to use these allowances? I f  it is 
investing heavily at the beginning o f its trading life, profits may be thin or non-existent. 
Alternatively, it may have surplus advance corporation tax available to set o ff against the 
mainstream liability offuture years (although following the abolition o f ACT in April 1999, 
surpluses no longer continue to accumulate) so that the reduction o f  taxable profits by virtue 
o f available capital allowances would be o f limited value. In these circumstances it might 
well be attractive to acquire the equipment under a lease which permits the lessor to take the 
allowances: the tax benefit could then be shared between the lessor and the lessee via the 
rentals due under the lease. In this way, the lessee may be able to finance its investment in 
the equipment at a smaller effective cost o f funds than the interest rate applicable to a 
loan. ”613
To summarize, in addition to possible non-tax advantages, leasing provides two main tax 
advantages:
First, the ability for taxpayers to transfer tax attributes from one taxpayer who cannot use 
them to another who can. Second, a tax deferral by granting accelerated depreciation that 
allows the taxpayer entitled to them to defer his tax liability as described in the above- 
mentioned quote. These benefits led legislators and tax authorities to adopt measures 
designed to limit the availability of depreciation deductions to those taxpayers and 
transactions that were originally intended to benefit from the leasing rules.614
Nonetheless, one should not conclude from the above quote that leasing is mainly a tax-
611 Gao (1999) at 20.
612 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2002) at 182.
613 Clayson (2002) at 11-2.
614 For example, §469 to the Internal Revenue Code preventing enjoyment in such transactions from high income 
individuals who would otherwise try to utilize passive losses to offset their high active income.
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motivated transaction. Supporting this view are the non-tax advantages of leasing as well as 
the actual figures of leasing transaction. In the UK, for example, of the £23.6 billion of new 
business made by Finance Leasing Association (FLA) members in 2001, 45% related to hire 
purchase and other non-tax based leasing.615
Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that leasing transactions are entirely tax based.
“Another interesting aspect o f cross-border leasing is that despite changes in the tax 
legislation in the UK and the US around 1986, reducing tax rates fo r individuals and 
corporations and widening the tax base, the volume o f national leases has not been reduced'. 
This seems to indicate that leases are not entirely tax based but rather another tool for  
equipment financing. However, it is also reported e.g. from Hong Kong and the UK that 
specific changes in tax legislation made with the purpose to reduce the tax benefits o f  
outbound cross-border leases have had a negative impact on the volume o f such leasing 
activities. The reduced corporate tax rates in the US and in the UK seem to have had a 
negative impact on leverage leasing a type o f leasing where at least three parties are 
involved, a lessee, a lessor and a long term creditor. ”616
Benefits of international leasing
With the relaxation of exchange controls in many countries, cross-border or international 
leasing became more acceptable and popular. It allowed a larger number of companies to 
seek finance options elsewhere, usually at a reduced cost. In addition, it allowed leasing 
companies to diversify their leasing portfolio and thus reduce some of the non-tax risks 
associated. At the same time, a lessee who is interested in obtaining a certain asset through 
leasing is no longer limited to local lessors. As a result, the competition increases and the 
ability of lessors to provide lease on better terms may cause a lessee to prefer one lessor to 
another. There are many reasons that are relevant in the choice of a lessor or a lessee and 
arguably tax is only one of several reasons. It is, however, an important reason, as it may 
allow the lessor to pass some of the benefits to the lessee in the form of better lease terms 
and thus become more competitive.
In that sense, the international nature of cross-border leasing allows both lessors and lessees 
to take advantages of the different tax principles in the different countries regarding both the 
classification of the transaction and the timing of the lease payments (“double-dip” and
615 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2002) at 3.
616 Lindencrona & Tolstoy (1990) at 23.
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defeasance leases, respectively, both described below), to structure leases in a way that is 
very beneficial to them and as a result to be able to reduce some of the finance cost, by 
offering, for example, similar leases but with lower costs.
While the place in which the equipment is going to be used is relatively fixed, other elements 
in the transaction are usually more flexible and can change in accordance with changes in the 
legal, accounting and tax environment. In an industry that is highly competitive, even minor 
changes may have an impact on the way things work.
Two key questions have to be examined. First, is the transaction in question a leasing 
transaction (as opposed to a secured finance transaction, for example)? Second, who should 
be the one enjoying the benefit of the depreciation deductions?
Depreciation deductions are basically the equivalent of expenses in the acquisition of a 
capital asset. In most cases, expenses, which are allowed against ordinary income, are not 
allowed in deduction with respect to a capital asset. To compensate for that and to encourage 
taxpayers to acquire business assets, depreciation deductions were introduced with respect to 
certain types of assets to reduce the disadvantage of acquiring an asset (as opposed to renting 
it). Thus, the depreciation deductions estimate the overall life of the asset and allow the 
taxpayer who acquires the asset to deduct a ratable portion of the price of the asset in every 
year during the life of the asset. Several countries, however, did not stop at this and made the 
depreciation deductions more generous than a simple economic or ratable depreciation (by 
allowing accelerated depreciation). As a result, depreciation deductions can be more 
advantageous than merely rent deductions as they allow the taxpayer the benefit of deferral 
by advancing deductions and deferring the payment of tax.617
In that sense, the depreciation deductions should be seen as a type of incentive granted to the 
owner of the asset. Being in the form of a benefit or an incentive, it is meant to encourage a 
certain activity by a certain group of taxpayers. Thus, one can assume that where the fisc 
does not agree with the use of the benefits by the taxpayer (for example, if the taxpayer 
decided to transfer the benefits in a way that does not coincide with the aim of the legislation 
i.e. to someone who was not intended to benefit) then it would disallow such use. The
617 Tiley mentions two main policy reasons behind the grant o f depreciation deductions. The first one is to 
encourage activity and the second one is to provide compensation for the use o f the property and depreciation in 
value. Over time, legislation tends to be influenced by one o f these two reasons. When the first reason controls, 
generous accelerated depreciation deductions are usually available. For example, during a period o f slowing 
economy or recession, hoping the depreciation allowances would encourage businesses to invest more, on other 
times, the second reason might control, limiting the extent o f depreciations deductions and their timing to be 
more parallel with economic depreciation o f the property. See generally, Tiley (2003).
174
general acceptance of leasing suggests that transfer of benefits is allowed. This acceptance is, 
however, subject to limitations in certain cases, for example, in the case of “export leasing.”
In a typical leasing transaction, a lessor is entitled to the depreciation benefits as he is 
regarded as the owner of the asset even though he is not using the asset. Allowing the lessor 
to claim depreciation deductions seems to be warranted as long as the rationale behind the 
depreciation deductions is not frustrated.
In some cases, protection of the fisc against revenue loss is also an important policy in the 
design of tax legislation. For example, as it was mentioned, many countries have adopted 
special rules to prevent so-called “export leasing”. One of the main rationales for such 
legislation is that while the fisc is happy to allow transfer of benefits within its boundaries 
from one taxpayer to another and thus to encourage certain activities (even if it is at cost to 
the fisc), the fisc is usually unwilling to “sponsor” or finance foreign taxpayers by allowing 
depreciation deductions (sometimes accelerated depreciation deductions) to be taken against 
domestic income thus reducing domestic tax liability (of the lessor) while the asset with 
respect to which these deductions are taken is not used by a domestic taxpayer and not used 
in the country.618
Defeasance leases619 have been quite popular and led to many legislative responses over the 
years. Without going too much into this type of lease, it appears that the rationale was not to 
allow taxpayers to claim depreciation deductions in situations where the grant of these 
deductions would frustrate the rationale and intention of the legislation. Similarly, many 
jurisdictions adopted certain provisions to curtail and reduce (if not eliminate) the extent to 
which lessors are able to use tax depreciation (or their equivalent) when the equipment is 
used outside the lessor’s country of residence620
618 See Hariton (1999).
619 The general reporters for the 1990IFA Congress define defeasance in the following way “A defeasance in the 
context o f  leasing is an assumption by a finance institution o f  liability fo r  the payment o f  leasing fees. A 
defeasance which is non-recourse to the lessee is called a legal defeasance, and a defeasance with recourse to 
the lessee is called an economic defeasance.” (Lindencrona & Tolstoy (1990) at 32).
620 For example -  ss 109 and 110 o f CAA 2001. See our discussion below (pp. 197-203).
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The Double-dip
In the context of international leasing transactions, a double-dip is a description of a situation 
whereby one leasing transaction gives rise to two simultaneous depreciation deductions, one 
in the hands of the lessor and one in the hands of the lessee.
“A double-dip transaction relies on and exploits the differences between two dissimilar legal 
systems and, in order for this “tax law arbitrage ” to be successful, it is essential that the 
systems be truly and substantially distinct. ”621
In general, tax systems attribute certain advantages to owners of property. The most 
important of these advantages is the ability to claim depreciation deductions with respect to 
the property.
"The key tax benefit exploited in a tax-oriented lease transaction -  as practiced in the U.S. 
and around the world -  is that attributable to depreciation deductions or other tax 
allowances fo r  the cost o f the leased property. Leasing, as detailed in chapter 5, is a 
technique fo r transferring all or a portion o f the benefit o f  such deductions from a taxpayer 
to a person who cannot use the deductions directly.1,622
Like leasing, this type of transactions is not a new phenomenon. In a 1981 article dealing 
with international leasing623 Park describes a transaction between a US party and a UK party 
whereby both parties are regarded, by their domestic tax legislation as the tax owner of the 
property. This result is based on the different approach taken by the UK and the US with 
respect to characterization and taxation of leasing transactions.624
The added benefit of double-dip leasing is not in the availability of a second set of 
deductions. This second set is already available under regular single-dip leasing which gives 
rise to two sets of deductions, one at the hands of the lessor (depreciation) and one at the 
hand of the lessee (rent). The difference is in the timing of the second set of deductions, 
which as a result of the inconsistent characterization of the transaction becomes accelerated 
(like the first set) and allows both taxpayers to take a deduction ahead of the actual timing of 
the expenditure.625 In effect, the parties share this additional benefit between them. Often,
621 Shrank & Gough (2003) §25:3.2 (p.25-139).
622 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-7.
623 Park (1981-82).
624 A legal formalistic approach and an economic approach, respectively. See generally, Park (1981-82) at 148.
625 Ring (2003).
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this benefit is evident in lower fee charges by the lessor or lower implicit interest payments 
in the rent paid by the lessee to the lessor.
One of the major limitations that is imposed, albeit indirectly, on the availability of the 
double-dip leasing is the special rules against export leasing, rules that are intended to 
discourage the use of export leasing transactions by restricting the benefit of the single-dip. 
In general, these rules, which are discussed more in detail below,626 spread the depreciation 
on the property over a longer period making the leasing a less attractive finance option. In 
the context of double-dip leasing, it would not be beneficial for a lessor to engage in a 
transaction that is subject to the export leasing rules because the application of these rules 
would have the result of neutralizing the benefit achieved through the double-dip. For that 
reason, double-dip leasing only exists where it is possible for the parties to achieve regular 
depreciation rate for the lessor, either because no export leasing rules exist or because the 
transaction qualifies into one of the exceptions in these rules. In other jurisdiction, for 
example the UK, double-dip leasing is usually not pursued as outbound transactions.
Therefore, for a double-dip leasing to be beneficial, it has to be a transaction of the type that 
is not objected to by the tax laws in the country of the lessor either directly (because the 
transaction fits into one of the exceptions of the export leasing provisions) or indirectly 
(because there are no general restrictions on export leasing), making the transfer of tax 
attributes to the foreign lessee acceptable.
However, if a transaction is to be tax effective as a double-dip transaction in the first place, it 
is necessary for both the lessor and the lessee to be regarded as the tax owner of the leased 
property (or as the person entitled to claim the depreciation deductions), each in his own 
country and for each of them to be able to claim deprecation deductions in his or her country 
of residence. One method of achieving this result is for the transaction to be regarded as a 
sale from the lessee’s country perspective and as a lease from the lessor’s country 
perspective. Another method is for it to be regarded as a secured loan (sale and a loan) from 
the lessee’s country perspective and as a lease from the lessor’s country perspective.
626 See pp. 197-203 below.
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Possible structures of cross-border double-dip leasing transactions627
Outbound double-dip
There are several ways in which US lessors managed in the past to create successful cross- 
border double-dip leasing transactions. In all of these planning options the US lessor was 
also the manufacturer of the leased property. As a result, the transaction benefited from the 
application of the FSC or ETI legislations.
The simplest option was to enter into a one-tier lease whereby the transaction is regarded as 
a true lease for US tax purposes and as a hire purchase for foreign tax purposes. As a result, 
the lessor was regarded as the owner of the leased property for US tax purposes and was 
entitled to claim depreciation deductions. In addition, the foreign lessee was also entitled, 
due to the characterization of the transaction as a hire purchase, to claim depreciation 
deductions in the foreign jurisdiction.
The inconsistent treatment was obtained through the use of a purchase option. Several 
jurisdictions, usually those that had a strong UK influence, tended to characterize a 
transaction in which a purchase option is granted to the lessee as a hire purchase transaction, 
even if the purchase option was at or above the anticipated value at the end of the leasing 
period.628 Under a hire purchase agreement, the hirer (lessee) was the party that was entitled 
to claim depreciation deductions. As a result, both lessee and lessor were able to enjoy 
depreciation deductions.629
Inbound double-dip
In the past, successful inbound double-dip transactions have two common features: these 
transactions were denominated and documented as a lease and the foreign lessor or a party 
acting on his behalf held the title to the leased asset.630
However, the most challenging obstacle in obtaining successful inbound double-dip leasing 
transactions is to establish that the US tax treatment of the leasing transaction should be 
based on the substance of the transaction as opposed to its form. For that purpose, following
627 See generally, Shrank & Gough (2003) Ch. 25.
628 Another method o f obtaining the inconsistency was through a lease to a lessee in a country has a statutory or 
regulatory rules regarding the maximum period allowed for a lease (e.g. Germany). Any transaction exceeding 
this maximum length would be treated as a conditional sale, making the lessee the owner o f the leased asset for 
local tax law purposes.
629 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-128.
630 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-141.
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the Coleman strong proof standard631, the taxpayer has to establish that there is a strong 
proof supporting such characterization.
In the context of inbound cross-border leasing the Coleman strong proof standard is 
described as including two cumulative requirements. First, the taxpayer has to establish that 
he bears, vis-a-vis the foreign lessor, all of the significant burdens and benefits of ownership 
in the leased asset. Second, that the parties intend the US party (the lessee) to be the US tax 
owner of the asset to the exclusion of the foreign party.632
The basic alternative option was to create a lease with a fixed price purchase option at a 
nominal price or a lease with an automatic passage of title upon the satisfaction of a pre­
determined event. These alternatives were not always available and they became less and 
less common with the development of advanced tax laws in the foreign jurisdictions to deal 
with the taxation of leasing transactions.
A successful planning option that was used in the past to achieve double-dip treatment was 
through the use of an economically compelled purchase option in the leasing transaction. 
This option has the effect of treating the US lessee as the owner of the leased property for 
US tax purposes (according to the burdens and benefits test) while not altering the status of 
the foreign lessor as the owner of the leased asset according to the tax laws in the foreign 
jurisdiction. Unlike the more basic alternative of a nominal fixed price purchase option, 
under this alternative, although the lessee has the option of buying the leased property for a 
substantial price,633 there are also other factors that will compel the lessee to exercise the 
option at the end of the lease period.634
631 The rule which bears the name o f the case in which it was decided requires a higher burden o f proof from a 
taxpayer who argues a transaction should be treated according to its substance and while disregarding its 
conflicting form. See generally, Coleman v. Commissioner, 87 TC 178 (1986).
632 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-142.
633 The price o f the option is important for the understanding and for the classification o f the transaction. One way 
o f distinguishing between a pure lease (operating lease) and a finance lease (similar to secured finance) is through 
the price o f the option at the end o f the lease period. In a pure lease, the payments that are made from the lessee to 
the lessor represent only the rental for the use o f the property during the term o f the lease. At the end o f the lease 
period, the value o f the leased property should equal its FMV and any option granted to the lessee to acquire the 
property at that time should be at least at FMV. In contrast, in a secured finance (financial lease) the lessee is 
normally paying not only for the rental o f the property but also payments o f principal to acquire equity in the 
property. Thus, at the end o f the lease period, any option granted to the lessee to acquire the property would be 
lower than FMV and even significantly lower, taking into account the payments o f principal made by the lessee 
during the term o f  the lease. As a result, it is also possible to ascertain the classification o f  transaction by 
reference to the value o f  the option given to the lessee (just for sake o f completeness, it should be noted, though, 
that in some jurisdictions, the mere grant o f an option would be sufficient to treat the transaction as a secured 
finance (finance lease) regardless o f its value).
634 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-158 -  25-160.
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Another alternative that was used was a guaranteed cross put and call. According to this 
alternative, the lessor has an option to sell the leased property at the end of the leasing period 
at a substantial price and the lessee has an option to buy the leased property at the end of the 
leasing period and at the same price. The combination of these two options ensure that 
whether the price of the leased property increases or decreases, one of the options will be 
exercised with the effect of transferring the asset to the lessee, making the cross option the 
equivalent of a deep in the money option.635
Two-tier transactions
In a sense, the differences between the two tax systems and their classification of the 
transactions replaces the use of artificial steps in the transactions to create the desired 
beneficial result. Sometimes, however, the differences between the two tax systems are not 
sufficient to result in ITA. For that purpose, taxpayers would try to use an intermediary in a 
third country to achieve the desired inconsistency and the ITA. The challenge with these 
structures is to structure them in a way so they are not caught within the scope of tax 
avoidance.
Nonetheless, if and to the extent such transactions come within the scope of tax avoidance, 
this is due to the artificiality element and not to inconsistency in treatment in the two or more 
jurisdictions. For example, a two-tier transaction whereby the lessor leases the property to a 
lessee resident in country X that then subleases the property for a period just short o f the 
head lease period to the intended lessee in country Y. to a large extent, the two leases, the 
head lease and the sublease are granted on similar terms. Such structures are usually more 
aggressive due to the artificiality portion (the existence of the intermediary and the result two 
leases granted back to back on similar terms). They are used when the laws of the 
jurisdiction in which the lessor resides and those in which the lessee resides (country Y) are 
different but not enough to support the creation of a one-tier double-dip lease.
A more sophisticated option was to enter into a lease/sublease structure. According to one 
variation of this option, a US lessor is entering into a twelve-year lease with a party who is 
able to use Australian tax benefits. The lease includes a purchase option and is regarded as a 
hire purchase agreement in Australia and the lessee is regarded as the owner of the leased 
property for Australian tax purposes. The lessee then enters into a sublease with a 
sublessee/user for a period of twelve years. The sublease does not contain an option to 
purchase the asset and is treated as a lease transaction.
635 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-160.
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UK - Characterization and capital allowances
A central distinction in the leasing area is the distinction made by standard accounting 
practice and in particular SSAP 21 which distinguishes between finance lease and operating 
lease but does not determine whether a transaction is a lease for tax purpose. Nonetheless, 
this qualification is relevant to an increasing number of aspects relating the taxation of 
leasing in the UK, an area that becomes more and more affected by accounting principles.636 
It appears that following the introduction of certain changes in Finance Act 1997 and in 
Finance (No. 2) Act 1997, the lessor’s accounting treatment will be paramount in the 
determination of the lease classification.637
SSAP 21 distinguishes between a finance lease and an operating lease. The latter is a lease 
whereby the lessor retains ownership over the leased asset by retaining substantially all the 
risks and rewards of ownership. A finance lease, on the other hand, is transaction whereby 
the lessee is vested with substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership and thus 
economically is the owner of the leased property. In essence, a finance lease is like a loan.
The test for the determination whether substantially all the risks and rewards of ownerships 
have passed from the lessor to the lessee is based on a comparison of the rental cash flow of 
the lease vis-a-vis the fair market value of the leased property.
This distinction, however, is irrelevant for the tax treatment of the transaction and in 
particular for the purpose of applying the capital allowances. For these purposes, the only 
relevant consideration is the identity of the legal owner of the asset. The test applied is a 
formal legal ownership test that rejects the economic substance over form approach taken by 
SSAP.
As it was commented by the Inland Revenue “When SSAP 21 accounting treatment was 
introduced in 1984 the Government decided at that time not to follow the same 'substance- 
over-form' approach for tax purposes. The tax system continues to regard a finance lease as 
the hire o f an asset and not as a loan.
Lessor
636 See also Inland Revenue (2003).
637 Price WaterhouseCoopers (2002) at 180.
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The finance lessor, as the legal owner o f the kit, continues to get the capital allowances and 
other reliefs fo r  capital expenditure, such as the film reliefs.
Lessee
The finance lessee gets no capital allowances but continues to get relieffor the gross rentals 
which, in total, equal the capital cost o f the kit (the 'loan') and the 'interest' on the 'loan'. ”638
In general, a finance lease for accounting purposes is treated differently for tax purposes 
mainly due to the fact that the ownership of the leased equipment remains with the lessor. As 
such, the lessor is going to be charged on the rental income received from the lessee and 
allowed to deduct the capital allowances given with respect to the property.
If the lease is regarded as an operating lease, the tax treatment is going to be similar to the 
accounting treatment, mainly due to the similarity in the identity of the owner of the leased 
property, the lessor.
It is possible for a lease to be structured as a finance lease for accounting purposes and as a 
lease for tax purposes. In that way, despite the similarity to financial transactions (loans) the 
transaction is taxed as a leasing transaction, possibly a much favorable tax result.
Following the formalistic approach to the characterization of transactions for tax purposes, it 
is necessaiy to determine whether a given transaction should be classified as a lease or not. 
This is a question to be determined based on legal nature of the relationship between the 
parties to the transaction and should be the starting point in the analysis.639
These are several types of transactions that are similar or resemble one another. Since the 
ability to claim capital allowances is an important tax advantage of leasing, a thorough 
understanding of the differences between the different types is a crucial aspect in obtaining 
this benefit.
Once the transaction has been classified according to the legal form and the identity of the 
owner has been determined, the timing of the payments made under the transaction and their 
character are determined by applying SSAP 21. Thus, while accounting rules and the 
distinction between operating lease and finance lease control the determination of the timing
638 Inland Revenue Finance Leasing Manual - FLM5.01.
639 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 11-4.
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and character of the payments made under the lease, they are irrelevant for the determination 
of the nature of the transaction itself As a result, this hybrid method of classification 
basically applies finance lease accounting to a transaction that is classified as a regular lease 
i.e. the lessor has ownership of the property (as opposed to a finance lease where the 
ownership is considered to have passed to the lessee). This may result in complex issues 
relating to the application of SSAP 21, for example, in the characterization of the payments 
made under the lease.
The Key -  Entitlement to claim capital allowances
An essential feature of a lease is that the lessor retains full ownership of the asset and only 
transfers a right to use the asset for a restricted period, at the end of which the asset is 
returned to the lessor. Thus, in the UK, the term “lease” is usually used to describe contracts 
that do not grant the lessee an option to acquire the property at the end of the lease term and 
thus allow the lessor to claim capital allowances. The existence of an option to purchase the 
property at the end of the lease period would usually result in classifying the transaction as a 
hire purchase and treating the lessee/hire purchaser as the owner of the property.640
A hire purchase, on the other hand, is a combination of a lease with an option to acquire the 
property at the end of the lease period, usually for a nominal sum.641 While the existence of 
option at a price higher than nominal is relatively common in other jurisdictions, in the UK it 
is not used in order to avoid timing and character issues under SSAP 21 .M2
Nonetheless the UK approach is not to transfer ownership in the property until the option is 
exercised. That is, as long as the option is not exercised, ownership is still vested in the 
original owner.
The general rule is that capital allowances (the UK equivalent of depreciation deductions for 
tax purposes) are given to the “owner” of the property. Thus, CAA 2001 s 24 requires an 
ownership of the property as a condition for claiming the capital allowances. This 
requirement replaced the prior requirement under CAA 1990 that the property would belong 
to the taxpayer. This change, however, is considered to be stylistic and not substantive.643
640 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001) at 202.
641 Clayson (2002) at 11-4. Arguably, the existence o f the purchase option itself would bring the transaction into a 
hire purchase classification for UK tax purposes. However, since a central feature o f  the planning is to be able to 
claim depreciation in both jurisdictions, it is necessary to ensure that the transaction does not run into 
capital/income issues as a result o f the relatively high value o f the option. According to Clayson, this issue can be 
solved by using either economic or legal defeasance to smooth the treatment on both sides o f  the transaction.
642 See the preceding part.
643 Tiley (2003) at 24A.2.2.
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Under both, the taxpayer is required to establish that he has an absolute and beneficial 
ownership in the property and this is examined from a legal perspective (and not, for 
example, from an economic substance or accounting perspective).
Several important aspects of the capital allowance legislation were raised and discussed 
recently in the Court of Appeal in Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd. (BMBF) v. 
Mawson644 (hereinafter, “Barclays” or the Barclays case). Although the subject matter before 
the court was a sale-leaseback transaction, the court made some very important comments 
regarding the capital allowance legislation, its application and its rationale. The narrow issue 
at stake was whether the taxpayer was entitled to claim capital allowances with respect to the 
pipeline (which was the leased property). The decision, however, raised two wider issues 
that are required for the decision on the narrow issue. First, what is the purpose of capital 
allowances? Second, does the Ramsay principle apply with respect to sale-leaseback 
transactions as the one that took place in Barclays?
The facts of the case are quite complex. However, it is possible to briefly describe them in 
the following simplified way:645 an Irish company, owner of a pipeline, entered into a sale- 
leaseback transaction with BMBF, a UK resident company, with respect to part of the 
pipeline. The leaseback was for 32 years. As part of the transaction, the Irish company was 
required to deposit the consideration received on the sale on a deposit that guaranteed the 
Irish company’s payments on the lease (the deposit was structured in a way that every time a 
payment had to be made, the Irish company would be able to withdraw it from the deposit. 
The twist was in the fact that the deposit, going through a long chain of companies 
essentially went back to BMBF, although (and this is an important point) BMBF did not 
have the right to use it.
The Special Commissioners applied the Ramsay principle and found that the transaction, as 
it was conducted, lacked economic reality. Thus, they refused to allow BMBF to enjoy the 
capital allowances. 646 The decision was appealed and on appeal to the High Court, Park J 
adopted the Special Commissioners findings and decision and denied the capital 
allowances.647
644 [2003] EWCA CIV 1560 (8); [2003] STC 66.
645 This description is based in part on Johnson’s brief description o f the facts in Johnson (2003).
646 Paragraph 14 o f the CA decision. Cf. Nash & Gonen (2003) at 109 Their view was also shared by the Court o f  
Appeal.
64 At para. 22. Park J applied the judicial anti-avoidance doctrine o f Ramsay as it was articulated by the House o f  
Lords in MacNiven, found that the term “incurring expenditure” is a legal term and as such has to have a legal 
meaning to it. Following Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in MacNiven, he looked at the underlying purpose o f  
Parliament in enacting the capital allowances legislation under the specific section in question which was not “to
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The Court of Appeal disagreed with both the Special Commissioners and Park J, finding that 
the Special Commissioners finding (and Park J’s affirmation of this finding) that there was 
no business reality was not based on any evidence or factual foundation and was actually 
contrary to the evidence given at the trial.
According to Gibson LJ, "[T]he purpose o f the capital allowances legislation would appear 
to be to encourage the expenditure o f capital on plant and machinery. The fact that the 
trader incurring the expenditure would not himself use the plant or machinery but would 
lease it and pass on the benefit o f the capital allowances to the lessee was not seen to be any 
reason for not conferring capital allowances on that trader who had incurred the 
expenditure. I  can see nothing in the legislation which substantiates the judge’s view that s 
24 was enacted so that capital allowances could be used to provide lessees with finance at 
attractive rates to use and to develop their real business activity. ”648
He then continues to reject the lower courts’ focus on the origin of the funds.
"To the test posed in s 24 it is immaterial how the trader acquires the funds to incur the 
expenditure or what the vendor o f the provided plant or machinery does with the 
consideration received. Provided that the expenditure is incurred on the provision o f plant 
or machinery and is so incurred wholly and exclusively fo r  the purposes o f the trader’s 
trade, subject to s 75(1) it is irrelevant to the operation o fs  24(1) whether the trader’s object 
is or includes obtaining capital allowances. ”649
Regarding the circularity argument according to which due to the circularity of the funds the 
taxpayer did not really incur the expenditure, Gibson LJ began by finding that,
"Lord Hoffmann in MacNiven (at p. 398 para. 68) said that for the purposes o f some 
concepts in tax legislation the circularity o f the cash flow and the fact that the transaction 
took place entirely for tax purposes would stamp the transaction as something different from  
that contemplated by the legislation. But he does not say that the circularity o f the movement 
o f the money would itself be enough. I  do not accept that the circulation o f money in the 
present case means that the transaction is to be treated like the scheme in Ensign. ”650
enable capital allowances to be used so as to provide to the lessees attractive rates finance for them to use and to 
develop their real business activities” (para. 22 o f the Court o f Appeal decision).
648 Para. 37.
649 Ibid.
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Based on that and declining the application of the Ramsay principle, the court found that the 
taxpayer did incur the expenditure.
What can be learned from the decision? First, the court confirmed that the sharing of tax 
benefits that arises from the availability of capital allowance (through for example, a leasing 
transaction) is an accepted commercial practice in this context.651 The court did not 
disapprove of the use of the property by someone who is not the person claiming the benefits 
of capital allowance, and even went a step further and interpreted the relevant section 
granting the benefits as being enacted with the view of granting such benefits to lessors so 
that they would be able to offer lower rates of finance to lessees.652
Second, a minimal degree of risk would not, by itself, be regarded as rendering a leasing 
transaction to be tax avoidance scheme. As long as there is a commercial reason to justify the 
circularity of funds, it will not, by itself, turn the transaction into a prohibited tax avoidance 
scheme.653
Third, according to the Court of Appeal, denial of capital allowances requires the existence 
of a clear provision in the tax statutes that limits or prevents the application of the capital 
allowances legislation. One should not read into the legislation principles or provisions that 
are not otherwise expressed in it.
Inland Revenue Proposal
In its August 2003 consultative paper, the Inland Revenue has indicated its intention to 
reform the rules governing the taxation of leasing transactions.654 According to the Inland 
Revenue, the current rules lead to inconsistent treatment of similar transactions, resulting in 
distortions that affect the decision between different types of finance.655 As part of a more 
comprehensive debate on capital allowances, the Inland Revenue is considering to amend the 
distortions by moving the entitlements to capital allowances from the lessor to the lessee in 
leases, which are essentially finance transactions.656 For that purpose, a distinction is drawn 
between a finance lease and an operating lease. According to the Inland Revenue, leasing
651 Nash & Gonen (2003) at 113.
652 Gibson LJ at para. 37 which is quoted above. This, however, has to be examined today in the light o f CAA 
2001 s.225.
653 Nash & Gonen (2003) at 113.
654 HM Treasury & Inland Revenue (2003), para. 2.53-2.60.
655 Ibid, at para. 2.54.
656 Ibid, at para. 2.55.
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transactions exist in the wide spectrum between pure financing transactions and basic 
operating leases. The distortions are created when some of the more developed leasing 
transactions, which are closer to finance transactions in their substance, are treated as 
operating leases.
As part of the proposed reform, the Inland Revenue intends to introduce a definition of 
finance transaction that would includes within its scope some types of the above-mentioned 
operating leases657 in order to minimize the distortions. These transactions will be treated and 
taxed as finance transactions whereby the lessor is not entitled to claim capital allowances 
and is taxable only with respect to finance elements in its leasing receipts whereas the lessee 
is entitled to deduct the finance costs out of the rental payments paid to the lessor as part of 
the finance transaction. In addition, lessees will be entitled to claim capital allowances with 
respect to the property.658
One of the reasons behind the introduction of the proposal is the increasing pressure of EC 
law on existing law and in particular on the different treatment of leases with UK resident 
lessees and non-UK (but EU) resident lessees, a distinction that would probably not survive a 
challenge. Basically, the UK has a choice of two alternatives. First, to treat all leasing 
transactions alike regardless of the identity of the lessee by granting regular capital 
allowances to the lessors in all transactions regardless of the identity of the lessee. In effect, 
adopting such an approach would be favorable to taxpayers and at the expense of the fisc as 
it will extend benefits also to those transactions that are currently expressly excluded from 
regular benefits.
A second option is to depart the legal characterization of leases and to move to an economic 
approach to the characterization on leases similar to the distinction between finance leases 
and operating leases. If this option is chosen, the UK legislation would follow the economic 
classification not only for the purpose of timing the payments under the lease but also for 
determining the nature of the transaction in the first place.
In its 2003 consultative paper the Inland Revenue followed the second option. According to 
the Inland Revenue, this proposal, which will apply to incorporated and unincorporated 
taxpayers, is not expected to affect many of the operating leases. If  enacted, the proposal will 
remove the tax distortions between loans and leases that are essentially loans and remove 
most of the restrictions that currently exist with respect to export leasing transactions, thus
657 See pp. 181-183 above.
658 Ibid, at para. 2.57-2.58.
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increasing the opportunities for UK lessors to engage in leasing transactions to non-UK 
resident lessees.659
US - Characterization and depreciation deductions
The US approach to classification of leasing transactions is based on an economic substance 
approach whereby the economic substance of the transaction and not the form of the 
transaction or its label is the controlling element in the classification of the transaction for 
tax purposes. This general approach is, however, subject to certain exceptions and 
limitations.660
In a true lease, the lessor is the party vested with ownership of the leased asset. According to 
the economic substance approach, the lessor, being the owner, has to retain substantially all 
the benefits and burdens of ownership. If, however, substantially all the benefits and burdens 
associated with ownership are not retained by the lessor, then the lessor is to be treated as if 
he disposed of the ownership and the transaction cannot be classified as a true lease for US 
tax purposes.
Congress has chosen not to define a true lease and in absence of statutory definition, the task 
of defining a true lease and distinguishing it from other types of transactions (e.g. loan, sale 
(conditional or credit) or provision of services) is left to the courts and to the IRS.
In a true lease, the lessor does not transfer most of the benefits and burdens of ownership to 
the lessee. The lessor transfers the right to use the asset for a limited time at the end of which 
the asset returns to the lessor.
The IRS has published its guidelines which provides a set of requirements that have to be 
satisfied if the taxpayer seeks a ruling that a given transaction is a true lease for US tax 
purposes.661 While the IRS has acknowledged that these guidelines should not be seen as a 
definition of a true lease,662 it is generally accepted that if a given transaction satisfies these 
requirements, it is less likely that the transaction will be challenged by the IRS in an audit.663
659 Ibid, at para. 2.59-2.60.
660 In general, the US approach to tax favors substance to form unless form controls as for example in the recent 
decisions in Compaq and IES Industries. For substance over form in general, see McMahon (2002).
661 Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-19 I.R.B. 1156 which modified and superseded Rev. Proc. 75-21.
662 2001-19 I.R.B. 1156 at section 3. The guidelines are merely a published criteria for advance ruling.
663 Cozart at 24.
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Rev. Ruling 55-540664 discusses the factors that define a true lease for US tax purposes. 
Before discussing the specific factors the ruling provides that each case must be decided 
based on its own particular facts. Nonetheless, based on the history of prior cases, the IRS 
has formulated a list of factors that the existence of one or more of which can, in the absence 
of contrary indication, can serve as an indication of a sale and purchase as opposed to a 
lease.
These factors are the following: first, if the portions of the periodic payments are made 
specifically applicable to equity to be acquired by the lease. Second, if the lessee acquires 
title after the payment of a specified amount of rental payments that the lessee is required to 
make according to the lease agreement. Third, the rental payments provided for in the 
agreement significantly exceed the current fair rental value. Fourth, the agreement provides 
an option to acquire the property for a price that is nominal in relation to the value of the 
property at the time that option is exercised. This criterion is to be determined when entering 
the original agreement. Fifth, a portion of the rental payment is either recognized as interest 
or designated as interest. Sixth, the overall amount the lessee is required to pay with respect 
to a relatively short amount of time is significantly high and close to an amount that would 
enable the payor to secure transfer of the title to the property.665
It is important to note that the ruling provides that the mere fact that the agreement does not 
include reference or a clause for the passage of title or even expressly precludes such transfer 
does not prevent a classification of a contract as a sale.
According to Rev. Proc. 2001-28, which refers to Rev. Rul. 55-540 as the relevant authority 
for classification of transactions as a lease or a sale,666, in the absence of other facts and 
circumstances that indicate to the contrary, the following conditions have to be satisfied 
when applying for a revenue ruling with respect to a leveraged lease:
■ The lessor must make a minimum unconditional “at risk” investment in the property 
equal to at least 20% of the cost of the property. The investment must remain 
throughout the lease term.
■ The lessor has to establish that an amount equal to at least 20% of the original cost 
of the property is a reasonable estimate of what the fair market value of the property 
shall be at the end of the lease period.
955-2 C.B. 39.
665 Ibid.
666 2001-191.R.B. 1156 at Section 2.
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■ No member of the lessee group has an option to acquire the property at the end of 
the lease period for less than the fair market value of the property at the time the 
option is exercised.
■ Subject to two limited exceptions that are stipulated in the procedure, the lessee or 
any of its group cannot contribute to the cost of the property or any improvements 
made in the property.
■ No member of the lessee group may lend the lessor any of the funds necessary for 
the purchase of the property. This also includes guarantees created with respect to 
the acquisition of the property by the lessor.
■ The lessor has to establish that he expects to receive a profit from the transaction and 
this profit must result apart from any tax benefits or tax deductions obtained by the 
lessor as a result of the transaction
In addition, the procedure provides some additional considerations that may be taken into 
account as for example, limited use property.
Thus, the IRS has taken an economic substance approach by looking, among other things, at 
whether there is still a linkage between the taxpayer seeking to claim the depreciation 
deductions on one hand and the responsibility for the risk of loss regarding the property and 
its residual value on the other hand. This approach is limited by the approach taken by the 
courts in three specific ways.667 First, the application of the sham doctrine and its effect.668
The second limitation is the decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Lyon669 and its 
consequences on current characterization issues. The third limitation on the economic 
approach is the limitations imposed by the courts on the taxpayer’s ability to assert economic 
substance of the transaction to its advantage (the so-called “Coleman Rule”). These two 
limitations are discussed below.
The question of tax ownership has been at the center of many court decisions including the 
1975 Supreme Court decision in Frank Lyon and more recently the decisions in Compaq and 
IES Industries. According to one commentator, the law of leasing is about reconciling two 
basic themes. The first, that the owner of a property possesses its benefits and burdens. The 
second theme is that tax law generally respects transactions that are conducted at arm’s
667 Cozart at part I.
668 According to the sham doctrine, the sham is where the transaction that took place in practice is not the same as 
the transaction that is contemplated in the relevant documents. As a result, the courts will often set aside this 
transaction as a sham. Arguably, an appropriate application o f the above analysis should confine the application 
o f the sham doctrine to limited exceptional situations.
669 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
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length with business purpose. The experience of case law in recent years has established a 
preference of the second theme, sometimes at the expense of the first theme.670
A better view is that there is some sort of confusion regarding the meaning of “tax 
ownership” and this confusion is reflected in some more recent and less recent tax 
decisions.671 All of these decisions deal or at least should deal with the concept of tax 
ownership, although not necessarily in the leasing context. The starting point is economic 
substance. The essence of this economic substance view is that the lessor retains tax 
ownership (and thus entitlement for tax depreciations) as long as the lessor retains 
substantially all the benefits and burdens of ownership, including the risk in the devaluation 
of the leased asset. As it is suggested below, most of the tax decisions regarding tax 
attributes of ownership in general and regarding leasing in particular can and should be 
analyzed based on this analysis of tax ownership and risk, whereby tax ownership follows 
risk.672 If this is accepted, then most questions can be determined without need to revert to 
different types of anti-planning doctrines.
The main obstacle for this approach is the decision in Frank Lyon. Although this decision 
has been significantly criticized over the years,673 one cannot discuss tax characterization of 
leases without referring to this decision by the Supreme Court.
Frank Lyon is a sale-leaseback case. The case dealt with a three party transaction, a feature 
that was central to the court’s line of argument. A bank (Worthen) wanted to expand its 
offices and to acquire new office building. Due to banking regulations restrictions, Worthen 
was unable to use other means of finance to construct the new office building and resorted to 
a sale-leaseback transaction whereby it would sell and leaseback the building from a third 
party.
Frank Lyon (FL) a closely held company was chosen as the buyer-lessor and a third party 
bank was chosen to help with the finance of the transaction. According to the structure of the 
transaction, Worthen, the owner of the land on which the building was to be constructed 
leased the land for a period of 76 years and 7 months to FL. In addition, Worthen sold the 
building to be built to FL in a sale agreement as part of the transaction, and entered into 
another agreement with FL, a lease agreement whereby it leased the building for a period of
670 Cozart at 26.
671 Kingson (2001).
672 Kingson (2001).
673 One practitioner, while commenting on another case (Estmark Inc. v. C.I.R, 90 T.C. 171) wrote the following 
comment “Esmark is thought by many practitioners to be the moral equivalent o f  the Frank Lyon case, a clearly 
misdecided case that one cites when one's legal position is all but hopeless.” (Steinberg (1999) at 483).
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25 years (primary period) and granted eight options to extend the lease period up to an 
overall period of 65 years. At the end of this period, unless Worthen were to acquire the 
building from FL, FL would have full ownership, use and control of the building. The rent 
obligation on part of Worthen only started upon completion of the building. Thereafter, for 
the first 11 years rent was set at $145,581.03 per quarter. For the following 14 years, the rent 
was increased to $153,289.32 per quarter and during each of the option periods (if exercised) 
the rent reduced to $300K per year. The rent payable over the primary period of the first 25 
years equaled the principal and interest payments on the mortgage loan taken by FL from the 
bank to finance the construction. In addition, FL would have to pay Worthen for the lease of 
the land. FL also invested $500K and Worthen had a purchase option that priced at the 
amount of the unpaid loan plus $500K and 6% of interest compounded on this investment.
The issue at stake was the tax characterization of the transaction and the identity of the 
owner of the building i.e. whether it was a finance transaction or a sale-leaseback 
transaction, whether FL was entitled to claim depreciation deductions and whether Worthen 
was entitled to deduct its rent payments. Based on these facts and taking into account the 
determinations of fact made by the District Court, the Supreme Court held that FL was the 
owner of the building and that the transaction should be respected as a sale-leaseback 
transaction. Both its reasoning and its final determination have been subject to criticism. 
Nonetheless, the decision introduced certain doubts to the tax treatment of leasing 
transaction in general and sale-leaseback transactions in particular.
First, the court relied on the factual finding of the District Court and respected the finding 
that the purchase option, for example, was reasonably priced at FMV. Based on this factual 
finding, the court declined to speculate whether the purchase option would be exercised in 
the future. On this point, the decision was criticized in two levels. First, at the level of the 
reliance of the factual finding of the lower court. The court of appeals that reversed the 
decision of the district court, and in doing so, decided to intervene and look at the factual 
findings as well on the ground that were clearly wrong. The Supreme Court was reluctant to 
do so and mentioned that as an appellate court it is only dealing with questions of law, 
relying on the factual findings of the district court. In doing so, it failed to address the 
question whether these findings were erroneously, wrong as it was decided by the Court of 
Appeals.674
674 Cozart at 49.
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“The Supreme Court treated the Eight Circuit as having simply mistaken a factual fo r a legal 
issue and did not discuss whether the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. In 
comparison to the lengthy discussion o f residual values in subsequent lease cases, the 
district court's analysis is manifestly inadequate.”675
One can only infer that their reluctance to intervene can be regarded as an implied indication 
at least that they did not think so. This raises another question -  was the factual 
determination that the purchase option represented a reasonable market value a sound 
determination? Arguably, the fact that the court based its decision, even if in part, on the 
basis that the purchase option was reasonable and at FMV and thus refused to speculate 
whether it would be exercised limits the application of this decision only to cases where 
similar determination can be made.
Second, the court seems to have combined the sham doctrine with the question of tax 
ownership and discussed these two separate and unrelated issues together.676 Kingson, while 
referring to an earlier commentary written by Del Cotto, comments as follows:
“As Professor Del Cotto puts it, the problem with interpreting Lyon arises ‘from both the 
multiplicity o f factors relied on by the Court and its failure to rank them in importance.' He 
adds that the Court confused 'business purpose with economic reality ’. In other words, the 
Court put the business motivation fo r leasing -  the banking regulators -  ahead o f economic 
terms o f the lease itself. ”677
The decision, according to the Supreme Court was based on the following reason,
“In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with 
economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is 
imbued by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the government 
should honor the allocation o f rights and duties among the parties. ”678
Third, it appears that the Supreme Court has examined the wrong type of risk in analyzing 
whether FL undertook sufficient risks and rewards that would constitute tax ownership. In 
analyzing whether the lessor retained the burdens and benefits of ownership, the court should 
have looked at whether the lessor bore the risk of loss as a result of decrease in the value of
675 Ibid.
676 Kingson (2001).
677 Ibid.
678 Frank Lyon v. Commissioner as quoted by Kingson (2001).
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the asset. Instead, ironically, the court focused on the risk of loss that was in fact a credit 
risk, whether there is a risk that the lessee would default and fail to satisfy its obligations 
under the lease, a risk that is usually associated with loans.679
The impact of the decision is hard to quantify. It appears that some courts have been quite 
reluctant to derive and apply principles from the decision in Frank Lyon.680 At the same time,
"Despite this reluctance in some quarters to ascribe much importance to Frank Lyon, the 
decision has established judicial recognition that, within limits, the parties ’ choice o f a form  
o f a transaction governs its tax consequences. Inasmuch as this proposition has been 
recognized in other areas o f the tax law, the appropriate inquiry regards only the extent to 
which it should be followed in leasing cases. While this proposition has appeared in dicta in 
several leasing cases, it is understandably difficult to determine its exact impact. ”681
According to LeDuc, Frank Lyon, being a highly ambiguous case, presents uncertainties in 
application to other leveraged leasing cases. First, it appears that it only applies to multi­
party transactions. The fact that the transaction in Frank Lyon was a multi-party transaction 
is emphasized in the decision of the Supreme Court that distinguished in its analysis other, 
non multi-party cases. Second, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court applied the 
substance analysis or was it more concerned with the form. This uncertainty results, to a 
large extent, from the court’s unwillingness to apply the decision in Lazarus where the court 
did apply the substance analysis.682
According to LeDuc, lower courts following the decision in Frank Lyon applied a two prong 
test: first, the court determined whether the transaction is a sham transaction devoid of 
economic substance. Second, if the transaction does not fall within the application of the 
sham doctrine, the analysis is to determine whether the lessor acquires / retains the requisite 
level of the benefits and burdens of ownership.683
679 Del Cotto (1981-1982) at 4. Del Cotto goes on and list four additional points central to the Court’ reasoning in 
Lyon. First, the decision seems to suggest that three-party deals involve a purchase whereas two-party deals 
involve a loan, a suggestion that according to Del Cotto has no foundation in theory. Second, the Court 
overlooked the fact that Lyon had an expectation with high likelihood to receive part o f the funds back. Third, 
based on the district court’s determination, the option was assumed to be at fair market value thus not granting 
Worthem any equity in the building. This determination strikes at the heart o f the government position. Fourth, 
the transaction was neutral for the government who did not care whether it was Worthen or Lyon who was the 
owner o f the property. It is not clear, however, how this reasoning fits with the tax issues at stake (Del Cotto, at 
41-43).
680 Cozart at 49 referring in particular to the decision in Transamerica Corp. v. US where the tax court rejected 
the Frank Lyon based argument holding that the taxpayer interpreted the decision too widely.
681 Cozart at 50.
682 LeDuc, (2002) at 277-278.
683 Ibid, at 278-279.
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The third limitation on the use of the economic substance approach deals with the ability of 
the taxpayer (or precisely, the taxpayer’s inability) to argue for substance over form. Also 
known as the Coleman rule, there appears to be a line of precedents (based on the decision in 
Coleman v. Commissioner) that limits the taxpayer’s ability to argue for substance over form 
only to cases where a higher standard of “strong proof’ is satisfied.684 According to this rule, 
the taxpayer seeking to argue for the application of the economic substance standard and to 
revoke its form has to show that there is a strong proof for preferring such economic 
substance approach to the apparently contradicting form of the transaction as evidenced from 
the contracts and documentation. Sometimes, this claim is forced due to non-tax reasons 
where the taxpayer is required to pass legal ownership (title) due to regulatory reasons or 
other requirements. This is, probably, the most challenging US tax obstacle which applies to 
double-dip leasing because the taxpayer is seeking to be taxed according to the economic 
substance of the transaction as opposed to its form.
Availability of Depreciation Deductions
§ 167(a) allows for depreciation deductions which according to § 168(a) will be determined in 
the case of tangible property by using the applicable depreciation method, the applicable 
recovery period, and the applicable convention.685
To allow businesses to claim depreciation expenses with respect to capital assets that are 
used in their trade, Congress enacted the ACRS legislation in 1981, a favorable accelerated 
mechanism that provides taxpayers with quicker depreciation pace (vis-a-vis regular 
economic depreciation). This legislation was intended to provide the “investment stimulus 
that is essential for economic expansion”.
Not all assets, however, may benefit from this legislation. Some assets, for example, those 
used predominantly outside the US, those leased to a tax-exempt entity and those financed 
by a loan that has tax-exempt interest, are required to use the alternative depreciation method 
(ADS), the straight-line method, as their depreciation method. 686 These limitations are 
further discussed below.687
684 There is a view that the stronger burden o f proof rule o f Danielson should apply where the taxpayer seeks to 
invoke the economic substance o f the transaction to his support while revoking the form of the transaction. This 
view is not shared by leading commentators who support the view that in the context o f leasing transactions, it is 
sufficient if  the taxpayer satisfies the less stringent “strong proof’ requirement o f Coleman. See generally, Shrank 
& Gough (2003) 125-141 -  25-150.
685 IRC § 168(a).
686 IRC § 168(g).
687 See pp. 204-207 below.
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Effect of different characterization in foreign law
As it is discussed above, the US has taken an economic approach to the characterization and 
the taxation of leasing. This approach is based on all the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the transaction and is aimed at understanding who is the true owner of the leased asset from 
an economic perspective and whether there has been a transfer of the ownership from the 
lessor to the lessee. It is thus quite interesting to understand the weight, if any, which is 
given to the characterization in other jurisdictions.
In TAM 9748005m  the Service indicated that it, in general, does not regard the classification 
of the transaction in the foreign jurisdiction as having a bearing on the characterization of the 
transaction for US tax purposes. Moreover, the Service indicated that the fact the foreign 
entity is regarded as the tax owner of the property for the foreign jurisdiction’s tax purposes 
would not prevent the US taxpayer from being considered as the tax owner of the property 
for US tax purposes.689
“This dual ownership will not will not be a concern in the United States when it is solely the 
result o f  differing US andforeign legal standards o f tax ownership being applied to the same 
facts because tax ownership is determined under US. legal standards without regard to the 
tax ownership treatment obtained under foreign law. Thus, the United States need not be 
concerned where the taxpayer in a cross-border transaction is able to show that the same 
facts that led the foreign taxing authorities to conclude that ownership lies in the foreign 
party, also support the conclusion that the taxpayer is the owner under U.S. standards. ”690
At the same time, there are situations where dual ownership or inconsistent treatment might 
be a reason for concern.
“A concern with dual tax ownership arises, however, i f  the U.S. and foreign legal standards 
o f tax ownership are the same, or i f  it is unclear whether and the extent to which they differ. 
Under those circumstances, putative dual tax ownership o f the same property might result 
from  facts being represented differently to the respective tax authorities. Moreover, the 
government facts a significant challenge in ascertaining the correct facts governing the 
substance o f a transaction when key evidence is located outside the United States. ”691
688 1997 WL 734312 (IRS TAM).
689 A few years before the issuance o f TAM 9748005, the courts took a similar position. In Illinois Power v. 
Commissioner 87 TC 1417 to which the IRS published its acquiescence (AOD CC-1990-94).
690 Ibid.
691 Ibid.
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The latter situation referred to by the government is, it is submitted, a situation of tax evasion 
rather than ITA, as the taxpayer either represents a different set of facts to each tax 
authorities or omits certain facts in its report to the tax authorities. Thus, where the taxpayer 
is providing the tax authorities with the full facts of the case and does so in a consistent 
manner, the dual ownership can only result from having different legal rules in the different 
jurisdictions. In this situation, as indicated above, the Service does not see any reason for the 
foreign treatment to have any bearing on the US treatment.
UK - Cross-Border Leasing -  Specific Measures692
In a recent leasing decision, the Court of Appeal reviewed the origin and development of 
capital allowances in the UK tax legislation. The starting point is that absent a clear 
provision in statute, no allowance or deductions can be claimed against capital assets. This is 
the general rule.693 This general rule operated as a disincentive to the acquisition of capital 
assets by businesses. Thus, in 1878, a special provision allowing deduction with respect to 
deprecation or “wear and tear” was introduced694 in order to achieve fiscal neutrality.
Only in 1945 was a positive tax incentive added to the tax legislation. A first year allowance 
equal to one fifth of the expenditure made with respect to acquisition of a plant or machinery 
for the purposes of a trade coupled with an annual allowance in subsequent years equal to 
five-fourths of the amount that would be allowed as “wear and tear” were allowed as 
depreciation. The incentive was in the form of the additional 25% given over the appropriate 
commercial amount. This regime remained unchanged until the legislation of the Finance 
Act 1971. That year, a 100% first year writing-down allowance was introduced and the link 
with the appropriate commercial amount of the “wear and tear” was broken.695
In most of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the UK leasing industry saw a rapid 
boom, especially in the area of export leasing out of the UK, mostly due to the availability of 
generous first year capital allowances for expenditure on plant and machinery.696 The 
perceived problem with this situation was that non-residents those who effectively enjoyed 
it, an outcome that was incompatible with the rationale behind the introduction of generous 
capital allowances in the first place.
692 While an in-depth analysis o f the UK treatment o f  outbound and inbound cross-border leasing is outside the 
scope o f this work, a brief overview o f the applicable provisions can shed some light on the approach taken in the 
UK with respect to the taxation o f cross-border leasing and its rationale and can assist us in illustrating our point.
693 BMBF v. Mawson [2003] EWCA CIV 1560 (8) referring to Income Tax Act 1842 s. 159 now Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act s.74 and s.817.
694 Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1878, s. 12.
695 BMBF v. Mawson [2003] EWCA CIV 1560 (8).
696 See generally, Lindencrona & Tolstoy (1990) at 590.
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As a result, “[FJrequently, lessees would be situated in the United States and obtain tax 
depreciation allowances there as well as the indirect United Kingdom benefits. United 
Kingdom exchange control restrictions provided a check on export leasing: the Bank o f 
England might refuse consent for transactions unless allowances were waived or deferred. A 
prompt legislative response was therefore requiredfollowing the lifting o f exchange controls 
in 1979. ”697
This was done in Finance Act 1982. The UK tax treatment of outbound cross-border leasing 
has changed dramatically with the introduction of what is now Sections 109 and 110 CAA 
2001 that were originally introduced in FA 1982.698
This legislation was intended to limit the fiscal incentive otherwise granted by the capital 
allowances in situations where it was thought to be too generous. The limitation is designed 
either to achieve a situation of fiscal neutrality with respect to some leases or to create fiscal 
discouragement in the case of other leases.
Prior to the introduction of the legislation, it was possible for a UK lessor to engage in a 
leasing transaction with a non-UK resident lessee and to enjoy the benefit of capital 
allowances in the UK while the asset was used in a foreign country by a foreign end-user. 
The Government felt that it was basically financing the costs of acquisition of non-UK 
purchasers who chose to acquire the property by way of a lease with a UK lessor and that a 
certain measure has to be adopted to prevent this loss of revenue.699700
As a result, the new legislation substantially reduces and even eliminates the amount of 
capital allowance available for UK lessors when the property leased is used by a non-UK 
lessee outside the UK. The legislation that started with FA 1982 and culminated in the two 
Finance Acts of 1997701, removed almost completely, the benefits of export leasing.
If the legislation applies with respect to a transaction, the percentage of writing down 
allowance per year is reduced to 10% or even nil, so that it is sufficient to shelter rental
697 Clayson (2002) at 11-3.
698 Prentice (1990) at 590-591.
699 Clayson (2002) at 11-19 ("The intention behind the legislation was .... 'not to allow it to milk the Revenue ’. 
Nonetheless, few  United Kingdom -  to -foreign  leases relying upon United Kingdom capital allowances have 
been written since 1982. ”).
700 See also Nash (2002) at 418.
701 Finance Act 1997, Finance Act (no. 2) 1997.
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income from the lease, if at all, but does not result in a loss. The legislation has a few 
exceptions, mainly to leasing of specific types of equipment and to certain short-term leases.
“Overseas leasing does not include situations where the leasing is 'short-term leasing ’ or 
where a ship, aircraft or transport container is leased and used fo r a 'qualifying purpose ’ by 
virtue only o f the extension for certain such assets. In these circumstances, the special rules 
do not apply and the usual pooling arrangements and 25 per cent writing-down allowances 
apply instead whilst the claim fo r the normal allowance (or the relevant company return) 
must be accompanied by a certificate setting out the description o f such ‘permitted leasing’, 
the identity o f the lessee and the assets in point. ”702
The general allowance is 25% per year and it is provided to the legal owner of the 
property.703 If s. 109 applies, the allowance is restricted to 10%. The rationale behind this 
limitation was to allow sheltering of the rental income received from the lease but not to 
allow sheltering of any other income not related to the lease.704 For this section to apply two 
conditions have to be satisfied. First, the plant or machinery has to be, at any time during the 
designated period,705 used for overseas leasing which is not a protected leasing. Second, the 
expenditure is not long-life asset expenditure. Plant or machinery is regarded as used for 
overseas leasing if it is used for the purpose of being leased to a person who is not a resident 
in the UK and does not use the plant or machinery exclusively for the purpose of earning 
profits chargeable to UK tax. In other words, it covers all “export leasing”. A lease is a 
“protected leasing” and thus outside the scope of s 109 if it qualifies as a short leasing 
(within the scope of s 121) or if it is a lease of a ship, aircraft or a container and it is made 
for a qualifying purpose according to s 123 (ships and aircrafts) or to s. 124 (transport 
containers).706
If s. 110 applies, the allowance is reduced to zero and is disallowed completely with respect 
to the plant or machinery that is leased in the lease that is subject to the application of this 
provision. For s 110 to apply, four cumulative conditions have to be satisfied. First, the 
expenditure has to be incurred on the provision of plant or machinery for leasing. Second, 
the plant or machinery has to be used, at any time during the designated period, for overseas
702 British Tax Library, para. 651-175 -  Assets leased outside the UK.
703 Clayson (2002) at 11 -13 -11 -14  (the ownership requirement is in CAA 2001 s.l 1(4)).
704 Clayson (2002) at 11-20.
705 “Designated period” is defined as the shorter o f 10 years period beginning with the date on which the plant or 
machinery was first brought into use and the date on which the person who incurred the expenditure ceases to 
own the plant or machinery (CAA 2001 s. 106(1), (2)).
706 CAA 2001 s 105(5); British Tax Library, para. 651-175 -  Assets leased outside the UK.
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leasing.707 Third, the plant or machinery has to be used for a purpose that is not a qualifying 
purpose.708 Fourth, the lease satisfies one of the conditions listed in the list that is included in
s. no.709
The main difference between the two categories lays in the nature of the lease. S. 109 
generally applies where the lease is not a finance lease and therefore a writing-down 
allowance of 10% would usually achieve the goal of fiscal neutrality, allowing the lessor to 
write off his expenditure over a period of approximately 15 years during which he is 
expected to receive a matching income which will be taxable in his hands.
S. 110, on the other hand, applies to finance leases where the nature of the lease violates the 
fiscal neutrality because the rental stream will not result in a taxable income in the hands of 
the lessor. As a result, to avoid the possibility that capital allowances are allowed although 
the rental income is not taxed in the hands of the lessor, s. 110 denies the entitlement for 
these allowances altogether.710
“The withdrawal o f writing-down allowances altogether is a fiscal disincentive, calculated 
to discourage the owner from incurring the expenditure in the provision o f the machinery or 
plant fo r  leasing to a non-resident on the terms o f a finance lease; or fo r leasing on the 
terms o f a finance lease to a lessee who is not a non-resident i f  at any time during the 
requisite period, the plant or machinery may be used fo r the purpose o f being leased (by 
that, or a subsequent, lessee) to a non-resident But, in a single lease case, that 
discouragement is removed i f  the machinery or plant is to be used by the non-resident lessee 
fo r  a qualifying purpose... . that is to say if  he is to use the machinery or plant for the 
purposes o f a trade, otherwise than for leasing, in circumstances in which, i f  he had bought 
the machinery or plant himself (instead o f leasing it) he could have claimed a first-year
711allowance or treated his expenditure as qualifying expenditure. ”
707 These two requirements are also applicable with respect to s. 109 discussed above.
708 A “qualifying purpose” as defined by s 105(6) as including any activity included in s 15(1) even if the profits 
or gains from such activity are not chargeable to tax. In addition, ss. 121 and 122 provides for certain types o f  
short-term leases that are regarded as made for a “qualifying purpose”, ss. 123 and 124 provide the same for 
certain leases o f ships, aircrafts and containers and s. 125 for other types o f leases which can be regarded as made 
for a qualifying purpose.
709 CAA 2001, s 110(l)(d). Among the conditions: (1) the lease is for a period o f more than 13 years, (2) the lease 
(or a separate document) make it possible, through an extension or a new lease, to extend the overall period o f the 
lease to be more than 13 years, and (3) there is a period o f more than one year between the dates o f  the making o f  
two consecutive payments under the lease.
710 [2003] EWCA CIV 1560 (18).
711 [2003] EWCA CIV 1560 (19).
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Outside the scope of these limitations are leases of ships, aircrafts, and transport containers 
as well as certain short-term leases, all of which are leases that Parliament decided should be 
eligible for the full capital allowances although the equipment is outside the UK.712
In effect, the legislation reduced almost completely the attractiveness of the UK as a location 
for lessors for outbound leasing713 and thus the attractiveness of the UK for outbound 
double-dip leasing transactions. It should be noted that the legislation was not designed to 
target outbound double-dip leasing specifically but was wider in its scope and sought to 
cover all but a limited number of outbound leasing transactions.
“Section 42 has effectively cut o ff the UK leasing industry from an important market o f  
offering lease finance to non-UK lessees and the decision in No. 24 case714 has not helped 
that position. Even i f  the lessors are able to structure their leasing agreements to comply 
with overseas leasing rules (which is unlikely), they are still likely to find  that they are 
unable to access the domestic leasing market to finance a lease to a non-UK lessee.” 715
At the comparative level, it is interesting to note that many European countries do not have 
comparative rules that distinguish between the treatment of outbound leases and the 
treatment of domestic leases.716 This point is in line with EU tax requirements and shall be 
further developed below.717
With respect to the UK legislation, it is questionable whether these measures are able to 
survive an EC tax challenge as it distinguishes between non-resident and resident lessees in 
the availability of capital allowances. The legislation refers to the place of use of the leased 
asset for determining the extent of the application of s. 109 and 110 (discussed above) and it 
is likely that such legislation would be regarded as incompatible with the provisions of the 
EC Treaty.718
“The reason why sections 109 and 110 might be considered illegal as a matter o f EC law is 
that their effect is, prima facie, to discriminate against non-UK lessees. Several principles o f  
EC law may be applicable here, including freedom o f establishment... .freedom to provide
712 CAA 2001, ss. 121, 123, 124.
713 Ibid. See also Nash (2002) at p. 418 (“although in recent years some leases to non-residents have been written 
which y ie ld  an economic return to the lessor even where the lessor’s allowances have been restricted to 10%’’).
714 BMBF (No. 24) v. IRC. The reference is to the High Court decision, which was later affirmed, to a large 
extent by the Court o f Appeal.
715 Nash & Gonen (2003) at 120.
7,6 Clayson (2002) at p. 11-19.
717 See pp. 242-245 below. This approach is also reflected in the Inland Revenue 2003 reform proposal that is 
discussed above (pp. 186-188).
718 See also, Clayson (2002) at 11-20.
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services andfree movement o f capital The Treaty, may therefore, be infringed i f  sections
109 and 110 create a disadvantageous pricing environment either from the perspective o f a 
lessee purchasing leasing services or from the perspective o f the lessor selling on a cross-
border basis Moreover, there are some recent cases, which cast doubt on the potential
justifications fo r  any such discrimination. ”719
In this respect it is interesting to note two recent decisions of the ECJ, Lankhorst-Hohorst 
and Bosal Holding. In both decisions, the ECJ held that the erosion of the tax base is not a 
valid reason for justifying a legislation that is incompatible with the EC Treaty. In both 
cases, anti-planning legislation720 was held to be incompatible with the EC Treaty as it 
treated residents and non-residents differently. An argument that the legislation was needed 
to prevent the erosion of the tax base of the MS involved was not accepted as a valid 
justification of public policy that would allow the acceptance of an incompatible measure. 
Moreover, in Eurowings, the ECJ rejected an attempt on part of a MS to impose 
discriminatory measures on a taxpayers based on the difference in treatment of the 
transaction, a cross-border lease, in the other country. This case is of particular importance as 
it dealt with cross-border leasing and with situation whereby a certain type of cross-border 
lease is more advantageous than a domestic lease due to the tax treatment in the foreign 
country (a lower rate of tax) which makes the tax treatment of the entire transaction more 
beneficial than the tax treatment of a domestic transaction.721
The situation is a bit different with respect to inbound cross-border leasing. The availability 
of capital allowances to the users under a hire purchase agreement makes it possible to 
structure a transaction in way that would allow both the lessor and the lessee (user) to enjoy 
capital allowance or deprecation with respect to the same equipment.
“In the international leasing arena, this regime provides, from the United Kingdom 
perspective, what are perhaps the most important tax planning opportunities. In particular, 
it is possible to structure a transaction in such a way that deprecation tax allowances are 
taken both in the United Kingdom and an overseas jurisdiction: actual ownership is relied 
upon overseas and deemed ownership in the United Kingdom (hence the expression ‘double 
dip j. Thus a United Kingdom user o f equipment, even one in a fu ll taxpaying position, can
719 Ibid.
720 Thin-capitalization legislation and interest allocation legislation, respectively.
721 See generally also, Clayson (2002) at 11-20. This pressure led the Inland Revenue to introduce a reform 
proposal to the taxation o f leasing transactions above (pp. 186-188).
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improve its cost o f funds by means o f sharing in the tax allowance available in more than 
one comtry. ”722
There appear to be no specific measures to prevent or restrict a person regarded as the tax 
owner of the equipment for UK tax purposes from claiming depreciation allowances with 
respect to equipment that is leased within the UK or that is within the charge to Corporation 
Tax in the UK.
“While the UK is rarely used for outbound leases, because o f the restriction o f WDAs to 
10% under Chapter 10 o f Part 2 o f CAA 2001... ., UK lessees can benefit from  double-dip 
leases by acquiring equipment on hire purchase terms from lessors in certain overseas 
territories or by using certain other structures.
In structuring such transactions there is often a conflict between the requirements to satisfy 
the economic ownership requirement in one jurisdiction and the requirement for the UK 
lessee to have a nominal purchase option at the end o f the lease. ”723
In the case of a lessee, in order for the lessee to be able to claim the capital allowances, the 
lessee would have to establish that he is indeed the tax owner or deemed tax owner, thus 
eligible to claim the allowances. In these situations, the restrictions discussed above in the 
context of hire purchase would apply.
From a UK country perspective, this attitude appears to be quite logical as it corresponds 
with the rationale behind the grant of the benefit in the first place, i.e. to encourage 
acquisition of assets that are being used in the UK.
722 Clayson (2002) at 11-2.
723 Nash (2002) at 423.
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US - Cross-border Leasing - Specific Measures724
At the cross-border level, a distinction has to be drawn between the treatment of outbound 
cross-border leasing transactions and the treatment of inbound cross-border leasing 
transactions.
On the outbound side, there appears to be a tension between competitiveness of US lessors 
on one hand and the desire to preserve revenues and prevent exportation of tax benefits to 
foreign taxpayers on the other hand. Another element that should be included in the analysis 
is the “cat and mouse” game between the taxpayers on one hand and the government on the 
other. As a result, a complex set of rules was created, not always with a clear intention 
behind it. These rules apply whenever a US lessor is engaging in a cross-border lease with a 
non-US lessee.
"Cross-border leasing structures exist in a very dynamic market U.S. investors and their 
advisors are constantly modifying and improving these techniques, and devising new ones. 
At the same time, the IRS, the Treasury Department and Congress continue to modify the 
laws, regulations and other authorities governing these transactions. These activities at time 
result in further limitations on existing structures and at times (sometimes the same times) 
provide new opportunities for structuring outbound leases. ”725
Prima facie, it appears that the US, like the UK, was not willing to allow the export of tax 
benefits to non-residents, thus resulting in revenue loss. At the same time, there were certain 
transactions in which the leasing portion was regarded as the tool rather than the end result. 
As a result two apparently contradicting pieces of legislation were adopted. On one hand, the 
US adopted rules that extended the period over which the depreciation deductions must be 
taken with respect to leasing with non-US residents lessees and limited the amount of 
depreciation that can be claimed each year. The intended result was to make outbound cross- 
border leasing not beneficial economically.
On the other hand, US lessors were able to make use of the US export incentives to make the 
cross-border leasing transactions more attractive. These incentives only apply in limited 
circumstances and the US lessors were required to comply with the requirements of the 
applicable legislation to enjoy its benefits. This legislation, first Domestic International Sales 
Corporation legislation (DISC), then the Foreign Sales Corporation legislation (FSC) and
724 For a comprehensive analysis o f these rules, see generally, Shrank & Gough (2003) chapter 25.
725 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-14.
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later the Extraterritorial Income (ETI) legislation applied usually when the leased asset was 
manufactured in the US.
By its terms, the application of either FSC or ETI resulted in the exclusion of a certain part 
of the US lessor’s income from tax in the US, thus making it more beneficial to engage in 
outbound leasing transactions and enabled the lessor to pass some of the benefits to the 
lessee, the user of the equipment, thus encouraging export of US equipment.
A good starting point for our discussion is 1984, a year in which two important changes were 
made to the tax Code. The first change introduced the export incentive in the form of the 
FSC legislation that was drafted wide enough to apply to export leasing by US 
manufacturers. The FSC replaced the DISC legislation which was held illegal by the WTO. 
The second change was the introduction of the Pickle Regulations that were meant to deny 
the benefits of accelerated depreciation benefits from lessors in export leasing.726
The apparent rationale behind the second legislation was to make leasing to tax exempt 
entities unattractive. This was done by extending the period with respect to which 
depreciation deductions are calculated on one hand and by limiting the rate of the 
depreciation deductions on the other hand (moving from an accelerated depreciation system 
to an alternative straight-line depreciation method).
“Almost since the inception o f the incentive depreciation systems -  beginning with ADR in 
1971 and continuing through ACRS in 1981 and into MACRS in 1986 -  property used 
predominantly outside the U.S. has been ineligible fo r  the maximum incentive provided by 
the then-current depreciation regime. Under MACRS, such property (along with “tax- 
exempt-bond-financed-property” and certain property imported from countries maintaining 
discriminatory trade barriers against the U.S.) must be depreciated under the “alternative 
depreciation system ” (ADS) provided by s. 168 (g) o f the Code.”727
Park, however, argues that the rationale behind the legislation in 1984 was not to discourage 
export leasing but rather domestic leasing with tax-exempt entities (such as, government and 
local governments). Thus, “Congress was primarily concerned with limiting lessors ’ use o f  
accelerated depreciation in leases involving domestic tax-exempt leases. Congress did not
726 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-8.
121 Ibid, at 25-15.
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explicitly address the question o f whether foreign lessees in FSC leases should be excluded 
from  section 168(g). ”728
According to Park, the legislation should be amended so it does not apply with respect to 
export leasing transactions that qualify under the FSC (or ETI) legislation. He bases his 
arguments on the distinction between domestic leasing transactions with tax-exempt entities 
and export leasing transaction between US manufacturers and foreign lessees of US made 
products. Whereas the former reduced the US revenue base, the latter has the advantages of 
promoting US goods and products abroad, making them more competitive vis-a-vis 
comparable products from other countries and supporting the US manufacturing industry. In 
addition, the US Congress did not intend to limit the benefits of export leasing by US 
manufacturers and this is evidenced in the legislative history.729
Although according to the ADS the property was only eligible to the less beneficial straight- 
line method of depreciation and although the recovery period taken into account under the 
ADS was the longer period of the property’s “class-life” (as opposed to the shortened 
depreciable lives applicable to most MACRS), it was still possible to obtain a beneficial 
lease transaction by applying the FSC rules and some other measures.730
These techniques were successful in dealing with the provisions of the original legislation 
and regulations but not for long. New regulations that were introduced in 1995 and finalized 
in 1996 included the term of the replacement lease transaction within the term that has to be 
taken into account for determining the “lease term” according to the Pickle Regulations. In 
effect, the new regulations took out the benefit in using replacement leasing transactions.
These regulations were criticized as being contrary to the object and purpose of the 
legislation that was first introduced in 1984.731 As discussed above, the legislation was 
targeted primarily at domestic leases with tax-exempt entities and not at export leasing to
728 Park (1996) at 304-305.
729 Ibid.
730 Shrank & Gough (2003) at 25-15. Post-1984 and Pre-1996 transactions had four main advantages that helped 
them remain economically viable. First, due to the application o f FSC regime, 30% o f the income was exempt 
from tax at the hands o f the lessor. The lease was made by using a FSC which was only subject to tax with 
respect to 70% o f its gross income. In addition, dividends paid by the FSC to its US parent company were not 
subject to further tax. Second, the leased property was held on a bust held by the US parent company o f  the FSC. 
As a result, the US parent company was able to claim depreciation deduction against its taxable income. Third, to 
remove part o f the effect o f the 1984 legislation, the parties use a replacement lease technique that was meant to 
accelerate the pace o f the depreciation deductions that as a result o f the then new s. 168(g) was calculated on a 
straight-line basis. At that time, the term o f the replacement lease was not included in calculating the depreciation 
and the taxpayers were able to shorten the period and increase the pace o f the depreciation. Fourth, the US parent 
usually financed its investment in the FSC with a third party loan and was able to claim depreciation deductions 
with respect to that loan (see generally, Park (1996) at 302).
731 Park (1996).
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foreign lessees. The reason export leasing transactions were included in the legislation was 
“to provide equal treatment o f similar transactions, with the reservation that a favorable tax 
treatment o f U.S. equipment leased to foreign lessees may be effective in “encouraging the 
foreign use o f American-made products”732
Thus, adopting regulations that would reduce the benefits of export leasing transactions 
would be to apply § 168(g) in a manner that was not explicitly set out in the statute or its 
legislative history.733
Unlike the pre-1984 situation, in 1995 only US manufactured assets were involved in export 
leasing. Otherwise, these leasing transactions would not qualify for the FSC benefits. 
Adopting legislation that would make the leasing less beneficial, it was argued, would result 
in damaging the competitiveness of US manufacturers abroad.734 As a result of the 
regulations, US manufacturers would no longer be able to offer US products in relatively low 
price due to the tax incentives available through leasing.
Today, with the requirement to repeal ETI, export leasing becomes even less attractive.
Inbound cross-border leasing transactions are subject to similar requirements as outbound 
cross-border leasing transactions necessary for the establishment of a different 
characterization in the US and in the foreign jurisdiction. However, unlike outbound or 
export leasing transactions, inbound leasing transactions are not subject to the application of 
the Pickle Regulations (or other similar provisions) that might restrict or defer the 
availability of the depreciation deductions. At the same time, these leasing transactions 
cannot benefit from the application of the ETI legislation (or its successors). In addition, 
where the transaction involves more than one tier, it is possible that the anti-conduit 
regulations may apply.
Recently, following the discussion on corporate tax shelters and as part of Temporary 
Regulations 1.601 l-4T(b)(3)(i)(E), it is now necessary for taxpayers engaged in transactions 
which adopt an inconsistent tax treatment in the US and in the foreign tax jurisdiction to 
report this inconsistent treatment as part of the report of the transaction.
733 Park (1996) at 315.
734 Ibid  at 316-317.
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Summary
Different systems grant depreciation benefits to certain taxpayers as a method for 
encouraging investment and acquisition of capital assets to be used in business. In most 
countries, the depreciation deductions (or their equivalent) are structured in a way that is 
more favorable than the true economic depreciation of the asset acquired. In that way, 
taxpayers entitled to the benefit receive their deductions earlier than they would be entitled 
to under economic depreciation.
The entitlement of the depreciation deductions is based on the satisfaction of a certain 
criteria by the taxpayer claiming the benefit. In most cases, it is an ownership requirement 
whereby the taxpayer is asked to qualify as the owner of the property. In each jurisdiction the 
test is applied in a different way. Some jurisdictions, like the US for example, favor the 
economic substance approach and will follow it subject to certain restrictions on the way 
taxpayers may assert the use of the substance over the form. Other systems, like the UK for 
example, favor a more legalistic approach and will tend to treat the legal owner of the 
property as the true owner of the property. Yet other jurisdictions may favor an approach that 
follows the accounting principles and grant the benefits to the owner of the property based 
on an accounting based determination. The UK has announced its intention to adopt this 
approach instead of its existing legalistic approach.
In all these situations, the treatment of the other party to the transaction in her own country is 
irrelevant for the determination.
Given this approach, it appears that the cross-border leasing where both parties are entitled to 
claim depreciation deductions does not necessarily stand against the rationale behind the 
grant of the deductions in the first place. First, the grant of the depreciation deductions is not 
dependant on the treatment of the taxpayer or its counter-party in another jurisdiction. In the 
US, for example, West has commented that “it is not an explicit condition or implicit 
premise o f the U.S. depreciation rules that the same property not be depreciated by another 
taxpayer under the laws o f some other country. Therefore, the United States has no 
legitimate tax policy objection to a double dip lease based on the fact that foreign law allows 
depreciation deductions based on legal principles inconsistent with those o f U.S. /aw.”735
Moreover, as it can be seen in some jurisdictions, there are certain leasing transactions to 
which the legislator did not wish to grant depreciation deductions. For example, some types
735 West (1996).
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of export leasing. In these situations, the legislator has acted explicitly to deny or limit the 
availability of the depreciation benefits regardless of whether these benefits are available in 
the other jurisdiction.
Second, the grant of the depreciation benefits suits the general purpose of the deprecation 
legislation, to encourage the acquisition of capital assets by taxpayers for the use in their 
business. As Ring notes, the real benefit in double dip leasing is not necessarily the second 
entitlement for deductions that is granted to the counter-party but the pace in which this 
second set of deductions may be claimed.736 Nonetheless, even though the entitlement to an 
accelerated second set of deductions is in line with the general concept underlying the 
legislation it may nevertheless be contrary to the specific scheme adopted by the legislator. 
For example, if we assume that in enacting the depreciation legislation, the legislator had in 
mind an internal structure whereby one type of asset is entitled to be depreciated over 10 
years whereas another type of asset is entitled to be fully depreciated over 20 years, allowing 
some assets that may gain from double-dip leasing to benefit from the favorable treatment in 
both jurisdictions has the potential of disturbing the internal structure of the depreciation 
scheme the legislator had in mind when enacting the legislation and may lead to equity and 
efficiency distortions.
There is, however, no explicit support for this approach to the legislation. Moreover, existing 
practice, especially in the US, does not seem to support this approach. In a recent revenue 
ruling that is also mentioned above,737 the IRS did not oppose to the existence of the double­
dip leasing per se and the above-mentioned internal structure argument was not raised. In 
practice, then, the correct approach should be the approach taken by West, mainly on the 
basis that the entitlement to the depreciation benefits is determined by each jurisdiction 
based on an independent inquiry made in that jurisdiction according to its domestic 
principles and without reliance, implicit or explicit, on possible determination by other 
jurisdictions.
At this stage, it is necessary to determine whether there are valid policy reasons that justify 
the change of this policy. At this stage, the discussion is divided into discussion of outbound 
transactions and discussion of inbound transactions as policy considerations may vary from 
one type to the other.
736 Ring (2003).
737 See p. 196 above.
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Chapter 8 - Discussion
Looking at the limited existing literature on ITA, we can identify several approaches that 
were taken. The starting point is probably with Rosenbloom’s starting argument that in the 
absence of an international tax system, there is arguably no objection to ITA which is the 
natural result of the differences between the tax systems, differences that result, in many 
situations, from a different approach to taxation of certain transactions.
One of the comments made by Rosenbloom in his lecture was that ITA is not worse than 
other existing opportunities that exist and that are not challenged. If this is so, why should 
ITA be discriminated against?738
Apart from challenging the existence of a problem, Rosenbloom also challenged the 
feasibility of a solution, should ITA be recognized as a problem worth restraining.739 
Avi-Yonah’s comment on Rosenbloom’s lecture once again focuses on ITA as a unified 
phenomenon and arguing that ITA should be objected to based on three leading principles, 
efficiency, equity and revenue loss.740
Shaviro recognizes that there is no need for harmonization to deny ITA and that each ITA 
situation should be examined based on its own merit thus rejecting the “all or nothing” 
approach with respect to ITA.741 He also recognizes the difference in approach between 
intended subsidies as he refers to it and general rules of classification. The former, like for 
example, depreciation deductions in leasing, are measures that are usually adopted following 
an intentional policy and a reaction on the part of a foreign country to deny such benefits 
might deliberately reverse another country’s express economic policies exposing the US to a 
possible retaliation from that other country.742
Thus, unilateral action should be limited to situations which are win-win situations where the 
intervention raises both the national and international efficiency. Intervention is not 
warranted when it would make bad policy to intervene. This, however, is a question to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.743
738 Rosenbloom (1999-2000).
™ Ibid.
740 Avi-Yonah (1999-2000) at 171.
741 See also Edgar (2003).
742 Shaviro (2002) at 326.
743 Ibid  at 326.
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His focus is on the more economic side on the discussion, on situations that he refers to as 
representing “money on the table”. While recognizing the possible political constraints that 
might limit the possibility to act, Shaviro is of the opinion that such constraints should not 
prevent an action where an action is warranted.744
Shaviro’s important contribution is recognizing that tax policy decisions are not made in 
isolation and that there is a relation between US policy decisions and foreign countries’ 
policy decisions, each affecting the other.745 Thus, if the US chooses to react unilaterally, it 
should also take into account the possibility of other countries’ reaction to the US initial 
reaction and whether by reacting in a particular way we are not contradicting other countries’ 
policies.746
Shaviro supports a multilateral reaction to eliminate ITA, which would lead to a better 
division of the revenues collected from the denial of ITA among the different countries.747 
The important point Shaviro wishes to put across is the importance of looking beyond the 
point that other countries’ tax laws are not the business of the US, as such laws clearly have 
an impact on the US.748
Ring proposes applying a balancing test to evaluate the competing different policies to 
decide in any given case whether intervention to prevent ITA is warranted and how such 
intervention should take place. The result achieved would probably be a compromise, neither 
full acceptable of ITA or lull rejection of ITA.749
The result of applying this test may vary as policy goals or other features of the system 
change. As such, it is not a static test. Ring recognizes that ascertaining the policy goals of a 
country is an important step and might not be a straightforward process with one possible 
solution because sometimes tax policy is uncertain or undergoing an existing debate.750
According to Ring, the application of the test should provide a comprehensive consideration 
of ITA and to the creation of a sophisticated mechanism to fully understand the ITA problem 
and to craft the responses to it.751 She recognizes the existence of two parallel paths, the 
national perspective and the international perspective and realizes that the outcome of
744 Ibid at 326-327.
745 See also Graetz (2001) above.
746 Shaviro (2003) at 326. This observation was famously articulated by Kingson (Kingson (1981)).
747 Shaviro (2003).
748 Ibid, at 329.
749 Ring (2003) at 83-84.
150 Ibid at 161.
751 Ibid  at 84.
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applying the balancing test may differ according to the path chosen, identifies the possible 
inconsistencies and achieves an outcome that would respond adequately to the competing 
goals of the national tax system as well as the “international tax system.”
Ring recognizes that a national perspective emphasizes competition whereas an international 
perspective emphasizes cooperation and concludes that at the end neither approach supports 
national or international interests because “neither nationalism nor globalization constitute a 
defensible, definable goal ”752 The real question is whose interest is to be taken into account 
in making tax policy decisions and what outcome serves that interest. In tax matters, Ring 
concludes that countries are the leading players.753
In her discussion, Ring focuses on only six different policies in the consideration of the ITA 
question. These are: efficiency, equity, political accountability, revenue effects, 
administrability, sovereignty and diversity.754 For that purpose, equity includes both the 
tension between labor and capital that is discussed above755 and the perception of tax abuse 
while political accountability refers to a situation whereby voters believe a certain tax regime 
is enacted but due to the lack of transparency in the tax rules are unable to identify that the 
effective tax regime is quite different to other taxpayers.756
According to Ring, a decision on part of countries not to intervene would be fairly 
unambiguous and would allow considerations of sovereignty, administrability and diversity 
to overcome considerations of equity and efficiency. A better way, according to Ring, would 
be to develop a method of evaluating the competing claims.757 She takes the position that 
even those who oppose intervention do not disagree with the violation of efficiency and 
equity. Thus, the conflict takes place over the evaluation of the cost o f intervention, a cost 
that can be divided into two broad categories, administrability and the risk to the systematic 
values of sovereignty and diversity.758
Ring’s analysis is beneficial because it is based on the premise that there are competing 
policy considerations that should be balanced and that the decision in made for each type of 
ITA separately. Thus, a decision with respect to ITA resulting from cross-border leasing 
might be different from a decision with respect to ITA resulting from HFIs. In addition, Ring
752 Ring (2003) at 84-85.
753 Ibid, at 85.
754 Ibid, at 135.
755 See pp. 32-34 above.
756 Ring (2003) at 123.
757 Ibid, at 134.
758 Ibid, at 124-125.
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recognizes the tension between national and international efficiency and the possibility for 
different outcomes.
Unfortunately, she does not include in her discussion the possible application of other 
considerations, for example political considerations, foreign policy considerations, and 
competitiveness, considerations that can explain some of the policy decisions taken by 
countries. Furthermore, she does not relate to the domestic treatment of cross-border 
transactions in general quite apart from ITA. In addition, she appears to presuppose that ITA 
is bad and that the only question to be asked is whether intervention is warranted or not.
Edgar, looking at ITA alongside tax competition,759 suggests focusing on the character of 
substitutability of taxing jurisdictions and transactional forms as providing a defensible basis 
for a limited range of ITA that is an appropriate target for policy response.
He analyzes existing literature on ITA and proposes three reasons why ITA should be 
responded to, whether or not there is a single tax principle or an international tax regime. 
First, those supporting benign treatment ITA assume that domestic classification decisions 
have some sort of an independent normative significance, although this does not exists in 
practice and many of the pervasive boundaries in tax law consist of a high degree of 
arbitrariness. This lack of normative content lead to arbitrary decisions in line drawing which 
are also very much the response to tax avoidance transactions involving situations of perfect 
or nearly perfect substitutability.
Second, even in the existence of some normative content for classification decisions, there is 
an assumption that the same decisions made in the domestic context should apply also in the 
cross-border context. According to Edgar, it is not clear whether decisions made in the 
domestic context should also apply in the cross-border context with respect to division of the 
tax base.
Third, supporters of benign characterization of ITA ignore the policy issues presented by 
ITA as a subset of the broader category of tax avoidance. ITA, according to Edgar, has the 
same policy stakes as domestic tax avoidance and although there are distinctions between the 
two, none of these distinctions has any important policy relevance. The central feature in 
both is the existence of lower-tax substitutes for transactions that would otherwise be subject 
to higher taxation. These transactions involve transaction costs, revenue loss and possible
759 Edgar (2003).
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efficiency loss that varies depending on the degree of substitutability of the low-tax 
transaction.
Thus, cases of perfect or nearly perfect substitutability present the clearest case for response 
to ITA, the challenge being where to draw the line in case of nearly perfect substitutability 
and how to identify those imperfect substitutes that should be included within the group of 
transactions to which a policy response is desired.
Examining both HFI and cross-border leasing, he focuses on those situations where there is 
perfect or near perfect substitutability between a transaction that is subject to high tax burden 
and one that is subject to lower tax burden. Edgar recognizes two types of substitutability, 
transaction substitution and jurisdiction substitution. The common feature of both types is 
that ITA enables taxpayers to achieve an overall better tax treatment while maintaining all or 
almost all of the non-tax features of the original transaction. In the former this is achieved by 
engaging in a transaction that is structured differently, for example, HFIs while in the latter 
the result is achieved through structuring the same transaction with an alternative 
jurisdiction, for example, a cross-border leasing with a lessor in country X as opposed to a 
lessor in country Y which preserves the non-tax features while achieving better tax 
treatment, the double-dip.
He distinguishes between the two cases and proposes a different approach to each type. 
Edgar regards cross-border leasing (and in particular the depreciation deductions element) as 
a form of tax expenditure, even though the determination of the entitlement to the 
expenditure may involve an element of arbitrariness. HFIs, on the other hand, contain no 
element of tax expenditure and are purely an arbitrary decision of the tax system regarding 
the taxation of the instrument. For that reason, Edgar approaches the two types of ITA 
differently because tax expenditures, being a spending program through the tax system 
should be assessed on the basis of standard budgetary criteria as opposed to technical tax 
policy criteria.760 In other words, there is a clear policy objective to be achieved that is 
implemented through the use of technical rules. Thus, it appears that Edgar would regard 
ITA involving HFIs as being more objectible than ITA using cross-border leasing as long as 
the latter satisfies the underlying purpose of the expenditure.
I agree with Edgar’s distinction of the two types of ITA. In my approach, which is described 
below,761 I first address the specific rationale behind the specific tax provision that is the
760 Edgar (2003) at 164.
761 See p. 220 below.
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subject of the ITA and only then move to discuss the effects of ITA on the tax policy at the 
country level and to what extent ITA conforms with this policy. Thus, in analyzing ITA of 
HFIs, the first part is generally irrelevant due to the arbitrary and technical nature of the 
distinction. This cannot be said of ITA in cross-border leasing where it is important first to 
determine whether the depreciation granted and the additional benefit of ITA conform with 
the specific rationale behind the decision to grant depreciation deductions in the first place.
Examining the two case studies and the preceding discussion, it is possible to put forward the 
following points:
First, tax policy decisions are conducted at the country level with an outlook of maximizing 
both national and international welfare as long as there is no contradiction between the two. 
In general, if the inter-nation distribution is not a concern and the system is a competitive 
system, then following the self-interests of the participants should lead to Pareto-efficiency.
According to the first theorem of welfare economics, competition leads to Pareto-efficiency. 
This, however, does not tell us anything about the other values of the Pareto-efficient 
outcome. Whether or not this point of Pareto-efficiency is also desirable is a question of 
distribution and different countries may have different views on how this should take place.
ITA has the effect of altering the distribution at the international level by providing 
preference to certain types of activities, to certain types of transactions and to certain types 
of taxpayers over others. To that extent, countries may attempt to act according to whether 
they perceive the ITA as improving or deteriorating their position.
Even acting in its national interest a country would try to predict the reaction of other 
countries to its possible decisions and act accordingly. Awareness should exist, however, to 
the possible understanding by other countries on one country’s reaction to ITA. Some 
countries might perceive intervention as a signaling for cooperation while others might look 
at it as an aggressive act meant to secure revenues for the intervening country.762
The situation is less clear with respect to equity where it would be necessary to draw a line 
both to define the comparable taxpayer and to determine similar transactions and whether a 
given situation is similar enough to receive similar treatment.
762 Compare Shaviro (2002) with Kane (2004).
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For example, a cross-border leasing transaction, with respect to which ITA is denied. Thus, a 
double-dip is disallowed and the taxpayer is not able to claim depreciation deductions with 
respect to an equipment another taxpayer is able to claim depreciation for.
Given that the benefit in double-dip leasing is not the second set of deductions but rather the 
accelerated pace in which the other party is able to claim them as opposed to rental 
deductions,763 should a rule covering double-dip leasing also cover cross-border transactions 
where the other party is not able to claim deprecation but is able either to accelerate the 
rental deductions or to defer the income on the lease?
At the same time, as it is further mentioned below, other relevant considerations might 
influence the country’s ability to act. These include both domestic and international restraints 
on the ability to act.
Second, ITA is a question to be determined based on the specific case and not an “all or 
nothing” question. While there are some situations where ITA should be prevented, there are 
others where it should be allowed.
For example, cross-border leasing and HFIs represent two completely different situations 
that necessitate a different approach by the relevant countries. HFIs are classified based on 
an arbitrary decision that is based on a problematic distinction between debt and equity and 
which takes place in each country depending partly on the legal environment in that country 
and on the response to domestic tax planning which lead different countries to base the 
distinction on different criteria, not necessarily correlating with the criteria or the line- 
drawing used by other countries.
Cross-border leasing, or leasing in general, forms part of an expenditure program that is 
designed to grant certain benefits to taxpayers and to promote the acquisition of assets for 
use in business. Unlike the situation with HFIs, here there is a solid policy reason behind the 
decision to grant benefits to some taxpayers and not to others, and, while the decision in part 
may involve some element of arbitrariness, it requires us to ask whether the specific taxpayer 
or the specific transaction is included in the type of transactions that were meant to be 
covered by the expenditure legislation. The difference between countries can thus result from 
two main sources. One point is the difference in the nature of transactions or taxpayers that 
are meant to be covered by the expenditure. The other point is that the differences in the
763 Ring (2003) at 174.
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approach each country is adopting towards identifying the covered taxpayers or to analyzing 
the relevant transactions.
This point can also gives rise to an alternative analysis that also supports the general view 
that each case should be analyzed separately. Thus, for example, ITA with HFIs can be seen 
as less objected to ITA with cross-border leasing. Because ITA with HFIs operates with 
respect to the different arbitrary line drawing of the two countries involved it cannot lead to 
the frustration of a policy on this part of one or two of the countries involved, mainly 
because there is no such policy to be violated in the first place. Cross-border leasing, on the 
other hand, is based on depreciation deductions which follow, in each country, a separate 
expenditure policy that each of the countries involved sought to execute through its tax 
system. ITA has the effect of altering such policy by giving preference to one type of 
property over others in a way that, even if not clearly objected to by the country involved, 
cannot be said to represent its intent in formulating the expenditure policy in the first place. 
Thus, although ITA does not contradict the general idea behind the expenditure policy (for 
example, to promote investment in business assets), it may well violate the details of the 
policy and its approach to the treatment of specific assets (for example, by allowing one type 
of property that can be used for ITA more accelerated depreciation vis-a-vis other properties 
that cannot be used for ITA even though the intent of the expenditure policy was to treat all 
assets alike).
The answer which analysis should be preferred depends also on the analysis of the country’s 
international tax policy in general. I prefer the first approach above mainly because of the 
difficulty and uncertainty of ascertaining the true intent of the legislation. For that reason, I 
believe that the analysis should focus on whether there is a clear violation of the rationale 
(for example, by granting depreciation deductions to leases that are not meant to be covered 
by the depreciation scheme).764 Whether or not the existence of a rationale supports ITA 
depends on whether the ITA violates the purpose of the legislation and its rationale. The 
rationale should be used as a reason for intervention only to the extent that it is frustrated by 
the ITA.765
Third, although prima facie it appears that there are clear inconsistencies between the 
different systems, each taking a completely different approach (for example, one system 
using an economic substance approach while the other relies completely on the legal form), 
in practice these differences are much more subtle and restricted. For example, in the
764 See also Ring (2003) at 148.
765 Ibid.
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classification of a transaction as a true lease for tax purposes in the US, although the general 
theme is to look at the economic substance of the transaction to determine its appropriate 
classification, this general theme is restricted by three very important restrictions that may 
require the taxpayer to follow the form of the transaction despite a contradicting economic 
substance.
As a result, although, as it is further developed in the next point, the distinction in the 
treatment of the transaction in different countries is to a large extent the result of each system 
adopting its own approach which is developed in that country independently, responding to 
domestic challenges and not necessarily cross-border challenges, the differences that remain, 
are much more subtle and delicate and using them for the advantage of the taxpayer requires 
sophistication that is not readily available to all. As such, this may give rise to equity 
considerations.766
Fourth, despite the differences, both case studies represent situations where a distinction is 
drawn for tax purposes between a situation that is treated one way and another situation that 
is treated in another way. This distinction is to a large extent focused domestically and is 
based on the development of domestic law responding to domestic challenges and not 
necessarily cross-border challenges, where the legislation and the courts interpret and change 
existing law by responding to domestic tax planning.767
Thus, not only tax policy decisions that are made at the country level but line drawing 
determining the tax treatment of a particular transaction is to a large extent a practice 
influenced by domestic reaction to domestic tax planning which challenges the line drawing 
at the national level. As a result, the approach adopted by each country is a relatively isolated 
approach.
Moreover, when benefits are denied at the cross-border level, they are often denied because 
of the application of limitations that apply with respect to all cross-border transactions and 
not necessarily those involving ITA.
This leads us to the fifth point. In both countries the legislation includes specific provisions 
that are designed to limit the benefits to domestic transactions or to domestic taxpayers or 
that impose greater restrictions where the transaction in question is a cross-border 
transaction. To a large extent, these provisions apply to all cross-border transactions and not
766 See also Makhlouf (2001).
767 For example, MIPS in the US with respect to the classification o f instruments as either debt or equity.
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specifically to ITA, making the question of the treatment in the other country an irrelevant 
consideration.768 Not only that. A successful ITA will normally exist while satisfying the 
requirements of the special legislations adopted with respect to cross-border transactions.
For example, in the case of cross-border leasing, export leasing is in general perceived by 
both countries as undesirable and both countries try to limit the availability of the 
depreciation benefits to such transactions to make them less beneficial and persuade 
taxpayers not to engage in them. This is not an objection to ITA but rather an objection to a 
certain type of cross-border transaction whether or not the benefit is duplicated in the other 
country.
The question is what can be understood from this point. Assuming the existence of ITA is 
known (i.e. there is no information problem) there are at least three different explanations 
that can be put forward. First, that existing legislation does not cover ITA because of 
problems in the design of the existing provisions and their scope. Second, ITA is left 
untouched because there is a difficulty in dealing with ITA through legislation and a danger 
for discriminatory or circular provisions. Third, ITA is left untouched because despite the 
end result (the benefit) the transaction is within the scope of transactions that should be 
allowed to benefit from the provisions of the legislation. As such, there is no reason to 
object. In the context of cross-border leasing -  a transaction that should be entitled to receive 
the benefits of accelerated depreciation.
Sixth, as noted above, in determining tax policy, it is necessary to take into account the effect 
of these decisions on other countries as well as the effect tax policy decisions by other 
countries might have on the country in question. In particular, intervention in cases of ITA 
can be understood by other countries to be either an act of aggressiveness or a signaling 
against allowing ITA.769 In addition, outside the realm of efficiency, foreign relations 
represent an important element in policymaking and should also be taken into account when 
the ITA in question is the type referred to by Edgar as being “jurisdiction substitutability”.
Seventh, while attention should be given to the interaction between different countries and 
their policy decisions, similar attention should also be given domestically, both to the effect 
political decisions have on tax policy and to the feasibility of certain policy decisions given
768 There are, however, some exceptions to this general rule o f specific situations in which specific targeted 
legislation was applied to prevent ITA although there are also other situations where domestic practice accepted 
the existence o f ITA.
769 Compare Shaviro (2002) and Kane (2004).
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the political element and to the effect decision regarding international tax policy might have 
on the domestic market and the relations between different types of domestic taxpayers.
Eighth, the lack of knowledge regarding the existence of transactions that are treated 
inconsistently presents a practical challenge to tax authorities. This can explain some of the 
hostility that exists with respect to some types of ITA which involve inconsistent treatment 
that results from applying similar principles in these situations, unlike situations where the 
inconsistency results from the application of different principles, there is a danger that the 
inconsistency is the result of inconsistent presentation of the factual situations as opposed to 
inconsistency from the application of the law to the same set of facts in the two countries. 
This danger leads to certain hostility towards some types of inconsistencies, which is 
inapplicable to ITA as defined in this work and should not be confused with ITA.
Based on the above-mentioned discussion, I propose the following analysis to determine 
whether a country should intervene in an ITA situation.
The starting point in the analysis is with the premise that policy determination is conducted 
at the country level. At the same time we need to take into account both the effect such 
determination might have on other countries’ tax policy as well as the effect other countries’ 
tax policy might have on tax policy decision in our country.
The first step is to discover the rationale behind the benefit granted to the taxpayer / 
transaction in the transaction that is subject to the ITA and to determine whether ITA 
violates this rationale. For example, in the case of cross-border leasing, it is necessary to 
discover the rationale behind the grant of depreciation deductions and to determine whether 
and to what extent (if at all) the grant of deductions in another country through an ITA 
violates such rationale. In the absence of such rationale, like for example with respect to 
HFIs, the analysis starts with the second step.
The second step is to analyze, independent of ITA, the appropriate international tax policy 
for the country. For example, in the case of HFIs, it is necessary to determine what is the 
appropriate policy of the country with respect to inbound direct and portfolio foreign 
investment as well as with respect to direct and portfolio outbound investment. The main 
challenge at this stage is to be able to determine whether a perceived tax policy is indeed the 
appropriate tax policy for that country with respect to the relevant type of transaction.
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The last step is to apply the specific ITA and to determine whether intervention is warranted 
based on a determination in one of the above-mentioned steps. Even if an intervention is 
warranted based on the country’s tax policy choices, it is still necessary to determine that the 
intervention as well as the manner in which it is supposed to take place fits with the rationale 
that is discussed under the first step, with the overall structure of the legislation in that area 
and with the international tax policy of the country.
In this step, it is necessary to investigate the effect an intervention (or lack thereof) might 
have both internationally and domestically and to attempt to analyze possible responses of 
other countries to such reactions. In the process, both foreign policy and domestic political 
considerations should be taken into account.
Applying to the case studies
In the next part I apply the outcome of the above-mentioned discussion to the two case 
studies that were introduced and discussed above. The application at this stage is at the 
policy level questioning what should be the policy of a country towards ITA in a given 
situation. For that purpose, it is necessary to identify the competing policies and to apply 
them to the case study. To do that in a clear and illustrative way, I conduct the analysis by 
reference to examples.
HFIs
At the policy level, it is necessary to distinguish among three different categories, direct 
investments where the target is still undecided, direct investments where the target is already 
determined and other investments. Each of these categories is further divided into two, 
inbound transaction and outbound transactions.
Unlike the situation with cross-border leasing, here the transactions are often purely financial 
transactions. Some of these transactions, especially those falling into the second category are 
transactions with a very strong tax influence.
An important difference between cross-border leasing and HFI is the source for the ITA. 
Unlike cross-border leasing, the ITA in HFI is based on an arbitrary distinction between the 
treatment of debt and equity for tax purposes, an arbitrary distinction that each jurisdiction 
approaches differently. Unlike cross-border leasing, there is no clear policy goal that each 
jurisdiction intends to achieve. Thus, whereas in the context of cross-border leasing I also
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examine the compatibility of ITA with the underlying policy of the legislation, no such 
examination is conducted in the context of HFIs. The only requirement in addition to the 
analysis at the country level is that the legislation would be consistent in its application and 
would not violate, to the extent possible, the principle of equity.
Another difference worth noting is the relatively wider application of these types of 
transactions. Unlike cross-border leasing transactions which are generally open only to 
taxpayers who are either considering to lease an equipment that is covered by these types of 
transactions or are in the business of manufacturing such equipment, HFI are more readily 
available to a wider category of taxpayers who are able to use this method of finance even if 
they are not engaged in cross-border transactions as part of their business. For example, 
under the third category discussed below,770 purely domestic taxpayers may use the 
advantages of ITA to raise cheaper finance. Thus, cross-border leasing generally is more 
limited in application, applies only with respect to a selected industry sector and usually has 
a corresponding business purpose.
On one hand, the more limited scope of cross-border leasing and its selective application 
gives the appearance that risks like revenue loss are more manageable and can be limited by 
identifying a very selected group of transactions that qualify for ITA. On the other hand, the 
narrower application of double-dip leasing within the already narrow category of cross- 
border leasing may lead to questions of efficiency and equity because the treatment of 
leasing becomes more advantageous vis-a-vis other forms of finance and because the 
benefits of leasing are only available to a limited group of taxpayers.
Thus, while the more limited application might reduce some of the objection to ITA on one 
hand, the same feature may make the case for intervention more compelling on the other 
hand.
Category 1
The first category deals with direct investments in situations where the location of the 
investment is still undetermined.
I use the following example to illustrate the application of the competing arguments: 
BIGCO, a country X resident company wishes to expand its international operations. After 
considering a large number of countries, BIGCO has finally limited its choice to one of two
770 See pp. 232-235 below.
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possibilities, country Y and country Z. I assume that both countries are relatively similar in 
their non-tax attributes and that both countries have a relatively similar rate of corporate tax. 
One of the important considerations in the decision is the ability to finance the operation of 
the new company that will engage in sales and marketing of BIGCO’s products in the region.
The tax laws of country X and country Y create a situation whereby it is possible for a HFI 
to be treated inconsistently under the tax laws of both countries, resulting in an ITA. Such 
ITA does not exist between country X and country Z.
Country Y perspective
Prima facie , there is a revenue loss as a result of the ITA because of the combination of an 
interest deduction in one country (country Y) without an income inclusion in the other 
country (country X). In addition, past studies have demonstrated that usually tax incentives 
targeted at attracting investments into a country do not prove to be beneficial overall, the 
cost being greater than the benefit.771 However, it appears that if country Y has thin 
capitalization and transfer pricing legislation in place, then ITA should not result in further 
revenue loss.772 Having thin capitalization and transfer pricing legislation in place would 
commonly be the situation regardless of the existence of ITA but rather to prevent base 
erosion due to highly leveraged finance by related parties.773
The combination of both provisions would limit the amount of debt and of interest expenses 
that a country Y corporation is able to claim. From a country Y perspective, there is no 
difference whether the instrument that is characterized as debt there is classified as equity 
elsewhere. As a debt instrument giving rise to interest payments which can be deducted, such 
instrument is subject to all the limitations that are usually imposed by country Y’s tax law. In 
general, debt financing is preferred to equity finance also in cross-border financing. As a 
result, due to above-mentioned limitations, country Y should be indifferent whether the 
instrument which is classified as a debt instrument has a different classification elsewhere.
One caveat to this argument is the possibility of a wider revenue loss. That is, revenue loss 
that does not result directly from the HFIs but indirectly from the reaction to the existence of 
the ITA. First, the suggestion above is made on the premise that the country has thin 
capitalization and transfer pricing provisions that would cover also guaranteed loans by third 
parties. To the extent that the existing legislation does not include such rules, then it might
77' Avi-Yonah (2000) at 1643.
772 In such case, the revenue loss should be suffered by the other country, country X. See below (p. 228).
773 But cf. C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst with respect to the UK.
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be possible to structure the investment through a third party. This would indirectly increase 
the leverage of the domestic company and is likely to result in revenue loss. For example, 
investments into a country, which like the UK does not have provisions dealing with third 
party guaranteed loans, can be structured through unrelated third parties, lead to increased 
leverage of domestic corporations, an increase which is encouraged by the availability of 
ITA and which is not covered by the thin capitalization and transfer pricing provisions.
Second, even without the possibility of guaranteed third party loans, it is possible that an 
increase in investments by taxpayers resident in country X (which are able to enjoy the ITA) 
will result in a move of investors from other countries, for example, country M, to invest in 
other countries instead of country Y.
Third, the application of EC law is likely to limit the ability of MS to treat non-residents 
disfavorably vis-a-vis domestic taxpayers to the extent the former are nationals of a MS. This 
may limit significantly the ability of MS to have effective legislation in place to prevent the 
base erosion whether through direct investment or through indirect investment from another 
MS. Moreover, the treatment of the other party to the ITA is not relevant and cannot be used 
to justify the discriminatory measures by the MS.774 Therefore, a distinction should probably 
be drawn between the UK and the US. The UK, despite its need for foreign investment and 
the increasing competition from other MS, is unlikely to have sufficient legislation to ensure 
that the revenue loss is not borne by it.
Revenue loss being an important consideration, the UK is likely to attempt to prevent such 
ITA, especially if it exists with respect to HFIs which are in general more readily accessible 
to taxpayers. Unfortunately, EC law might significantly limit the UK’s ability to counteract. 
Measures like those adopted in 1992 with respect to equity notes are likely not to survive a 
challenge at the ECJ. This is likely to limit the UK’s ability to respond and political restraints 
are likely to prevent the UK from responding selectively to some countries.775 Moreover, EC 
law (and especially the relatively wider freedom of movement of capital) is likely open the 
ITA to be accessed also by residents of third countries, thus potentially increasing revenue 
loss problem. The open options to the UK appear to be: (1) not to react (2) react by a 
complete change of the law776 (3) react by applying international measures also to domestic
774 C-294/97 Eurowings and the discussion above on EC law and its impact o f UK tax policy.
775 Equity notes -  above (pp. 141-144). European Union -  above (pp. 81-95).
776 Discussed below in the context of cross-border leasing.
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transactions, and (4) react through the use of tax treaties with selected countries with which
777 77®the ITA takes place. However, such measures would have to comply with EC law.
Even outside EC law context, the availability of the bilateral approach to ITA might solve 
other concerns that may affect the decision on ITA in a unilateral decision, for example, 
foreign policy and the reaction by other countries to a unilateral act on the part of one 
country. Yet, the availability of the bilateral approach depends on the existence of common 
understanding between the two countries with respect to the appropriate approach to be taken 
in the specific situation.779
Fourth, the validity of the no revenue loss argument depends to a large extent on the state of 
the capital market in the country Y and the ability of financial institutions in that country to 
offer, through repackaging, the benefit of ITA to taxpayers that would not be able to benefit 
from the ITA directly. This possibility, however, appears to be more relevant in the context 
of category 3 below where the threshold of the investment is lower (not being a direct 
investment).780
Even if from a pure revenue loss perspective country Y might appear to be an indifferent 
party, because of its desire attract foreign investment into its territory, it is not completely 
indifferent. Eventually, it might gain more revenues at the expense of other countries paying 
for the incentive. This might change in category 2, where country Y is no longer concerned 
about the loss of the foreign investment and might have its own reasons for being willing to 
give up the free benefit conferred by the ITA in exchange for something else.
Another consideration is equity. The question is to what extent a domestic corporation with a 
foreign investor and a domestic corporation with a domestic investor are in the same 
situation or in a different situation. To the extent that they are in a similar situation, equity 
would require similar tax burden and similar treatment. Conversely, to the extent one is 
economically better off (before tax), equity would require their treatment to differ.
777 See for example, 2001 US-UK tax treaty.
778 See generally Craig (2003) in the context of the 2001 US-UK tax treaty.
779 An obstacle might exist if, for example the country o f source, like country Y in our example, does not have a 
reason to do so because it does not suffer a revenue loss.
As Edgar notes, the 2001 US-UK tax treaty is a good example of a bilateral approach where two countries agree 
on the treatment o f  a specific type o f transaction. To the extent the ITA exists with other countries as well, a 
unilateral approach through a tax treaty might result in a violation o f equity and efficiency. Compare the approach 
taken by the US and UK in 1986 (IRC § 1503(d) and TA 1988 s.404, respectively) and the approach taken in 2001 
(2001 US-UK tax treaty).
780 See pp. 232-235 below.
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From a competition perspective, it is necessary to balance the potential desire on part of the 
country itself to be regarded as more competitive and attractive (due to the availability of 
ITA) and the desire of domestic corporations to preserve their competitiveness vis-a-vis 
foreign corporations investing in country Y.781 To a large extent, the choice depends on the 
identity of both the country and those domestic taxpayers that consider themselves as being 
disadvantaged by the existence of the ITA.
At the country level, the advantage of ITA over other more conventional methods of tax 
incentives is the lack of clear action to create the benefit, an act that might attract criticism 
and counter-actions from other countries. ITA created as a result of differences in the general 
structure of the tax systems in the two countries might be perceived as less controversial 
when compared with specific intentional introduction of tax incentive measures.782
Nonetheless, the importance of competitiveness at the country level depends to a large extent 
on the identity of the country involved. A country like the US should be less concerned as to 
whether or not it is competitive enough for direct investment by foreign corporations mainly 
because of its vast market and the lack of comparable competitors.783 This goes well with a 
powerful and important local industry that is eager to maintain a level playing field by 
preventing ITA for inbound investments.784
The UK, on the other hand, which is dependent to a large extent on foreign investment 
including foreign direct investments but does not have a natural market that would attract 
such investments (like the US), might find itself in a different position, especially in light of 
the EU which is supposed to create an internal market without any borders and limitations 
making the competition among MS harsher with respect to attracting foreign investments 
from outside the EU.785
The position of the country with respect to attracting foreign investment can serve as an 
important consideration in the final decision, especially if the cost of financing for the 
incentive, which is usually the object of existing criticism on the desirability of tax 
incentives, is borne fully or partially by other countries.786
781 For example, country X corporations who will be entitled to the benefits o f the ITA and thus enjoy a lower 
cost o f finance with respect to their operations in country Y.
782 This is especially due to an important difference between ITA and tax incentives. Whereas the latter are often 
the result o f a positive act o f legislation, the former are not. With ITA to have the incentive, a country merely has 
to retain existing law. A task that is likely to prove much easier than the alternative.
783 In that sense, the US is closer to being a “captive market”.
784 See for example, IRC §894(c) and the regulations that followed.
785 Refer to our preceding discussion above.
786 Outside the narrow scope o f ITA, it might be perceived as sending a negative signal to potential investors.
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At the taxpayers’ level, an important question is which industry is most affected by the 
existence of ITA. This would depend to a large extent on the identity of the possible 
beneficiaries from the ITA, those taxpayers residents of country X that would be able to 
operate in country Y with lower costs of finance. The more powerful the domestic industry 
is, the more likely it is for an intervention to take place.787 A good recent example is the 
legislation dealing with the US domestic reverse hybrid entities and the prevention of ITA 
opportunities there due to a legislation that was initiated following pressure from domestic 
taxpayers complaining about the competitive advantages of their Canadian competitors who 
were able to benefit from the ITA that existed prior to the legislation.788
Another option is for country Y to use the ITA and its decision to prevent it as a signal to 
other countries regarding its intent to disallow ITA.789 At the same time, it is necessary to 
take into account the price of the signaling (especially if it is discovered that there is no 
revenue loss in which case it is paid for in other’s people money). The price can be a 
preference by foreign corporations to invest elsewhere. In addition, unless the situation is 
properly addressed, an intervention to prevent ITA might be perceived as a negative signal to 
the foreign country (country X in our example), a measure that is designed to reduce the 
competitiveness of country X’s taxpayers operating in country Y or an aggressive attempt on 
part of country Y to benefit from all or part of the funds saved by the prevention of the ITA 
at the expense of country X.
Thus, the more aggressive a country is with respect to its treatment of inbound investment, 
the more limited ITA is and the more able such country is to allow ITA to exist as an 
incentive paid by other tax systems.790 In addition to possible arguments of efficiency and 
equity, potential objections for allowing ITA to exist can be found either in the form of 
political objections or of request from other countries that suffer from the existence of the 
ITA to collaborate and deny together the ITA. On the other hand, a country that does not 
have aggressive inbound approach is more likely to suffer from the ITA and to find it 
necessary to intervene and prevent the ITA from taking place. In this respect EC law has an
787 In HFIs because o f the general applicability to many different industries, it is quite possible that the reaction to 
ITA would be cross-industry. For example, having a wider group of domestic businesses supporting intervention 
where their interests would otherwise suffer.
788 See generally, Sheppard (2004).
789 The signaling idea is promoted by Kane (2004) but contrast Shaviro (2002).
790 For example, in the US, the existence o f the anti-conduit legislation helps to close some o f the opportunities 
for ITA through the use o f intermediaries. Although these ITA situations are generally objected to on the ground 
o f artificiality, the existence of provisions like the anti-conduit provisions allows the country the comfort with 
respect to the decision whether to respond to ITA. This is because the existence o f  these provisions is likely to 
prevent ITA that includes an element o f artificiality, limiting the opportunities for ITA and thus making it more 
or less manageable.
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important influence as it causes MS to remove some of the protective measures, thus making 
them more vulnerable to ITA. As discussed above,791 such countries often do not have the 
ability to react. In the context of the EU, this is mainly due to the application of EC law 
which would tend to limit any measures adopted to the extent such measures are in violation 
of EC law. These EC law limitations, which apply regardless of ITA, affect MS’ ability to 
adopt measures to prevent ITA. Below,792 in the context of cross-border leasing, I discuss 
one of the options that countries have to overcome such limitations.
Country X perspective
Here as well, it is necessary to examine whether the revenue loss is borne by country X. The 
revenue loss can also be the result of a preference on the part of domestic companies to form 
or acquire foreign subsidiaries by using a combination of equity and HFIs both of which are 
relieved from taxation in country X. To the extent the availability of ITA results in an 
increase in the percentage of equity finance (including both pure equity and HFIs), the 
revenue loss should be limited to the amount of tax on interest income that is no longer 
received and taxed and to the amount of underlying foreign tax credit that is granted to the 
taxpayers as a result of the ITA.793
The revenue loss is also dependent on the nature and identity of the country into which the 
ITA is structured. ITA with a country with which country X has substantial trade relations 
might lead to high revenue loss due to the volume of cross-border investment and the general 
nature of HFIs ITA. On the other hand, an ITA with a country that does not have developed 
trade relations with country X might not give rise to significant revenue loss concerns from 
country X’s perspective, sufficient to warrant intervention794 795
In addition to the revenue loss, two competing interests from country X’s perspective are 
domestic competition and the need to preserve neutrality in the determination between
791 See pp. 87-93 above.
792 See pp. 235-242 below.
793 Since both the US and the UK are foreign tax credit countries, the assumption is that this method is used by 
the country o f residence. If, however, the exemption method is used instead, then the possibilities for structuring 
HFIs and especially under category 3 are much wider.
794 Thus, for example, ITA was denied in the UK in 1986 (dual resident companies), in 1992 (equity notes) and in 
2001 (Repo transactions) when the other country was the US. ITA was also denied by the US in 1986 (dual 
resident companies) when the other country was the UK and in 1997 and 2002 (hybrid entities) when the other 
country was Canada. Whether the country intervening is the country o f source or the country o f  residence in each 
case is less relevant as long as there appears to be a revenue loss. Once a revenue loss appears to exist, the 
identity o f the other country becomes relevant. The identity o f the other country is also relevant in the 
competitiveness and political considerations that are mentioned below.
795 To the extent that there is an attempt to use the ITA with respect to transactions between the two countries and 
a third country, such attempts should be dealt with by general anti-avoidance legislation as the objection is not the 
ITA but the artificiality that is involved when a third country enters the picture.
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foreign and domestic investments on one hand and international competition on the other 
hand.
Regarding the first interest, the need to preserve neutrality, its scope and application depends 
to a large extent on the international tax policy of the country in question. For example, both 
the US and the UK follow CEN but only in a limited way. The US, for example, based its 
approach on a more than forty years old compromise between complete CEN on one hand 
and competitiveness supporting deferral of tax on foreign source income on the other hand. 
Being a political compromise, it is hard, if not impossible, to clearly determine where the 
compromise lies. Arguably, so long as the ITA supports the conduct of active business 
abroad, then this should be covered by the competitiveness part of the compromise which 
would allow ITA. This, however, is not completely clear.
Thus, in the US for example, a determination of the scope of this interest would require a 
prior determination of a wider issue, US tax policy for outbound investments and in 
particular, the balance between CEN and equity on one hand and competitiveness on the 
other hand. This would require first the ascertainment of the true logic behind Subpart F to 
determine whether ITA violates the rationale behind the legislation or supports the 
compromise reached in 1962.796
This determination of the true scope of the legislation has a strong element of 
competitiveness to it. On one hand, allowing the ITA to continue would allow domestic 
corporations that operate abroad in countries with which ITA is possible to enjoy lower 
taxation on their investment and as a result, a competitive advantage. The two questions that 
should be considered are whether this constitutes a neutral competitiveness or a disguised 
form of a subsidy and whether country X should promote the competitiveness of its resident 
corporations as part of its tax policy.797
Intervention might be less objective if the competitiveness argument loses its strength, 
whether because of a different legislative system that is less influenced by such arguments 
from the industry or because of a weaker link between the specific ITA and the 
competitiveness of the taxpayers asserting this argument.
796 See for example the exchange between David Hariton and Reuven Avi-Yonah on the treatment o f income 
from manufacturing tax haven companies and the logic o f Subpart F -  Avi-Yonah (1998a) (1998b) and Hariton 
(1998).
797 The different aspects o f these questions are considered as part o f the general discussion o f competitiveness, 
above (pp.44-46).
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On the other hand, allowing ITA to exist is likely to alter the competition between resident 
corporations that operate both domestically and abroad and those that only operate 
domestically.798 The latter, unable to enjoy the benefits ITA might find themselves in a 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the former. To the extent the resident corporations that 
only operate domestically cannot alter their position, an additional consideration becomes 
relevant, equity.
An interesting distinction that was mentioned in the context of the competitiveness argument 
is the link between the ITA and the business of the taxpayer as a criterion for the strength of 
the competitiveness argument. Compare, for example, cross-border leasing when the 
argument is put forward by the lessor who also manufactures the equipment on one hand and 
ITA from a financial transaction unrelated to the taxpayer’s core business, especially if it 
also involves some element of artificiality (repo transactions for example).
Prima facie , the first category appears to be more justifiable because the availability of ITA 
is connected directly with a legitimate transaction, the acquisition of a business asset, and 
appears not to contain abuse. The other type of ITA is a pure financial transaction that may 
or may not be related to another business activity. As a result, there is a risk that such 
transaction involves a certain degree of artificiality that is designed to obtain the tax benefit 
as the transaction’s prime goal (as opposed to a situation where the tax benefits are ancillary 
to or correspond with a business activity). But this is not necessarily that clear.
The question is how to distinguish between similar and less similar transaction. That is, 
where to draw the line. Another consideration that has to be examined is the relation between 
this distinction and other policy considerations. For example, the different approach that is 
usually adopted with respect to inbound ITA on one hand and outbound ITA on the other 
hand.
For example, if on one hand, we have one taxpayer that enters into a cross-border leasing 
transaction that enjoys the benefits of ITA and on the other hand we have a taxpayer that 
acquires the same property but uses for this purpose funds he raises from third parties 
through the use of HFIs that also benefit from ITA (alternatively, he can raise the money by 
benefiting from ITA through a repo transaction). Should they be treated differently? Should 
the direction of the ITA make a difference? Equity considerations would appear to argue that
798 For simplicity I refer to this group as including corporations that only operate domestically. In fact, to be 
accurate it is necessary to define this group as including corporations that operate both domestically and abroad 
but not in countries with which the benefits of ITA are available.
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no such difference should take place to the extent the taxpayers are in a similar pre-tax 
position. The answer would depend on the policy priorities of the country in question. For 
example, countries like the US that appear to adopt a lenient approach with respect to 
outbound ITA alongside an aggressive approach to inbound ITA would find it difficult to 
maintain the distinction based on the business activity connection test.
Throughout the debate it is important not to overlook political considerations and the extent 
to which political pressure might alter the balance between the above-mentioned 
considerations and result in either intervention or non-intervention. On one hand, those 
corporations that benefit from the ITA would press for political support on the basis of 
maintaining their competitive advantages.
On the other hand, taxpayers that are likely to be disadvantaged by the ITA would press for 
political support to deny ITA benefits on the basis that ITA assists domestic corporations to 
operate abroad and would result in migration of workplaces outside the country.799 1 return to 
this issue in the context of cross-border leasing, below.800
Category 2
Unlike the first category, here the location of the investment is already determined and 
BIGCO has chosen to invest in country Y. After five years of operation, BIGCO would like 
to refinance its operations in country Y. Like in example above, the tax laws of countries X 
and Y make it possible to structure a HFI that would be inconsistently characterized in the 
two countries resulting in an ITA.
The question is whether to allow two taxpayers who are probably related (due to the 
investment that was already made) to enjoy a lower burden of taxation with respect to a 
transaction that but for the ITA would give rise to higher tax. Most of the different 
considerations mentioned above801 in category 1 are valid for the discussion here. The 
important difference is from country Y’s perspective and related to the fact that the 
destination of the investment is already determined. As a result, the danger of non­
investment is reduced. Theoretically, country Y might wish to use this change and prevent 
the ITA thus raising its tax revenues.
799 Compare US corporations’ reaction to Notice 98-11 (leading to Notice 98-35 and regulations that have yet to 
be published) on one hand and their support of the Treasury in enacting s.894(c) and the regulations thereunder 
on the other hand.
800 See pp. 235-242 below.
801 See pp. 222-231 above.
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Under category 1 country Y has less incentive to react because a reaction might lead to 
foreign investments going elsewhere. This risk is reduced under category 2 but it still does 
not follow that country Y should intervene despite the arguments supporting such 
intervention, as discussed under category 1 above.802
If signaling is appealing to country Y, category 2 might represent the best situation to do so 
without a great risk of losing foreign investments as a result and while maintaining the 
potential risk of loss at a manageable level.
Thus, whereas country X’s situation does not change from category 1 to category 2, country 
Y is now in a position of intervening and preventing the ITA. This is also consistent with a 
prior policy decision by the UK.803
An important objection to intervention is that such a decision would be hard to reconcile 
with a decision not to intervene under category 1, both in practice (how to make the 
distinction) and when regarded from an equity perspective. Thus, despite the different 
interaction of the competing considerations under category 1 and category 2, country Y will 
be required to reach the same decision in both cases. Consistency and possibly also equity 
considerations would require such an approach of non-intervention to be followed.804
Category 3
After successfully expanding its operations, BIGCO is interested in raising additional funds 
to finance to expand its operations to other regions. BIGCO is issuing HFIs that are 
characterized as debt in country X. In foreign jurisdictions, the character of the HFIs varies. 
In some jurisdictions the HFIs are treated as debt and in other jurisdictions, including 
country Y, the HFIs are treated as equity instruments.
In this category, the subject of the investment is mobile income that is more susceptible to 
the effect of taxation. In addition, being a mobile portfolio investment, it is relatively easy to 
move it from one location to another and locations usually do not confer any significant
802 See pp. 222-228 above.
803 Legislation preventing ITA through the use o f equity notes (1992).
804 This does not mean that the analysis is not valuable and should not be conducted separately, at least at the 
stage o f determining the desired policy. Although it appears that for considerations o f  consistency and possibly 
equity, similar policy has to be adopted for the two categories, a separate analysis o f the two categories can 
provide us with information that would assist in making a better informed decision. For example, it can provide 
us with information on which o f the two categories is more significant. This can assist in determining, in case o f a 
conflict, whether to follow the decision made with respect to category 1 or the decision made with respect to 
category 2.
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benefits apart from the tax and can be replaced with relative ease. As a result, the decision 
where and how to invest is much more influenced by the tax treatment of the investment and 
countries are more likely to carefully review legislative actions that can have the effect of 
altering investment patterns and are more likely to react to existing trends to improve their 
relative position.
Moreover, availability of ITA in these instances might allow domestic businesses to raise 
funds more cheaply and improve their competitiveness. This might have also some political 
element that can affect the decision.
Country X perspective
The transfer pricing and thin capitalization provisions that are relevant with respect to 
categories 1 and 2 above805 are no longer applicable in this category. At the same time, due 
to the absence of special relations between the issuer and the holder, there is usually no need 
for such.
In order to benefit from the underlying foreign tax credit in country Y, the country Y resident 
has to invest a relatively significant amount (usually, the underlying foreign tax credit is 
available to shareholders holding 10% or more from the shares of the issuing company). This 
requirement would significantly limit the range and amount of potential taxpayers who might 
qualify and enjoy the ITA under this category.
Nonetheless, unlike the situation under categories 1 and 2 above,806 here the country risks the 
possibility of a revenue loss as a result of the availability of a perfect or nearly perfect 
substitute that give rise to lower tax revenues.
Here, country X needs to examine the potential revenue loss on one hand and the potential 
benefit for its taxpayers with the availability of cheaper and more diverse finance which 
might allow them to become more competitive on the other hand.
While domestic taxpayers should in general be better off, this does not necessarily cover all 
domestic taxpayers. Some taxpayers are likely to be disadvantaged by the existence of the 
ITA. These taxpayers are likely to include small corporations that are unable to raise finance 
from foreign sources and do not have access to the market. In addition, a similar outcome
805 See pp. 228-232 above.
806 See pp. 228-232 above.
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might result with local financial institutions that might find the existence of ITA to disfavor 
them, as they would not be able to compete with the advantages created by the ITA. At the 
same time, they should have more funds to finance other corporations that are not able to 
raise funds abroad or that are in more difficult financial situations. Thus, arguably, ITA can 
have the effect of freeing capital to finance other taxpayers that are unable to enjoy the 
benefits of ITA because they are unable to raise funds from investors abroad either because 
they are too small or because they are not in a financial situation that allows this.807
This is an interesting point that might be subject to further empirical examination. That is, 
does ITA actually serve as improving the availability of funds in the market? If, for example, 
BIGCO is able to get better finance by raising money from foreign investors and as a result 
reduce its borrowing from domestic financial institutions who are then able to finance more 
local businesses including those that have no access to the international market, then it can 
be argued that ITA actually promotes the availability of funds in the market. Alternatively, 
the existence of ITA may result in capital leaving the country with the benefit of the ITA 
leading to an increase in the cost of capital. In this situation, ITA might not serve as 
improving the availability of funds in the market.
An important consideration against possible intervention is the lack of apparent abuse.808 The 
transaction is conducted between unrelated parties and thus the presumption of arm’s length 
and no abuse exists. Unlike the transactions in categories 1 and 2 above,809 non-tax 
considerations may play an important role in the structure of the investment, including the 
rights granted by the instrument to the holders, the payments etc. in this environment, when 
the substitution is achieved through negotiation between two unrelated parties, there is a 
strong reason not to object.
Country Y perspective
Starting with neutrality and efficiency, the first task is to determine the policy of country Y. 
If, country Y follows a policy of neutrality with respect to outbound investments and in 
particular outbound portfolio investments, then ITA represents a violation of this policy as it 
creates an advantage for taxpayers to invest abroad. If, however, country Y does not follow
807 Alternatively, there might be able to create, through repackaging, an investment product that enjoys the 
benefits o f the ITA and can be marketed to domestic taxpayers in country X. This outcome, if  it takes place, is 
likely to result in more revenue loss to country X. Its availability depends, among other considerations, on the 
amount that is at stake (potential revenues and potential tax saving) and transaction costs.
808 Ring connects this concept with the concept o f equity. See Ring (2003) at 122.
809 See pp. 222-232 above.
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such policy, then it might be indifferent to the existence of ITA, at least from an efficiency 
and neutrality perspective.
From an equity perspective, it depends whether or not ITA is open to all taxpayers. Unlike 
under categories 1 and 2, the opportunity to invest abroad should be, theoretically at least, 
open to all taxpayers. Absent either high transaction costs or high minimum investment 
requirements,810 the relevant objection is efficiency rather than equity.
Another potential argument favoring intervention is the potential revenue loss. Unlike under 
category 1 and 2, here the thin capitalization and transfer pricing rules do not apply and it is 
possible that more HFIs will be created replacing also some equity investments, increasing 
the amount of interest deductions in country Y while not decreasing the amount of foreign 
tax credit and especially underlying foreign tax credit in country X, thus resulting in revenue 
loss for both countries.
Cross-border Leasing
Assume that USCO, a US resident company is an airplane manufacturer. As part of its 
business, USCO enters into a leasing transaction with Easyair, a country X resident company 
that is interested in expanding its airplane fleet. In the process USCO compete against ZCO, 
a country Z resident company that is also an airplane manufacturer. As part of the leasing 
arrangement between USCO and Easyair, the parties manage to arrange the transaction 
through USCO’s wholly owned foreign sales company resident in a low-tax jurisdiction. In 
addition, the transaction includes an option granted to Easyair to acquire the airplanes at the 
end of the lease period at FMV. The existence of this option does not alter the character of 
the transaction in the US but results in the transaction being regarded in country X as 
transferring the ownership in the airplanes to Easyair. As a result, both USCO and Easyair 
are regarded as the owner of the airplanes and each is able to claim depreciation deductions 
with respect to them.
As mentioned above,811 HFIs and cross-border leasing differ in certain respects, making 
cross-border leasing a more specific case study alongside a more general case study in of 
HFIs. In addition, unlike HFIs where there is no specific policy underlying the different
810 High minimum investment requirements may result if, for example, country Y uses the foreign tax credit as a 
relief mechanism and as a result, to benefit from HFI, domestic taxpayers are required to invest in at least 10% o f  
the capital o f the foreign corporation to qualify for the underlying foreign tax credit. To that extent, it is possible 
that the 10% requirement would necessitate high investment which would prove to be an entry restriction to some 
taxpayers.
811 See pp. 221-222 above.
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treatment of debt and equity and the tests used to distinguish between the two for tax 
purposes, there is an underlying tax policy behind the decision to grant depreciation 
deductions. For this reason, the analysis in this part is performed in two different levels. 
First, at the specific policy level, examining the compatibility of ITA with the underlying 
policy behind depreciation deductions. Second, at the country level, examining the 
compatibility of ITA with the international tax policy of the country in question.
Outbound
Looking at the transaction from the perspective of USCO’s country of residence, the first 
question is whether granting the depreciation deductions is within the scope of the 
depreciation deductions legislation and in accordance with the rationale behind the 
legislation. The answer would depend on the country in question. Prima facie, it seems that 
the answer is no.
Just for illustration -  in the UK, at present it appears that such transaction would not be 
within the type of transactions intended to be covered by the legislation. This is due to the 
identity of the lessee as a non-UK resident and to the fact the leased airplane is not planned 
to be used in the UK. The existence of depreciation deductions in the other country are 
irrelevant as the legislation is restricted in its application with respect to most types of export 
leasing whether or not ITA exists. There might be, however, compelling reasons at the 
country level that would make it beneficial for the UK to divert from its existing dislike of 
export leasing transactions.
In the US, however, the situation appears to be unclear. On one hand, there is a strong 
resistance towards export leasing, resistance that is evident by special regulations that are 
intended to extend the period of the lease and to spread the deprecations deductions as much 
as possible. At the same time, these regulations are not designed specifically against export 
leasing (but rather with respect to domestic leasing with tax exempt entities) and in fact the 
IRS has accepted, also in private letter rulings, transactions that applied the existing 
regulations together with the beneficial FSC regime to achieve a result that would make 
export leasing beneficial from an economic perspective. Not only that. Such transactions 
were accepted also when the other party to the transaction claimed depreciation deductions 
in his country due to ITA, making the issue an almost irrelevant consideration in the 
decision.
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Thus, prima facie , the grant of depreciation deductions in a lease with a lessee that is not 
subject to tax in the US is probably outside the application of the accelerated depreciation 
deduction scheme. This general exclusion is subject to an important exception. It is probably 
correct to stipulate that as long as the lessor is not merely a financial institution but also a 
manufacturer of the leased asset and the asset is manufactured or produced in the US, the 
transaction is not contrary to US tax policy.
The rationale for the exception should be found at the country level, as the result of a desire 
to promote the competitiveness of US manufacturers,812 the relatively limited scope and the 
apparent absence of abuse.
A better view is probably to regard the US depreciation policy as being limited to leases with 
lessees that are subject to US Federal income tax. At the same time and despite the above- 
mentioned policy, there is a parallel US policy to support and encourage domestic 
manufacturers who export their products abroad. As a result, export leasing that qualifies 
under the FSC/ETI regimes is economically beneficial despite the disadvantageous 
depreciation deductions. The outcome for our discussion is that even though outbound ITA 
is not compatible with and might not qualify under the depreciation policy examination, it 
should still be allowed because it is compatible with the country level policy analysis.
Moving to the country level, it is necessary to examine whether there is a policy reason to 
intervene and prevent ITA from the perspective of the lessor’s country of residence.
Starting with the questions of neutrality and efficiency, although the benefit in cross-border 
leasing that benefits from an ITA is a timing benefit (as opposed to an additional set of 
deductions as it might be thought), allowing the ITA would create an incentive for domestic 
lessors to engage in export leasing as opposed to domestic leasing. Nonetheless, despite the 
incentive to engage in export leasing, such incentive does not necessarily come at the 
expense and instead of domestic leasing. Focusing on the US as an example, the compromise 
struck down with respect to Subpart F appears to imply that with respect to outbound 
investment involving active business income competitiveness takes precedence over CEN to 
the extent that there is a conflict. This result appears to constitute a reason for not 
intervening.
812 The justification used in this context is that the FSC/ETI provisions are meant to neutralize and balance what 
is perceived by the US to be an “uneven” playing field. This, however, is not a view shared by the EU and WTO.
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From a competition perspective, on one hand, allowing ITA would allow domestic lessors 
(who are also manufacturers or producers of the leased assets) to better compete vis-a-vis 
foreign competitors.813 In our example, USCO, an airplane manufacturer would be able to 
better compete with non-US airplane manufacturers in the non-US markets.
At the same time, to the extent that there are other US corporations that are only selling their 
products in the domestic market, allowing corporations, like USCO, that sell their products 
both domestically and abroad to enjoy ITA and to better compete abroad might also have an 
impact on their ability to compete domestically vis-a-vis domestic taxpayers that are not 
operating abroad and thus does not enjoy the benefit of ITA.814
The outcome of this analysis depends on the answers to the following two questions: First, 
are there any domestic lessors that manufacture similar products but only market them to the 
domestic market. Second, are domestic lessors who engage in cross-border leasing at a 
competitive disadvantage in the absence of ITA. The answer to this question has to be given 
both vis-a-vis domestic lessors operating only in the domestic market and with respect to 
foreign lessors operating in the same market.
To the extent that the answer to the first question is no, then the entire focus is on the 
international level and the relevant question is whether the effect of the ITA is to level the 
playing field or to create a competitive advantage for the domestic lessor (USCO) vis-a-vis 
potential foreign competitors.
If the ITA has merely a neutralizing effect, then it would be easier to support it from a policy 
perspective. Even if, however, the ITA has the effect of creating a competitive advantage to 
USCO vis-a-vis foreign competitors, although there would be a stronger policy reason to 
object to the existence of ITA, it is not clear if there are strong policy considerations that 
would lead the US to relinquish the benefits enjoyed by its taxpayers especially when its tax 
policy is aimed at encouraging and assisting domestic taxpayers operating abroad.815
813 Whether or not the effect o f the ITA is to provide the taxpayer with a competitive edge or merely to level the 
playing field depends on the view o f the situation that exists without the ITA. For example, for many years, the 
US has argued that its taxpayers are in a competitive disadvantage vis-i-vis foreign corporations. This was also 
one o f rationales behind the DISC legislation in 1971 that was later replaced with the FSC legislation (the other 
rationale was to encourage US companies to manufacture in the US and not in foreign jurisdictions. See the 
discussion above (pp. 45-46)).
814 Although I make the distinction between taxpayers that sell in both domestic and international markets and 
those that only sell in domestic market, a more precise distinction would be between those that sell also in 
countries with which an ITA exists and those that do not.
815 Due to the combination between the hostility against export leasing on one hand and the support for US
manufacturing on the other hand, the existing legislation is structured in a way that would not be beneficial to
taxpayers unless they qualify as a manufacturer, thus limiting significantly the potential for abuse.
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To the extent that the answer to the first question above is yes, then the preceding analysis 
should be conducted both at the international level vis-a-vis foreign competitors and at the 
national level vis-a-vis domestic competitors. Here, the same reason that was good to justify 
ITA at the international level might be used to justify intervention at the domestic level 
because ITA provides companies like USCO with an advantage over other domestic lessors 
that only sell to the local market.816
The competitiveness argument goes well with the political consideration. To the extent that 
the industry is strong enough, its political influence should also be strong and make the 
competitiveness argument more compelling. Obviously, this depends to a large extent also 
on the country in question. As it is discussed above,817 in general, the US tax policy is 
influenced by political considerations, which form an integral part of the discussion. This is 
especially true when the domestic taxpayers involved are in the manufacturing business 
which “allows” them to use the political argument even further, for example, to raise the risk 
of unemployment818
In summary, in light of the US insistence over the last 30 years on retaining the FSC regime 
in one way or another819 and the acquiescence of the IRS in the combination of FSC and 
cross-border leasing even if they result in ITA, it would appear that limiting or preventing 
ITA would go against US policy on the matter.
Inbound
From the perspective of the lessee’s country of residence, at least the answer to the first 
question appears to be much more straightforward and clear. The asset that is leased is being 
used in the country and the lessee is a resident of the country. Thus, to the extent that the 
lessee is entitled to the depreciation deductions, this would agree with the rationale behind 
the depreciation deduction legislation, to promote and encourage business investment and 
investment capital assets in the country.
In effect, as Ring notes, the benefit of inbound double-dip is not only that the acquisition of 
assets is encouraged through generous timing in depreciation deductions, a benefit that is
8.6 Although in the specific context o f airplanes, the chances are very small to find a manufacturer and a lesser 
that only work with the domestic market, this distinction can exist in other industries.
8.7 See pp. 98-109 above.
8.8 One possible advantage can be the potential lack o f political resistance because o f the relatively narrow 
application o f the ITA and the fact foreign manufacturers who might object do not vote in US elections.
819 See generally our discussion above in the context o f competitiveness, especially pp. 45-46.
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also reflected in the price of the lease, but also in the fact that part of this benefit is funded by 
the other country.820 Prima facie , it appears to be a good example where ITA should not be 
objected to. This, however, is subject to certain objections that might render a different 
conclusion.
First, still at the level of the policy behind the depreciation considerations. As it is mentioned 
above,821 there are basically two main schools of thought regarding the use of depreciation 
deductions. The first believes that acquisition of new property should be encouraged by 
granting generous depreciation benefits that are reflected in accelerated pace of depreciation 
making the investment more beneficial to the party claiming the depreciation and through the 
lease mechanism also to the other party. If this school of thought is followed, then not only 
should inbound double-dip leasing not be objected to, it should actually be supported.
An alternative school of thought takes the position that the tax system through the grant of 
depreciation deductions should compensate the acquirer for the cost of the capital asset that 
can not otherwise be reflected in his tax status and reflect his true financial situation but not 
encourage any activity. Thus, the pace of the depreciation should be similar to the pace of 
economic depreciation on the asset. If this is the policy that is followed, then double-dip 
leasing which essentially accelerates the pace of depreciation and provides an 
encouragement to acquire new assets might go beyond the limits of this policy. The question 
is whether the fact that the extra benefit is provided for, partially at least, by the other 
country makes a difference. Arguably, the rationale behind the amount and pace of 
depreciation deductions takes into account also considerations of costs. A more limited and 
restrained expenditure can also reflect a decision on the part of a country not to spend money 
on a certain type of expenditure and to use the funds for other purposes. If, however, the 
expenditure is partly paid by another country, why should the country object to this?
A possible objection might exist in the form of equity. This objection has to be examined in 
two levels. At the first level, among taxpayers who use leasing those who have and those 
who do not have access to cross-border leasing. At the second level, the examination is made 
among taxpayers that can use leasing and those that cannot use leasing to finance their 
operations.
820 Ring (2003).
821 See p. 174 above.
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One mitigating argument is the spillover effect, the possibility that the benefits of double-dip 
leasing would affect other leasing as well as other finance methods, lowering the costs of 
finance and benefiting indirectly a large group of taxpayers that might not benefit directly.
At the country tax policy level, there are several additional objections although it appears 
that the arguments in favor of ITA outweigh the objections.
On one hand, ITA can be objected to because it favors foreign lessors and foreign 
manufacturers over domestic lessors and manufacturers. This competitiveness argument is 
closely related to political considerations. To that extent, the political argument made 
above822 can also be used here in this context with the necessary changes.
A similar argument can be made by domestic financing institutions that are unable to provide 
finance on similar terms to domestic corporations as they lack the double-dip benefits. To 
that extent, it is necessary to determine whether an open or protectionist approach would 
better suit. The problem in this approach is that it requires the country to raise the cost of 
finance to some of its taxpayers to make it equal for all.
On the other hand, such leases reduce the cost of finance for the domestic corporation 
leasing the asset. Thus, ZCO in our example above would be able to lease the same asset but 
at a lower cost due to the ITA. This will have an effect not only on the cost of finance but 
also on the ability of ZCO to compete provided it is able to use for other purposes funds that 
are available as a result of the lower financing of the asset. Depending on the extent of the 
saving and the scope of the finance that benefits from the ITA, it might also be possible to 
argue the above-mentioned political argument in reverse. To the extent this becomes 
possible, then the legislator might have to distinguish between two competing 
competitiveness and political arguments.
In addition, allowing domestic taxpayers to enjoy ITA can have the potential of making the 
country more attractive as an investment location. The country would benefit because it has 
potential of increasing the business activity in its territory without frustrating the underlying 
objective of the expenditure legislation. Taxpayers would be justified, as they will be able to 
enjoy cheaper finance to expand their business and become more competitive.
822 See pp. 67-71 and 231 above.
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In the context of the UK, this can have an added benefit. As it was discussed above,823 EC 
law imposes limitations both of the ability of MS to offer attractive investment incentives 
and on their ability to protect their revenue base. In the context of ITA, while the existence 
of ITA is not expected to violate EC law, attempts to prevent it do. As it is discussed 
above,824 one way of overcoming the problem of ITA is to change domestic law in a way that 
would not only make sense domestically but also internationally. Prima facie , the suggested 
reform in the treatment of cross-border leasing is the step in this direction. The provision is 
meant to achieve consistency domestically but it is also important to examine its possible 
application in a cross-border setting. To the extent that it is going to create opportunities for 
inbound ITA, it is unlikely to be held in violation of EC law and it is likely to attract 
investment into the country and encourage leasing by UK lessees. There might be also some 
disadvantages to such an approach. For example, domestic lessors might find themselves in a 
disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign lessors. Nonetheless, my argument is that ITA should not be 
treated with hostility all the time. There might be situations in which it would present a good 
policy move.
EC law and the UK
I have outlined an approach to assessing ITA that has the quality of analyzing the desirability 
of an intervention in the light of both international tax policy and the specific policy of the 
area of the law in which ITA takes place. By way of illustration I would like to complete the 
analysis by looking more closely at the considerations that EC law raises for the UK’s 
approach to ITA.
In the case of the UK, an additional consideration in the analysis is compatibility of the 
desired solution with EC law. The addition of EC law considerations to the UK tax policy 
analysis both in general and in this particular situation of ITA gives rise to two issues. The 
first issue concerns the need for a UK legislative reaction to be compatible with EC law. In 
contrast to the situation under international law, the UK, by entering into the EU agreed to 
restrict its ability to adopt legislation that does not agree with EC law. While this limitation 
is not new, the special nature of ITA makes it peculiar, as it is the reaction as opposed to the 
perceived abuse that is restricted.
The second issue concerns the need for the UK in general to be attractive enough to attract 
foreign investments especially in light of the likely competition from other European
823 See pp. 81-95 above.
824 See pp. 186-188 above.
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countries, for example, Germany. This concern coupled with existing EC law restrictions on 
fiscal incentives might cause the UK to reconsider and use existing ITA to operate to its 
advantage. This is enhanced by the need to raise money to finance the public sector and to 
lower the burden on other more mobile sources of funds leading to a search for new sources. 
This trend was clearly visibly in the recent budget where a crackdown on tax avoidance was 
announced in an attempt to raise more funds to finance the public sector. The need to raise 
more revenues to finance the public sector becomes much more important in the light of the 
potential liability UK might have with respect to past violation of EC law, placing the UK in 
an interesting position from a tax policy perspective.
On one hand, the UK is dependant on foreign investments, most of which are almost equally 
divided between the US and the EU making it very important to keep the UK as an attractive 
place for investments, both direct and portfolio investments. Thus, in its publications and 
press releases in recent years, the Inland Revenue has stressed the need to create an efficient 
and competitive system that would be able to compete in the global markets and attract 
investments on one hand and would prove beneficial for its taxpayers on the other hand.
From outside the EU, the desire on part of the UK to serve as the gateway to the EU from 
countries like the US necessitates the need to retain competitiveness especially vis-a-vis 
other EU member states.825 Overall, the UK has to strike a balance between keeping its 
attractiveness as a location for investments (as well as a location of its existing MNEs) on 
one hand and its need to raise revenue on the other hand. The option of granting certain 
benefits to its residents without extending them to other non-resident EU taxpayers is no 
longer available.
ITA, to a large extent, fit the general objective of the EC Treaty as contained in the first 
articles of that treaty by encouraging cross-border activity and investment. In addition, the 
Four Freedoms of the EC Treaty coupled with the strict application by the ECJ put additional 
burden on MS that seek to prevent ITA by adopting unilateral measures for that purpose. To 
qualify, it will be necessary to establish that ITA equals tax avoidance and that the adopted 
measures satisfy the four conditions set forth by the court in Gebhard.
Moreover, even existing restrictions that restrict cross-border transactions and as a result also 
make ITA less available as a practical matter are now under the scrutiny of the ECJ. Recent
825 This need and its application in practice can be seen in the 2001 US-UK tax treaty that provided the UK with 
some important benefits vis-£-vis other EU member states and was criticized for that, questioning whether it is 
compatible with EC law. See for example, the 0% withholding tax on certain dividends, which was the first o f its 
kind in treaties with the US and represents an advantage held among EU states only by the UK.
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decisions in Lankhorst-Hohorst and Bosal Holding made it clear that the ECJ is interested in 
removing barriers and obstacles that stand in the way of achieving the goal set forth in Art. 
3(1 )(c) of the EC Treaty and will not be afraid to hold a legislation to be incompatible with 
EC law if this legislation is found to be discriminatory or restrictive in any form and it does 
not qualify under one of the limited narrow exceptions provided either by the EC Treaty or 
by case law.
Although the forthcoming test of the ECJ in Marks & Spencer will determine how far the 
court is really willing to go, existing case law already establishes an easy ground for ITA, 
where ITA is generally allowed and MS can only limit the existence of ITA with legislation 
that fits into the narrow exceptions provided by the EC Treaty and by the courts. For 
example, it is doubtful whether certain measures that are currently aimed at restricting ITA 
would stand the scrutiny of an ECJ challenge because such legislation is based on TA 1988 
s.212 whose validity under EC law principles is, at best, questionable.
The current situation in the EU, with very limited positive legislation on direct tax matters on 
one hand and a very extensive and developed case law that forces the removal of obstacles 
for a common internal market on the other hand, present a challenge to MS by inducing them 
into competition on revenues, whereby some of the methods that can be used are either 
prohibited or restricted by EC law and such limitations are carefully reviewed by the ECJ.
The only alternative, apart from a multilateral measure that is probably unlikely, is to change 
the entire legislation to make a certain type of ITA irrelevant. ITA, however, is not a 
sufficient reason for that purpose and it would usually require much more to be at stake.
A good example is the 2003 proposal to amend the UK tax treatment of leasing by adopting 
a more accounting oriented approach and granting the capital allowances in a finance lease 
to the lessee instead of the lessor. This legislation, designed to solve the export leasing 
problem by removing the restrictions on export leasing while at the same time not losing UK 
revenues for such a move, is likely to make it very difficult to create outbound double-dip 
leasing out of the UK. At the same time, it might introduce new ITA and planning 
opportunities for inbound cross-border leasing from countries that classify leases based 
on their legal form, making the UK an attractive destination.
Alternatively (or in addition) the UK might want to consider using ITA to its own advantage 
thus raising the need revenues on one hand and keeping its attractiveness on the other hand.
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Such an approach would require a change in the priorities of the UK in its analysis whether 
the specific ITA warrants intervention.
The prerequisite question in such an analysis should probably be revenue loss, mainly due to 
the increasing importance raising revenue has at present. If  the ITA in question does not 
result in revenue loss to the UK or in a revenue loss that is acceptable in the light of the 
associated benefits, then other considerations can be taken into account.
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Conclusions
In this thesis I have tried to discuss the dilemma of ITA and in doing so to establish a few 
points.
First, the dilemma of ITA does not have a clear answer. As it was already established 
before,826 ITA is not a question of all of nothing. As a result, different situations of ITA are 
likely to give rise to different answers regarding the appropriate reaction to ITA.
Second, in discussing ITA, many considerations that are usually not involved in policy 
discussion should be included. These considerations that should also be included in non-ITA 
policy discussions have significant effect on the outcome of the discussion and are able to 
offer possible explanations to policy decisions taken by countries. Such considerations 
would usually include consideration of foreign policy and political considerations.
Third, policy decisions are usually made at the country’s level. As such, they tend to 
accommodate the needs of the system applying them. In the two case studies I have 
examined in this work, more than one approach exists to determine the tax treatment of a 
HFI or a cross-border lease.
The case studies represent two distinct situations of ITA. Whereas HFIs are instruments that 
are intended to be classified based on an arbitrary premise and by applying arbitrary criteria, 
cross-border leasing and in particular the grant of depreciation deductions, have a valid 
policy goal and although they are applied using an arbitrary set of rules, their application is 
made by reference to the underlying purpose behind the legislation.
In both areas, HFIs and cross-border leasing, more than one method exists for the 
determination of the tax consequences of a given transaction. One method is to follow the 
economic substance of the transaction to determine its classification. An alternative method 
is to respect the legal form of the transaction. ITA is usually obtained when one country 
follows a certain method, the other country follows a different method, and together the 
combination of the treatment in the two jurisdictions provides a benefit to the taxpayers 
involved in the transaction.
A detailed analysis of the laws in both the US and the UK in the two case studies has 
established the following observations:
826 See p. 216 above.
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1. In each country the tax laws are applied independently of the application in the other 
jurisdiction.
2. While the general rule is that the US should follow the economic substance approach 
whereas the UK should follow the legal form approach, in practice the situation is 
not that clear and both countries deviate from the general rule. A good way to 
illustrate this is to use an observation that was made with respect to the US tax 
system in general -  '‘'‘substance controls form unless form controls substance”*11 As 
a result, ITA is usually not the outcome of a general mismatch between two systems 
but rather a difference in approach in specific situations where the two countries 
involved choose to treat the same transaction differently.
3. This difference in approach can be partially explained by the fact that the law in 
each tax system developed independently, responding to tax planning in that 
jurisdiction whereby taxpayers attempted to use discontinuities in the system to their 
advantage and tax authorities responded with legislation and case law. Foreign law 
that developed in a different way created opportunities for taxpayers to use not only 
domestic inconsistencies but also international discontinuities to their advantage. In 
the context of cross-border leasing, it appears that in an attempt to limit taxpayers’ 
ability to claim the first dip, different countries developed provisions that in effect 
allow the double-dip to take place. A recent example is the Inland Revenue proposal 
to reform the taxation of leasing in the UK by treating finance leases and some 
operating leases as transferring the ownership to the lessee who then becomes 
entitled to claim depreciation deductions. While this proposal is in line with other 
domestic legislation and is meant to achieve greater neutrality in domestic 
transaction, it has the potential effect of creating new ITA opportunities in the UK.
4. Over the years, each jurisdiction developed body of statutory provisions and case 
law dealing with cross-border transactions. This body of law has not been developed 
in relation to ITA but rather to general cross-border transactions. Nonetheless, its 
application to cross-border transactions, which also include ITA, makes it essential 
for ITA to satisfy the requirements of these cross-border provisions for the ITA to 
actually take place. In some situations, these general cross-border provisions would 
deny the existence of ITA or limit it significantly. This is especially relevant in the 
context of cross-border leasing where special provisions have been adopted by the 
US and the UK to deny or defer depreciation deductions where the lessee is not
827 McMahon (2002).
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subject to tax in that country. In the UK, these provisions make the question of 
outbound ITA a moot question.
In that sense, ITA illustrates the importance of considering the application and reaction of 
foreign tax law in the formulation of domestic tax law.
Fourth, at the policy level, the analysis should take place at two different levels, first, 
examining the rationale behind the distinction in domestic law (to the extent such rationale 
exists) and second by examining the consequences of ITA and its compatibility with the 
international tax policy of the country in question.
The two main themes that were developed in the thesis through the case studies have been 
the effect of political considerations as a consideration in determining tax policy and the 
potential impact of EC law on UK tax legislation. The former has been clearly evident when 
I have examined US tax policy. Unfortunately, its role has not always been acknowledged. 
With respect to EC law and the UK, the analysis suggests that ITA is not necessarily a 
problem.
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